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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on three prominent areas of macroeconomic policy: fiscal stimulus,
bail-outs and industrial policy, and monetary policy. In each case, I analyze the nature of
the problem without intervention first before turning to why and how policy can be used to
improve outcomes. In the first chapter, I study how relative demand shocks for different
goods and services propagate through the economy to affect aggregate employment – and I
use these insights to show how fiscal stimulus should be designed to achieve the greatest
bang for buck in terms of employment. In the second chapter, I study how firm entry and
exit in one industry can affect other industries and the economy as a whole through input-
output relationships. I characterize which firms and industries are systemically important,
show that the equilibrium is generically inefficient, and study when and how bailouts can be
used to improve welfare. In the final paper, I provide a new microfoundation for downward
wage rigidity, show that this microfoundation yields predictions that are consistent with the
data, and study how monetary policy should behave given this microfoundation.
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Introduction
In the first chapter, I address how supply chains affect the intensity with which an industry
uses labor. I derive the network-adjusted labor intensity as the answer to this question. The
network-adjusted labor intensity measures not just the direct labor intensity of a given
industry, but also takes into account the labor intensity of all its inputs, its inputs’ inputs,
and so on. I show that this measure is the relevant sufficient statistic determining labor’s
share of income, the propagation of demand shocks, the relative rankings of government
employment multipliers, and the composition of optimal fiscal policy. I use network-
adjusted labor shares to decompose labor’s share of income into disaggregated industrial
components. Using a sample of 34 countries from 1995 to 2009, I find that labor’s share of
income has declined primarily due to a universal decrease in labor-use by all industries,
rather than changes in households’ consumption demands or firms’ input demands. This is
in contrast to the popular value-added decomposition, which gives a much larger role to
industrial composition.
In the second chapter, I show how the extensive margin of firm entry and exit can
greatly amplify idiosyncratic shocks in an economy with a production network. I show
that canonical input-output models, which lack the extensive margin of firm entry and
exit, have some crucial limitations. In these models, the systemic importance of a firm
does not respond to productivity shocks, depends only on the firm’s role as a supplier, and
is equal to or well-approximated by the firm’s size. This means that for every canonical
input-output model, there exists a non-interconnected model that has the same aggregate
response to productivity shocks. I show that when we allow for entry and exit, the systemic
1
importance of a firm responds endogenously to productivity shocks, depends on a firm’s
role not just as a supplier but also as a consumer, and a firm’s systemic influence is no longer
well-approximated by its size. Furthermore, I show that non-divisibilities in systemically
important industries can cause one failure to snowball into a large-scale avalanche of
failures. In this sense, shocks can be amplified as they travel through the network, whereas
in canonical input-output models they cannot.
In the third and final chapter, I show that household expectations of the inflation
rate are more sensitive to inflation than to disinflation. To the extent that workers have
bargaining power in wage determination, this asymmetry in their beliefs makes wages
respond quickly to inflationary forces but sluggishly to deflationary ones. I microfound
asymmetric household expectations using ambiguity-aversion: households, who do not
know the quality of their information, overweight inflationary news since it reduces their
purchasing power, and underweight deflationary news since it increases their purchasing
power. I embed asymmetric beliefs into a general equilibrium model and show that, in
such a model, monetary policy has asymmetric effects on employment, output, and wage
inflation in ways consistent with the data. I show that although wages are downwardly
rigid in this environment, optimal monetary policy need not have a bias towards using
inflation to grease the wheels of the labor market.
2
Chapter 1
Labor Intensity in an Interconnected
Economy
1.1 Introduction
How labor intensive is a production process given the existence of supply chains? With
constant returns to scale, the labor intensity of producing a good, if there are no intermediate
inputs, is clear: we simply divide the wage bill by total revenue. This is the gross labor
share of a firm. However, when there are intermediate inputs, it is insufficient to simply
look at the gross labor share since some fraction of revenues is spent on intermediate inputs.
A popular measure used in the literature to account for this is labor’s share of value-added.
This is a firm’s total wage bill divided by its value-added (revenues minus intermediate
input costs).
In a neoclassical model with independent industries, the value-added labor share is a key
statistic that answers many important questions. For instance, an industry’s value-added
labor share converts demand for goods into demand for labor. As such, it determines
how demand shocks or government spending shocks to different industries can move
employment. Furthermore, a weighted-average of value-added labor shares determines
labor’s share of aggregate income. The aggregate labor share of income is a crucial object
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with implications for long-run growth, inequality, and macroeconomic dynamics.
This paper argues that in the presence of non-trivial firm-to-firm connections, the value-
added labor share is the wrong measure of how much labor an industry uses. This is
because the value-added labor share does not incorporate any information about the nature
of an industry’s supply chain. The key insight is that the labor intensity of an industry is not
solely determined by how much of its revenues, or even its value-added, it spends on labor.
To know how labor intensive an industry is, we also need to take into account the labor
intensity of its entire supply chain. I derive an industry-level measure of labor intensity, the
network-adjusted labor intensity, that takes these considerations into account. I show that the
network-adjusted labor intensity is the key statistic determining labor’s share of income, the
employment multipliers from different kinds of government spending, and the propagation
of demand shocks.
The network-adjusted labor intensity is conceptually distinct from the value-added labor
share commonly seen in the literature, for example in Estrada and Valdeolivas (2012), Elsby
et al. (2013), or Neiman and Karabarbounis (2014). Whereas the network-adjusted labor
intensity counts the contributions of labor to the production of a given good throughout
its supply chain, the value-added labor share divides the wage bill by revenues net of
intermediate inputs. This means that the value-added measures do not take into account
the labor/capital mix of the intermediate inputs of an industry.
Network-adjusted labor intensity, and the closely related network-adjusted labor share,
are key statistics for understanding how industry-level changes affect aggregate outcomes.
For example, the consumption-weighted average of network-adjusted labor shares is equal
to labor’s share of income. Writing the labor share of income as a consumption weighted
average of network-adjusted labor shares allows us to decompose fluctuations in labor’s
share of income into more disaggregated parts. In particular, we can decompose changes
in aggregate labor share into changes in consumption patterns, changes in supply chains
(including trade), and changes in gross labor shares at the industry level for low, medium,
and high-skill labor. This decomposition is related to the seminal work of Berman et al.
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(1994), but improves upon their work by explicitly accounting for intermediate inputs and
trade in intermediate inputs. The resulting decomposition is more detailed, more closely tied
to theory, and more stable than the value-added decomposition of labor share common in
the literature. Furthermore, by explicitly accounting for imports, it allows us to distinguish
between some competing theories of why the aggregate labor share is moving.
Using this decomposition and a sample of 34 countries over 15 years, I find that, on
average over the sample, the overwhelming culprit behind the decline in aggregate labor’s
share of aggregate income is the decline in the gross labor share of all industries, rather
than compositional effects across industries. That is, it is not the case that labor intensive
industries are getting smaller and capital intensive ones are getting larger – instead, all
industries are using less labor. Furthermore, the decomposition casts doubt on theories of the
decline of the aggregate labor share that rely directly on increased imports of intermediate
and final consumption goods. These findings are in contrast to the conclusion one would
reach if one relied on the popular (but misleading) value-added decomposition of the same
data. The value-added decomposition attributes most of the changes to compositional effects
between industries.
One of the advantages of using network-adjusted labor shares is that we can analyze
changes to an industry’s labor share taking into account its entire supply chain. For example,
we can analyze labor’s share of manufacturing income, taking into account manufacturing’s
reliance on non-manufacturing labor. This contrasts with the manufacturing’s value added
labor share, used for example in Oberfield and Raval (2012), which ignores the nature
of manufacturing’s supply chain. Using my approach, I show that for the United States,
changes to the composition of industries is responsible for the decline in labor’s share
of manufacturing income. This is consistent with a story where increased imports are
responsible for the drop in manufacturing’s labor share. However, as stated previously, this
is not a significant driver of the decline of the aggregate labor share.
Using network-adjusted labor shares by skill level, I also find that substitution of
income across different types of labor, emphasized by Goldin and Katz (2009), dwarfs the
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substitution of income between labor and capital. To the extent that factor income shares
are important determinants of inequality, this suggests that substitution across different
labor types has been more important than substitution from labor to capital. I show that
there is a near-universal trend of industries substituting from low and medium-skilled labor
towards high-skilled labor in almost all countries in the sample. Once again, the culprits are
the movements of the gross labor-shares of all industries, rather than changes in the supply
chains or consumption patterns of households.
Not only are network-adjusted labor intensities important for studying long-run patterns
in labor’s share of income, but they are also important for analyzing short-run fluctuations.
Network-adjusted labor intensities determine the relative ranking of employment multipliers
from demand shocks. In particular, they show how fiscal policy should be targeted to
maximize its impact on output and employment. I show that in a model with involuntary
unemployment, the network-adjusted labor intensity is a key determinant of the composition
of optimal countercyclical fiscal policy. Furthermore, the network adjustment allows us to
compute the fraction of each dollar of government spending that is eventually paid out
to different kinds of workers. I find that federal government consumption expenditures
(defense and nondefense) are overwhelmingly tilted towards spending on high-skilled
workers with at least 4 years of college education. On the other hand, state and local
government investment and private investment spend much more on low-skilled workers
without college degrees. These results speak to how government fiscal policy can be targeted
to stimulate specific parts of the labor market.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 1.2, I develop a one-factor model
where the network structure of the economy is irrelevant both in terms of labor’s share of
income, and the relative employment multipliers from government spending and demand
shocks. This shows that in a very general sense, simply having a network structure is not
enough to generate interesting answers to our questions; we need a second factor. In section
1.3, I introduce the benchmark model used throughout the rest of the paper that breaks the
irrelevance of section 1.2 by adding capital, and I define the network-adjusted labor intensity.
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In section 1.4, I decompose labor’s share of income into disaggregated components and
show how each component has varied over time for a sample of 34 countries. In section
1.5, I characterize the relative employment multipliers from government expenditures in
terms of network-adjusted labor intensities. I add a nominal rigidity and show that the
network-adjusted labor intensity pins down the industrial composition of optimal fiscal
policy when the zero lower bound constrains the central bank. I conclude in section 2.7.
1.2 An Irrelevance Result
In this section, I sketch a competitive constant returns to scale model where labor is the only
non-constant returns to scale factor. I prove an irrelevance result in this environment showing
that the network structure does not affect equilibrium employment in any meaningful way.
Specifically, I show that the network does not affect labor’s share of income nor the size
of government multipliers. This drives home the point that models without a second
factor, like Long and Plosser (1983) and Acemoglu et al. (2012), are uninformative about
the determinants of labor’s share of income or the composition of fiscal stimulus, despite
having production networks. The intuition is that without profits or capital, all income is
ultimately spent on labor. Therefore, the details of how industries are interconnected do not
matter in terms of how shocks affect aggregate employment.
I use a dynamic framework so that the results can be directly compared to the later
sections. Let the representative household maximize
max
cit,l
∞
∑
t=0
ρtU(c1t, . . . , cnt, lt) (1.1)
such that
N
∑
i=1
pitcit = wtlt +Πt + (1+ it−1)Bt−1 − Bt − τt,
where ρt is the discount factor in period t, pit is the price of good i and cit is the quantity of
good i consumed in period t, the wage is wt, labor is lt, lump sum taxes are τt , nominal
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government bonds are Bt with interest rate it, and Πt denotes firm profits.
Assume that the representative firm in industry i maximizes profits
max pityit −∑
j
pjtxijt − wtlit
such that
yit = Fi(lit, xi1t, . . . , xint),
where Fi is a constant returns to scale function and xijt are units of good j used by firm i in
period t. The set of functions {Fi} defines the network structure of this economy.
Let git be government consumption of good i, and assume that the government runs a
balanced budget
∑
i
pitgit = τt,
and sets the net supply of nominal bonds to be zero. Suppose that the distribution of
government spending is given by the vector δ:
δit =
pitgit
∑j pjtgjt
.
Note that in this basic setup, government consumption is socially wasteful, and is not
consumed by the household.
Definition 1.2.1. A competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices {pit}Ni=1, sequence of
wages wt and interest rates it, and quantities {xijt, cit}ijt, and labor supplies lt and labor
demands {lit}i such that for any given government policy {git}Ni=1, and τt,
(i) Each firm maximizes its profits given prices,
(ii) the representative household chooses consumption and labor supply to maximize
utility,
(iii) the government runs a balanced budget,
(iv) and markets for each good, labor, and bonds clear.
I focus on the steady-state equilibrium of this model, so time-subscripts are suppressed.
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Definition 1.2.2. Labor’s share of income is the wage bill wl divided by total expenditures
on final goods ∑i pici +∑i pigi.
Trivially, labor’s share of income, in this model, is always equal to one, regardless of the
network structure. This follows from the fact that firms have constant returns to scale and
make zero profits. More interestingly, we have the following result.
Theorem 1.2.1. In the absence of profits or capital, the distribution of government expenditures has
no effect on equilibrium employment. That is, equilibrium employment is not a function of δ.
The intuition is that constant-returns-to-scale at the firm level mean that relative prices
do not respond to δ. This allows us to use the Hicks-Leontief composite commodity theorem,
see for example Woods (1979), to represent this economy as having only one aggregate
consumption good. Therefore, the only way δ can change employment is through labor
supply, or in other words, through the marginal utility of wealth. However, the marginal
utility of wealth only depends on the amount the government taxes the household, not on
how those taxes are spent because the household does not derive utility from government
consumption. Therefore, it is only the total size of the government’s budget, not its
distribution, that matters.
Another way to see this is to note that constant returns to scale firms make zero profits
in a competitive equilibrium. Therefore, all revenues are spent either on intermediate inputs
or on labor. The portion of revenues spent on intermediaries is in turn either spent on other
intermediate inputs or on labor. Ultimately, all firm revenues must be spent on labor, which
means that changing the composition of government expenditures has no effect for a fixed
amount of total spending. Of course, as stated above, this requires that the composition of
government spending not affect labor supply directly.
Proof. See Appendix I. 
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1.3 Benchmark Model
To break the equivalence between GDP and compensation by labor, we need a second source
of earnings. This could be profits or returns from land and capital. A second source of
earnings is also necessary for the composition of government spending to affect equilibrium
employment. Once a second “sink” for revenues is introduced in the model, the composition
of government spending matters for labor demand, and labor’s share of income is no longer
equal to one. Then, in order to maximize employment, the government should concentrate
its spending in a way that minimizes the amount of money being spent on the other factors
as it travels through the supply chain. This is equivalent to the government varying the
composition of its expenditures to boost labor’s share of income.
In this section, the second “sink” is inelastically supplied capital rented out by house-
holds to firms in a spot market. In appendix IV, I detail how profits, rather than inelastically
supplied capital, can also play the role of a second sink. Ultimately, it does not matter for
the results whether the second sink is returns to capital or profits. Either way, it is a notion
of the network-adjusted labor intensity that acts as the relevant sufficient statistic.
The model in this section is neoclassical. Therefore, although fiscal policy can affect
equilibrium employment, interventions are socially harmful. Nevertheless, in section 1.5, I
show that the intuition from the neoclassical model carries over to models with involuntary
unemployment and nominal rigidities.
1.3.1 Household’s problem
The household chooses
max
cit,lt,Bt
∞
∑
t=0
ρt
(
log(Ct)− l
θ
t
θ
)
,
where
Ct = u(c1t, . . . , cnt),
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with u having symmetric and constant elasticity of substitution across different consumption
goods. The household’s budget constraint is
∑(1+ τit)pitcit + qtBt = wtlt + rtK + Bt−1 +Πt − τt,
where pit is the price of good i in period t, Bt is a nominal bond (in zero net supply), Πt is
firm profits, τt is lump sum taxes in period t. The new ingredients in this section are rt, the
rental rate of capital, and τit, an ad valorem consumption tax on good i. So that the problem
is well-defined, suppose that there is a physical limit on the number of hours that can be
worked
lt ≤ l,
although we assume that this is always non-binding. This simply allows for the inclusion of
inelastic labor supply as a special case. To keep the exposition clear, for now, I assume a
homogenous labor market. In section 1.3.9 I consider the extension with heterogenous labor
markets. Assume that capital is inelastically supplied at K.
1.3.2 Firms’ problem
Firms rent capital and labor on spot markets from the household, and reoptimize every
period. Therefore, their problems are static, so I suppress time-subscripts. Since in a
competitive equilibrium with constant returns to scale, firm size is indeterminate, I simply
state the problem of the representative firm in industry i:
max
yi ,li ,xij
piyi −∑
j
pjxij − wli − rki
subject to the constant-returns to scale production function
yi = Fi(li, ki, Gi(xi1, . . . , xin)),
where li is labor, ki is capital, and xij are inputs from industry j. Let Fi and Gi have constant
and symmetric elasticities of substitution between their arguments σF and σG respectively.
For simplicity, I assume that σF = σG, thought this can be relaxed. Once again, the network
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structure of the economy is captured by the production functions. In particular, note that
if all industries used no labor, the model in this section is a special case of the model in
section 1.2.
1.3.3 Government behavior
The government runs balanced budgets every period
∑ pigi = τt +∑
i
τit pitcit, (1.2)
and the fraction of government expenditures on industry i is
δi
∑j δj
=
pigi
∑i pigi
.
Before solving for the equilibrium, we need a a few key definitions that will serve us
throughout the rest of the paper.
1.3.4 Network-adjusted labor intensity
Now we can define the network-adjusted labor intensity. It turns out that network-adjusted
labor intensities play a key role in the determination of equilibrium employment. Recall
that the representative firm in industry i has the following production function
yi = Fi(li, ki, Gi(xi1, . . . , xin)),
where Fi and Gi have symmetric elasticities of substitution between their arguments σF and
σG respectively. Now define the following generalized elasticities of production with respect
to inputs by
ωˆij :=
dyi
dxij
(
xij
yi
)1/σG
,
and
αi :=
dyi
dli
(
li
yi
)1/σF
.
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Let
Ωˆ :=
[
ωˆij
]
ij ,
be the matrix of ωij’s and α be the column vector of αi’s. Define
Ψ := I + Ωˆ+ Ωˆ2 + Ωˆ3 + · · · = (I − Ωˆ)−1,
to be the influence matrix. If we think of Ωˆ as defining a weighted directed graph, then the
influence matrix is its inverse Laplacian. The ijth element of Ψ can be interpreted as the
total intensity with which i uses inputs from j, taking into account both direct and indirect
connections. Finally, the vector
α˜ = Ψα
is network-adjusted labor intensity. Intuitively, α˜i captures both the direct and indirect
uses of labor by industry i. Computationally, α˜i is a weighted sum of the labor intensities of
i, and i’s suppliers, and i’s suppliers’ suppliers, and so on.1
A closely related object of interest is the network-adjusted labor share. To define this, let
pi denote the price of good i and w the wage. Then, let
wˆij :=
pjxij
piyi
,
be industry i’s expenditure share on input j, and
ai :=
wli
piyi
,
be its expenditure share on labor (gross labor share). Let
Wˆ :=
[
wˆij
]
ij ,
be the matrix of wij’s and a be the column vector of ai’s. Define
a˜ = (I − Wˆ)−1a
1We can also think of α˜ and 1− α˜ as the dominant eigenvectors of the matrix defined by
(
Ωˆ
0
[α η]
I2
)
, where I2 is the 2× 2 identity matrix.
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to be the network-adjusted labor share. Intuitively, a˜i captures the total fraction of industry
i’s income that is eventually paid out to labor, whether directly by that industry itself, or
through its supply chain. This fact is also noted by Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) who
use it to measure factor income shares for the four major sectors of the US economy. The
network-adjusted labor share also has an interpretation from the input-output literature
pioneered by Leontief (1936). If we fix prices, and assume that production functions have a
Leontief form, then the network-adjusted labor share is the total amount of labor required
in order to produce a unit of a good.2
An important observation is that when Fi and Gi have Cobb-Douglas forms, the network-
adjusted labor share and the network-adjusted labor intensity coincide. This makes Cobb-
Douglas a very convenient modelling assumption, since it allows us to identify network-
adjusted labor intensities from only expenditures data, and it makes the structural objects
of interest α˜ coincide with accounting objects of interest a˜. In Appendix III, I show how the
network-adjusted labor intensities affect labor’s share of income in a CES economy.
Intuitively, the network-adjusted labor intensity is always weakly greater than the gross
labor intensity for every industry. This follows from the fact that taking into account the
supply chain of a given industry can only increase the intensity with which labor is used.
Proposition 1.3.1. For every industry i, we have
α˜i ≥ αi.
Proof. This follows from the non-negativity of Ω and α. 
Just as with the value-added labor and capital shares, the network-adjusted labor and
network-adjusted capital shares always sum to one.
Lemma 1.3.2. Let a be the gross labor shares and c be the gross capital shares of industries. Then,
2As we shall see, when prices are being set flexibly, it is the network-adjusted labor intensity and not the
network-adjusted labor share that determines equilibrium responses to shocks. So, with flexible prices and
Leontief production functions, the usual input-output estimates of the impact of a demand shock are invalid.
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the sum of the network-adjusted labor and capital share equals 1 for every industry.
(I −W)−1a + (I −W)−1c = 1.
Proof. See Appendix I. 
This means that the network-adjusted labor share of industry i is labor’s share of income
from industry i. We can aggregate this observation up to get labor’s share of total income.
Proposition 1.3.3. Labor’s share of aggregate income is equal to the final-consumption weighted
average of network-adjusted labor shares. Specifically,
wl
GDP
=
(H + G)′ a˜
GDP
,
where H is the vector of household spending net of consumption taxes, and G is the vector of
government spending by industry.
Proof. See Appendix I. 
It is crucial to note that proposition 1.3.3 is an accounting identity, and it will hold for
all production and utility functions. Proposition 1.3.3 will serve as the foundation for a
decomposition of labor’s share of income into disaggregated components in section 1.4.
1.3.5 Response to Demand Shocks
In this subsection, I show that network-adjusted labor intensities allow us to trace out the
aggregate effect of shocks to an industry’s demand. For clarity, I assume that production and
utility functions have Cobb-Douglas forms and leave the more general case to Appendix III.
Competitive equilibrium is defined in the usual way. I focus on the steady-state equilibrium
of this model and therefore, suppress time subscripts.
Definition 1.3.1. The employment multiplier of a taste shock to industry i is defined
as dl/dβi, where l is equilibrium employment and βi is the Cobb-Douglas taste of the
household for goods from industry i.
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The following proposition shows how the network-adjusted labor intensities allow us to
translate a change in final demand for goods into changes in equilibrium employment:
Proposition 1.3.4. Employment multipliers of taste shocks satisfy
dl/dβi
dl/dβ j
=
α˜i − β′α˜
α˜j − β′α˜ .
Proof. See Appendix I. 
This shows that multipliers for industry i’s demand are proportional to industry i’s
network-adjusted labor intensity minus the average labor intensity of consumption. This
is quite intuitive since increasing the household’s taste for good i will reorient household
expenditures from all other industries towards industry i. To the extent that household pref-
erences change at business cycle frequencies, this proposition shows the relative importance
of preference shocks for aggregate employment. In section 1.5, I show that fiscal stimulus
affects equilibrium employment in much the same way, and I derive the optimal industrial
composition of fiscal policy when monetary policy is passive.
This result can be extended, without change, to the case where consumption and
production functions have constant and symmetric elasticity of substitution, with β being
the CES share parameters of consumption.
1.3.6 Comparison to labor share’s share of value-added
The network-adjusted labor share is different from the value-added labor share commonly
seen in the literature, for example in Estrada and Valdeolivas (2012), Elsby et al. (2013),
Neiman and Karabarbounis (2014), or Oberfield and Raval (2012). Whereas the network-
adjusted labor share counts the contributions of labor to the production of a given good
up the supply chain, the value-added labor share divides the wage bill by revenues net of
intermediate inputs.
To see the difference, consider figure 1.1. There, we see how the same production process
being broken from a single aggregate firm into two firms affects the network-adjusted and
value-added labor shares. In the first panel, an aggregate firm provides a good to the
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(b) Fragmented production process.
Figure 1.1: Fragmentation of the same production process. Each node represents a firm and the numbers
under each node denote the gross labor and capital share of that firm. Edges denote the flow of goods and
services. The labels on the edges denote the transaction’s share of the downstream firm’s total expenditures.
household. In the second panel, the first firm supplies the capital part and the second firm
the labor part of production. Intuitively, the activities of firm 1 in panel (b) are just as labor
intensive as firm 1 in panel (a). However, the value-added labor share and the gross labor
share of firm 1 in panel (b) are both equal to zero. On the other hand, the network-adjusted
labor intensity of firm 1 is the same in both cases. So the network-adjusted factor shares and
factor intensities are robust to changes in accounting rules or ownership structure, while the
value-added measures are not.
Theoretically, there is no reason to expect a tight connection between the value-added
labor share and the network-adjusted labor share. To see this, consider an industry whose
inputs are made purely from labor but does not use labor directly. This industry’s value-
added labor share will be zero, but its network-adjusted labor share can be arbitrarily
close to one. Reversing the roles of labor and capital produces the opposite result, with
value-added labor share equal to one, and a network-adjusted labor share that can be
arbitrarily close to zero. In section 1.3.7, I compare observed network-adjusted, gross, and
value-added measures of labor intensity for the US economy.
In practice, the difference between these two measures becomes most apparent when
considering primary industries with low-margins. The value-added approach will assign
high labor shares of around 90% to primary industries like “Soybean and other oilseed
processing,” “Fiber, yarn, and thread mills,” and “poultry processing” since their capital
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share (revenues minus labor and intermediate inputs) is close to zero. However, the network-
adjusted labor share of these industries is quite low since their supply chains are not very
labor-intensive.
The value-added labor share and the network-adjusted labor share will coincide when
the supply chain of an industry uses the same capital/labor mix as the industry itself.
The leading case of this is when an industry buys its intermediate inputs exclusively from
itself (i.e. a degenerate input-output matrix with only diagonal elements). This intuition
makes clear why the level of aggregation will be crucially important for whether or not
the value-added labor share is a useful statistic. Once we aggregate the economy into
a single sector, the input-output matrix is always diagonal (since it is a scalar), and so,
the network-adjusted labor share and the value-added labor share coincide. However, at
this level of aggregation, the value-added labor share is no longer informative about the
industrial composition of the economy.
1.3.7 Calibration of α˜ for the US
Now that we have defined and interpreted network-adjusted labor intensity α˜, we turn to
calibrating it for the United States. If we assume Cobb-Douglas functional forms, then we
can measure α˜ using national accounts data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. There
are two reasons to assume Cobb-Douglas. First, as discussed earlier, network adjustments
are only interesting in cases when the underlying data is disaggregated. Assuming Cobb-
Douglas allows us to use much more disaggregation since we only need expenditures data
to calibrate the model, whereas a non-unitary elasticity requires both price and quantity data.
Second, for Cobb-Douglas, all network-adjusted labor intensities can also be interpreted as
network-adjusted labor shares, which are accounting objects of independent interest. Once
we deviate from Cobb-Douglas, the relevance of the computations will depend on how well
we choose the elasticity of substitution, which is a controversial question outside of the
scope of this paper.
I use the detailed 2007 benchmark use-tables at purchaser values. This measures the
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Figure 1.2: Labor intensities plotted against network-adjusted labor intensities using the detailed BEA input-
output table. There are 381 industries in this plot. The black asterisks are manufacturing industries, while
red circles represent non-manufacturing industries. Non-monotonicities represent cases where industries are
ranked differently according to the different measures of labor use.
dollar expenditures of a given industry on inputs. Since the Cobb-Douglas parameters are
equal to the shares of expenditures, it is easy to calibrate the production functions of the
various industries, as well as the utility function of the household using this data. I let the
capital intensity of a given industry equal one minus the labor share and the intermediate
input share. The calculations in this section abstract from world trade in production and
assume all imports are final goods. The reason for this is that data on the breakdown of
imports between intermediate and final use are not available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis’ statistical data sources. In section 1.4, I explain how we can account for trade in
this model by using other data sources. The results are plotted in figure 1.2. As implied by
proposition 1.3.1, all points in figure 1.2 lie above the 45-degree line.
Industries with the largest and smallest |α˜i− αi| are listed in table 1.1. Generally speaking,
manufacturing industries are much more labor intensive than their gross labor shares would
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Table 1.1: Industries with the largest and smallest differences between their network-adjusted labor intensity
and their labor share.
Industry α˜− α α˜ α
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 0.476 0.613 0.137
Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing 0.459 0.498 0.039
Heavy duty truck manufacturing 0.457 0.576 0.119
Railroad rolling stock manufacturing 0.434 0.566 0.132
Motor vehicle seating and interior trim manufacturing 0.431 0.593 0.162
Automobile manufacturing 0.43 0.582 0.152
Other financial investment activities 0.423 0.721 0.298
Sawmills and wood preservation 0.422 0.609 0.187
News syndicates, libraries, archives and all other information services 0.104 0.396 0.292
Support activities for agriculture and forestry 0.105 0.682 0.577
Postal service 0.108 0.866 0.759
Civic, social, professional, and similar organizations 0.11 0.85 0.739
Office administrative services 0.111 0.889 0.778
Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, and payroll services 0.111 0.635 0.524
Animal production, except cattle and poultry and eggs 0.113 0.189 0.076
Oil and gas extraction 0.114 0.199 0.085
indicate, whereas service industries like “the postal service” or “office administrative
services” are about as labor intensive as their gross labor share suggests. This is intuitive,
since service industries have shorter, less labor-intensive, supply chains. The key exception
to this general rule are some financial industries like “Funds, trusts, and other financial
vehicles,” which also have much higher labor intensities than one might infer from their
gross labor share. The calculations here indicate that once supply chains are properly taken
into account, the manufacturing sector is very labor intensive.
The alternative popular measure of labor intensity at the industry level is the value-
added labor share. As discussed earlier, there is no reason to theoretically expect the
network-adjusted labor share to be related to the value-added labor share. In the data, the
correlation between the value-added and network-adjusted labor shares is 0.90, which is
only slightly higher than the correlation between the gross and network-adjusted labor share
at 0.87. The value-added and network-adjusted labor intensities are plotted in figure 1.3.
Unlike figure 1.2, there are data points above and below the 45-degree line. Furthermore,
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Figure 1.3: Value-added labor shares plotted against network-adjusted labor intensities using the detailed BEA
input-output table. There are 381 industries in this plot. The black asterisks are manufacturing industries,
while red circles represent non-manufacturing industries. Non-monotonicities represent cases where industries
are ranked differently according to the different measures of labor use.
unlike figure 1.2, where a gross labor share close to 1 implied that the network-adjusted
labor intensity must also be close to 1, no such pattern need hold now.
The fact that the slope of the line of best fit in figure 1.3 is less than 1 implies that an
industry’s capital-labor mix is negative correlated with its supply chain’s capital-labor mix.
This is because network-adjusted labor shares are higher (lower) when value-added labor
shares are low (high), meaning that accounting for the supply chain properly increases
(decreases) the labor share.
Another advantage of network-adjusted labor shares over value-added labor shares is
that they are more stable in time series. Value-added labor shares can move around violently
at a high frequency if an industry’s profits fluctuate. Network-adjusted labor shares, since
they are weighted averages of many industries’ labor and capital shares, are more stable over
time. The increased time series stability suggests that secular changes in network-adjusted
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labor shares are more likely to reveal meaningful patterns. Furthermore, since they are
averages over many industries, they are less badly affected by measurement error.
1.3.8 Upstream and Downstream Influence
Proposition 1.3.4 shows that α˜ is the relevant influence measure of how industry-specific
demand shocks move aggregate employment. Acemoglu et al. (2012) derive an alternative
influence measure that they show maps supply (labor-augmenting productivity) shocks to
aggregate output. To clarify α˜’s network-theoretic properties, it helps to compare it with
the alternative influence measure of Acemoglu et al. (2012). In this model, the Acemoglu
et al. (2012) measure corresponds to β˜ ≡ β′Ψ. This can be thought of as a network-adjusted
consumption share. It takes into account both direct sales to households, as well as sales to
industries who to sell to households, and sales to industries who sell to industries who sell
to households, and so on. Acemoglu et al. (2012) show that β˜ is the key statistic determining
how output responds to supply (labor-augmenting productivity) shocks. Since they are
interested in the propagation of productivity shocks, Acemoglu et al. (2012) abstract away
from capital and assume that labor is inelastically supplied. Since we are interested in the
effect of demand shocks on employment, we need both of these ingredients, because as we
saw in section 1.2, without them the model would give trivial answers to our questions.
To see the difference between the α˜ and β˜, consider the example in figure 2.3.
1 2 3 4
HH
Figure 1.4: The arrows represent the flow of goods and services.
In figure 2.3, the network-adjusted labor intensity of firm (1) is
α˜1 = α1 +ω12α2 +ω12ω23α3 + . . . ,
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while the network-adjusted labor intensity of the final firm (4) is simply equal to the regular
labor intensity
α˜4 = α4.
On the other hand, in figure 2.3, the network-adjusted consumption share of firm (1) is the
same as its regular consumption share
β˜1 = β1,
while the network-adjusted consumption share of firm (4) is
β˜4 = β4 + β3ω34 + β2ω23ω34 + . . . .
This simple example makes the difference clear: the network-adjusted labor share α˜
is a downstream centrality measure, while the network-adjusted consumption share of
Acemoglu et al. (2012) is an upstream centrality measure. This is because demand shocks
travel upstream from consumers of inputs to producers of inputs, while supply shocks
travel downstream from suppliers of inputs to consumers of inputs.3
The difference between the two measures can be seen most clearly by setting (βi, αi) =
(α, β) for all i and considering two different star economies in figure 1.5.
1 2
3
4
5
(a) Firm 1 is a star consumer
1 2
3
4
5
(b) Firm 1 is a star supplier
Figure 1.5: The arrows indicate the flow of goods and services.
3See Baqaee (2014b) for more details about the class of models where demand and supply shocks travel
only in one direction.
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Firm (1) in figure 1.5a will have the highest network-adjusted labor share and the lowest
network-adjusted consumption share. The situation is exactly reversed in figure 1.5b. In the
former case, firm (1) is an important conduit for the transmission of demand shocks and a
poor conduit for the transmission of supply shocks, whereas in the latter, the opposite is
true.
1.3.9 Heterogenous Labor Markets
We can easily extend the model to cover heterogenous labor markets. This allows us to
analyze and craft policies to target specific parts of the labor market. To keep the notation
clean, I suppress time subscripts. Suppose there are M different types of labor indexed by
m and the production function of industry i is given by
yi =
(
M
∏
m
lιimim
)αi
kηii
N
∏
j=1
x
ωij
ij .
Now, labor market clearing for type m labor is given by
wmlm =
M
∑
i=1
piyiαiιim,
= (H + G)′Ψ(α ◦ ιm),
where ◦ denotes the element-wise product and ιm is the column vector of ιim’s for different
industries i. Now define the network-adjusted type-m labor intensity by
α˜m = Ψ(α ◦ ιm).
The network-adjusted type-m labor intensity, for a Cobb-Douglas economy, is also that labor
type’s share of an industry’s income. In the next section, this will allow us to break up labor
income into labor income by skill level. Furthermore, we can now speak of demand-side
interventions to specific labor markets. So for instance, if policy-makers wish to use fiscal
policy to boost low-skill employment because the low-skill labor market is failing to clear,
then they can tailor policy towards increasing demand for goods with high network-adjusted
low-skill labor intensity.
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Unfortunately, neither the BLS nor the BEA publish statistics about the intensity with
which different types of labor are used by different industries. Therefore, I use the American
Community Survey from 2007 to construct ιm for each industry group in the detailed
benchmark US input-output table of 2007. I divide labor into 11 types by educational
attainment. In table 1.2, I report network-adjusted and gross labor shares for each type
of labor for the industries that move the most when we take the input-output structure
into account. For lower skill levels, manufacturing sectors gain the most from the network
adjustment, while for higher skill levels, financial industries move the most.
In the next section, I build on these results to show how and why labor’s share of income
has changed over the past 15 years.
Table 1.2: Industries with the largest difference between their network-adjusted labor share and gross labor
share for each labor type. This table combines data from the 2007 American Community Survey from IPUMS-
USA with the detailed Benchmark Input-Output table using purchaser prices for 2007 published by the
BEA.
Education level Industry Network-adjusted labor share Gross labor share
N/A or no schooling Coffee and tea manufacturing 0.0048 0.0005
Nursery school to grade 4 Coffee and tea manufacturing 0.007 0.000
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 Coffee and tea manufacturing 0.023 0.001
Grade 9 Sawmills and wood preservation 0.014 0.004
Grade 10 Sawmills and wood preservation 0.015 0.004
Grade 11 Sawmills and wood preservation 0.015 0.005
Grade 12 Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing 0.169 0.019
1 year of college Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing 0.067 0.006
2 years of college Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing 0.039 0.003
4 years of college Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 0.219 0.057
5+ years of college Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 0.156 0.030
Table 1.3: Industries with the largest network-adjusted labor share for each labor type. This table combines data
from the 2007 American Community Survey from IPUMS-USA with the detailed Benchmark Input-Output
table using purchaser prices for 2007 published by the BEA.
Education level Industry Network-adjusted labor share
N/A or no schooling Support activities for agriculture and forestry 0.011953
Nursery school to grade 4, Greenhouse, nursery, and floriculture production 0.018467
Grade 5, 6, 7, 8 Support activities for agriculture and forestry 0.057632
Grade 9 Civic, social, professional, and similar organizations 0.024194
Grade 10 Civic, social, professional, and similar organizations 0.026585
Grade 11 Electronic and precision equipment repair and maintenance 0.029375
Grade 12 Private households 0.407733
1 year of college Private households 0.173831
2 years of college Residential mental retardation, mental health, substance abuse and other facilities 0.115352
4 years of college Management of companies and enterprises 0.360452
5+ years of college Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, and payroll services 0.385613
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1.4 Labor’s share of income
As lemma 1.3.2 and proposition 1.3.3 show, network-adjusted labor shares are labor’s
share of an industry’s income. Therefore, they can help us to decompose aggregate labor
shares into disaggregated industrial components. Research on the evolution of labor’s
share of income has recently exploded. Piketty (2014) places labor’s share of income at the
heart of his theory of inequality. A variety of papers have been written on the causes and
consequences of the decline in labor’s share of income (see Neiman and Karabarbounis,
2014; Oberfield and Raval, 2012; Elsby et al., 2013). Popular theories for why labor’s share of
income has trended down include: increased globalization, increases in the capital stock,
decreases in the price of investment goods, and increased automation in production.
This paper’s contribution to this debate is to provide a coherent accounting framework
for decomposing labor’s share of income into disaggregated components. Using this
framework, I find that the decline in labor’s share of income is due primarily to a decrease in
the gross labor share of all industries, and not changes to the composition of industries. In
particular, I do not find strong evidence for the idea that labor’s share of aggregate income
has decreased due to substitution of imported inputs or imported consumption goods for
domestic labor. I also find similar results for the income share of different labor types by
education. Furthermore, consistent with the skill-biased technical change hypothesis of
Goldin and Katz (2009), I find that changes in income share within labor types dwarfs
changes between labor and capital’s share of income, and that the source of these changes is
within industries.
As already discussed, the network-adjusted labor share of an industry is precisely
labor’s share of that industry’s income, and the GDP-weighted average of network-adjusted
labor shares is equal to labor’s share of aggregate income. This accounting identity must
hold regardless of the underlying production and utility functions. This allows for a
decomposition of labor’s share of income into disaggregate industrial components.
For this section, I add international trade in intermediate and final goods to the model
in section 1.3. This not only brings the model closer to the data I use, but it also allows
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us to account for the effects of globalization on labor’s share of aggregate income. The
key assumption of the model is that labor and capital are immobile, but other goods and
services are traded with the rest of the world in consumption and production. The results
in this section complement the work of Trefler and Zhu (2010) who account for intermediate
inputs in computing the factor content of trade. They show that adjusting for the role of
intermediate inputs significantly improves the Heckscher-Ohlin model’s fit to the data.
The key result for this section, proposition 1.4.1, does not depend on structural assump-
tions, and relies only on accounting identities. Let W∗ be the matrix whose ijth element is
industry i’s share of expenditures on the domestic industry j, and let b be the column vector
whose ith element is the share of final-use expenditures on domestic industry i. Finally,
let a be the column vector whose ith element is the gross labor share of industry i. Then,
analogous to the closed-economy proposition 1.3.3, the following proposition holds with
international trade.
Proposition 1.4.1. Labor’s share of income is
wl
GDP
= b′(I −W∗)−1a = b′Pa = b′ a˜, (1.3)
where P = (I −W∗)−1, and a˜ is the vector of network-adjusted domestic labor shares.
Proof. Let si denote the sales of industry i. Then, labor market clearing implies that
wl = s′a.
Furthermore, market clearing for good i gives
s′ = (b)′GDP+ s′W∗,
where W∗ is the domestic input-output expenditure share matrix. Then,
s′ = (b)′(I −W∗)−1GDP,
and so
wl = (b)′(I −W∗)−1aGDP.
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Note that this proposition holds for any structural model of the economy because it
only makes use of accounting identities. A convenient way to give proposition 1.4.1 a
structural interpretation is presented in Appendix II. There, I show that in an Armington
model of trade, with unitary elasticity of substitution in consumption and production, the
network-adjusted domestic labor share coincides with the network-adjusted domestic labor
intensity. Adding trade to the model in this way does not change the model’s qualitative
properties. Analogues of all of the propositions in section 1.3 exist in the model with
international trade. The presence of traded goods simply means that we must adjust the
influence matrix for the fact that some fraction of expenditures on each good purchased
was imported.
Using proposition 1.4.1, decompose labor’s share of income into changes in its constituent
parts
∆
wtlt
GDPt
= (∆b)′tPtat + b′t−1(∆Pt)αt + b
′
t−1Pt−1(∆at), (1.4)
where ∆ is the time difference operator. Observe that if we assume Cobb-Douglas functional
forms, b, P, and a will correspond Cobb-Douglas parameters. Summing equation (1.4) over
N time periods gives
wit+N l
i
t+N
GDPt+N
− wtlt
GDPt
=
t+N
∑
t
∆b′tPtat︸          ︷︷          ︸
consumption
+
t+N
∑
t
b′t−1∆Ptat︸             ︷︷             ︸
supply chain
+
t+N
∑
t
b′t−1Pt−1∆at︸                ︷︷                ︸
gross labor share
. (1.5)
Equation (1.5) decomposes changes to labor’s share of income over time period t through
t+ N into changes due to three different components: (1) changes to the composition of final
goods consumption, (2) changes to the supply chain, including increased use of imported
inputs, and (3) changes to the fraction of expenditures on labor by each industry.
We can see that the first summand is the effect of changes in consumption because ∆bt is
the change in what final goods are demanded in the economy. To turn the effect of a change
in final good demand into a change in aggregate labor share, we must multiply ∆bt by the
network-adjusted labor shares Ptat to capture the flow-on effects of changes in final good
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demand on intermediate industries.
We can see that the second summand is the effect of changes in supply chains because
∆Pt captures the changes in the input-output matrix. To turn the effect of a change in the
domestic input-output matrix into a change in aggregate labor share, we must multiply it
by final goods demand bt−1 and gross labor shares at.
Finally, we can see that the third summand is the effect of changes in gross labor shares
because ∆at captures changes in industry-level gross labor shares. To turn the effect of a
change in gross labor shares into a change in aggregate labor share, we must multiply ∆at
by the total size of the industries b′t−1Pt−1.
Of course, in practice, all of these terms will be moving together at the same time.
However, changes are still interpretable. As an example, consider the case where industry i
reduces its expenditures on labor, so ait falls. This means that either that industry’s gross
capital share must be increasing or its intermediate input share must be increasing. If only
the gross capital share increases, then we would observe a drop in the third component
of the summand and no change in the second and first component, since ∆b = ∆Pt = 0.
However, if the intermediate input share rises instead, then it depends on what intermediate
input is being purchased. If that intermediate input uses a lot of labor, then we observe a
drop in the third component and an increase in the second component. If that intermediate
input uses a lot of capital or was imported, then we observe a drop in the third component
and no change in the first and second components.
To summarize, the first component of (1.5) captures changes in how final goods con-
sumption has changed across industries. This would capture changes in labor’s share of
income due to changes in household consumption patterns (either across different industries
or between domestic/foreign production). The second component of (1.5) captures how
changing supply chains are affecting labor’s share of income. This would include either
changes in the interconnections between industries, or increased use of imported interme-
diate inputs. The first two components capture changes in labor’s share of income due to
the changing composition of industries. This means that globalization-driven changes to
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the labor share, most recently emphasized by Elsby et al. (2013), should show up in the first
two components. This is because if labor’s share of income is falling due to households and
firms buying more labor-intensive goods from overseas, this should show up in the first or
second component of (1.5).
A further breakdown is possible if we assume that labor inputs consist of high skill,
medium skill, and low skill labor. Then we can further decompose the changes in the high,
medium, and low skill labor share as
∆
witl
i
t
GDPt
= (∆b′t)Pt(a ◦ ιit)︸              ︷︷              ︸
consumption
+ b′t−1(∆Pt)(at ◦ ιit)︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
supply chain
+ b′t−1Pt−1∆(at ◦ ιit)︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
gross labor share
+ b′t−1Pt−1(at−1 ◦ ∆ιit)︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
intralabor
,
(1.6)
where ιit is the vector of the shares of type i labor as a fraction of total labor used by the
different industries in period t, and ◦ is the element-wise product. This formula allows us to
decompose changes in labor type i’s share of income into four components. The first three
are the same as before, but now we have a fourth term capturing substitution within labor.
The primary reason to suspect that the fourth term has changed is skill-biased technical
change, emphasized by Goldin and Katz (2009).
For this section, I use data from the World Input-Ouput Database (WIOD). Using the
WIOD, we can compute labor’s share of income, and the decomposition of labor’s share
of income, implied by input-output tables of 34 different countries from 1995 to 2009. One
of the great advantages of the WIOD over national input-output tables is that the WIOD
includes data on trade in intermediate inputs. Whereas, many national data sources, like the
BEA, do not provide this information. The downside to using the WIOD is that rather than
having 381 industries, there are only 35 industries. For more information on the sources
and construction of the WIOD see Timmer et al. (2012).
In figure 1.6, I plot the cross-country average (weighted by GDP) of equation (1.5) for
the entire sample. This can be interpreted as a decomposition of labor’s share of average
income. We can see that the labor share at the industry level explains the majority of
changes in labor’s share of income. Changing consumption patterns also contribute, but
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their contribution is more than 3 times smaller. Changing supply chains, on average, are not
causing any trends in labor’s share of income.
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Figure 1.6: Cross-country average of cumulative changes in labor’s share of income according to decomposition
in equation (1.5). The data are from the World Input-Output Database. The data is in percentages.
The fact that the “consumption” and “supply chain” lines do not move very much in
figure 1.6 is evidence against the idea that changes in the nature of supply chains or changes
in imports of foreign goods for domestic goods have caused aggregate labor’s share of
income to drop in the sample (on average). However, by averaging over many countries,
we are losing interesting variation within countries. If it turns out that in some countries
globalization is increasing labor’s share of income and in others it is decreasing labor’s
share, then we lose this by averaging. To get a sense of magnitudes, in figure 1.7 I show the
total change, in absolute values, of each component of equation (1.5) over the sample for
each country. The figure shows that by and large the largest movements in the labor’s share
of income are in the gross labor shares of all industries.
In figure 1.8, I break down the cross-country average into its effect for different labor
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Figure 1.7: The absolute value of the total change in each component of equation (1.5) for each country from
1995 to 2009. The data are from the World Input-Output Database
types by equation (1.6). We see that the largest changes are attributable to the change in the
composition of labor use from low-skill to high-skill. Adding the three lines in each plot
gives the evolution of that labor-type’s share of income. While low-skill and medium-skill
labor shares have declined since 1995, high-skill labor’s share of income has increased,
primarily due to increased reliance on high-skilled labor relative to other types of labor.
In terms of substitution within labor’s share of income, that is substitution between
differently skilled labor, the global picture is much more homogenous. To show this, in
table A.1, I report the total change owing to each of these components for all the countries
in the sample for which all the data is available. The numbers in table A.1 show that, within
labor-types, there are very strong and near-universal compositional effects, with high-skill
labor’s share increasing and low-skill labor’s share dropping. Column 5 shows that all
countries in the sample, with the exception of Denmark and Estonia, feature declining
low-skill labor share. Column 4 shows that large fractions of this decline are due to changes
in the fraction of low-skill labor as a fraction of total labor. Similarly, all countries except
Mexico feature increasing high-skill labor share of income. Therefore, the change between
labor types is happening within industries and not across them. Adding the 5th, 10th, and
15th columns gives the overall change in the labor share.
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Figure 1.8: Cross-country average of changes in components of labor’s share of income according to decompo-
sition in equation (1.6). The data are from the World Input-Output Database.
These findings update and strengthen the results ofBerman et al. (1994) who found
that realloaction from unskilled to skilled labor in manufacturing over the 1980s in the
US occurred within industries rather than between them. My work improves upon their
decomposition by explicitly accounting for intermediate inputs and trade. My findings are
also strongly supportive of the “skill-biased technical change” thesis of Goldin and Katz
(2009) and Katz and Murphy (1992). The pattern of intra-labor substitution is particularly
pronounced for the United States (see figure A.2), where the labor share has remained
roughly constant from 1995 to 2009, but the relative shares of the different skill levels have
changed drastically. This suggests that, at least for the United States, increases in income
inequality are more likely linked to substitution from low-skill and medium-skill labor to
high-skill labor, rather than increased use of imports or capital.
Figure A.2, in the Appendix, plots the decomposition of the labor share into its con-
stituent high-skill, medium-skill, and low-skill components, as well as a decomposition of
the changes in the each type of labor share for the US. Once again, the break-down shows
that the largest component of the decline in low-skill labor intensity is the final component:
33
low-skilled labor as a share of total labor. Although changing consumption patterns and
supply chains contribute to fluctuations, there are no strong universal trends. This rules
out theories of the decline in low and medium skilled labor’s share of income that rely on
substitution from labor towards imported intermediate inputs, or changing composition
of industries. It also rules out the possibility that changing supply lines, for example an
increase of IT services in production, is driving the trend. If these factors were driving
the trends, we should expect the “consumption” and “supply-chain” lines to be trending
downwards. The trends we observe are consistent with skill-biased technical change.
1.4.1 Comparison to value-added decomposition
An alternative decomposition of labor’s share of income common in the literature follows
from the following accounting identity:
wl
GDP
=∑
i
VAi
GDP
αˆi,
where VAi = piyi−∑j pjxij is sales net of intermediate input costs, and αˆi is the value-added
labor share defined as labor costs divided by value-added. This identity gives rise to
∆
wtlt
GDPt
= ∆
VA
GDP
′
t
αˆt︸        ︷︷        ︸
between-industries
+
VA
GDP
′
t−1
∆αˆt−1︸              ︷︷              ︸
within-industries
.
This decomposition, if the input-output matrix were diagonal, would have the following
interpretation. The first summand captures changes to the composition of industries due to
changing final-use expenditure patterns. For instance, households are spending a larger
fraction on foreign-made goods or they are spending a larger fraction of their income
on less-labor intensive sectors. The second summand, on the other hand, captures the
labor/capital mix of each industry holding fixed sectoral compositions. These terms are
commonly, but misleadingly, referred to as the between-industries and within-industries
changes.
Since the input-output matrix is non-diagonal, these interpretations are not technically
appropriate. In the empirically relevant case where the input-output matrix is non-diagonal,
34
the value-added decomposition is difficult to interpret. This is because it is a non-linear
transformation of the data that is not tightly connected with the theory. In figure 1.9, I plot
the cross-country decomposition using value-added measures. Figure 1.9 is the value-added
decomposition of the same data as figure 1.6. The two figures tell drastically different stories.
The value-added decomposition gives the misleading impression that the composition term
is much more important than within industry changes in explaining the decline in labor’s
share of aggregate income. This would incorrectly suggest that theories that affect industrial
composition, could be the significant driver of the effect for the aggregate labor’s share of
income in this sample.
To see why the two decompositions may paint differing pictures, consider a simple
example of an industry that uses labor, capital, and imported intermediate inputs to produce.
Now suppose that this industry experiences capital-biased technological change, so that it
changes its input mix, but it does not expand or shrink its sales. This industry substitutes
away from intermediate inputs and labor towards using more capital. This would seem like
a textbook case of within-industry change and under the network-adjusted decomposition,
it would show up as purely a within-industry change. However, under the value-added
decomposition, this would show up as both a change in the composition of industries (since
the industry’s value added would go up) and within-industries (since the industry’s labor’s
share of value added would go down).
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Figure 1.9: Cross-country average of changes in labor’s share of income using the value-added decomposition.
The data are from the World Input-Output Database.
1.4.2 Labor’s Share of Manufacturing Income
A great advantage of this disaggregated approach is that we can zoom in on individual
industries in a well-defined sense (without discarding the changes in their supply chains)
and see which component is driving the change in their network-adjusted labor intensities
for various labor types. In this subsection, manufacturing provides a good case-study.
The decline in manufacturing’s labor share in the US has attracted much attention, for
example, it forms part of the story behind the decline in labor’s share of income in Elsby
et al. (2013), and is the focus of Oberfield and Raval (2012). The papers in this literature
focus on how manufacturing’s value-added labor share has evolved over time. In figure 1.10,
I plot manufacturing sector’s labor share, as measured by compensation of employees as a
fraction of revenues (“gross labor share”), compensation of employees as a fraction of value
added (“value-added labor share”), and the final consumption weighted network-adjusted
labor share of the manufacturing sector for the US from 1995 to 2009. The network-adjusted
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labor share should be interpreted as the fraction of each dollar spent in manufacturing that
is eventually paid to workers (even if they are non-manufacturing workers).
Formally, the value-added measure is defined as
∑
i∈M
(
VAi
∑j∈M VAj
)(
αi
αi + ηi
)
,
where M is the set of manufacturing industries, αi is gross labor share, and ηi is gross capital
share. Note that the value-added measure ignores how the supply chains of manufacturing
are changing. The Network-adjusted labor share is given by
∑
i∈M
(
β∗i
∑j∈M β∗j
)
α˜i,
where β∗ is final-use expenditure shares. The supply chain of each industry is encapsulated
in α˜i. Economically, the network-adjusted labor share of manufacturing captures the fraction
of each dollar of expenditures in manufacturing eventually spent on labor (either directly or
indirectly through intermediate inputs). This is precisely labor’s share of manufacturing
income.
From 1995-2009, the manufacturing sector’s value-added labor share fell by 12.2%. The
network-adjusted labor intensity, however, dropped by 6.5%. The gross labor share fell
by only 0.9%. The network-adjusted and value-added measures are highly correlated
(correlation of 85%) but they’re far from identical, either in levels or in changes. For
instance, the drop in the network-adjusted measure is almost half as large as the one in the
value-added share.
Crucially, we can go one step further and decompose the share in figure 1.10 according
to equation (1.5). The results are plotted in figure 1.11. We see that in manufacturing,
globalization and changing industrial composition have played a much larger role in labor’s
share of income than for the US economy as a whole. Unlike the the aggregate labor share,
labor’s share of US manufacturing income has been significantly affected by changing
supply chains and consumption patterns. This finding is consistent with the idea that
the changing composition of industries, which includes increased import competition, are
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Figure 1.10: Evolution of labor use by the manufacturing industries of the US using the WIOD data from
1995-2009.
responsible for the decline in labor’s share of manufacturing income in the US, even if this
does not aggregate up to be important for the economy as a whole. The idea that import
competition has been important to workers involved in manufacturing is consistent with
recent findings of Acemoglu et al. (2013).
Figure A.3 in Appendix VI shows that the value-added decomposition is not misleading
for US manfacturing. In this case, the composition effect is picking up the trend in aggregate
labor shares in a way that’s consistent with the results of figure 1.11. This suggests that
once we aggregate over all manufacturing industries, assuming a block-diagonal input-
output matrix, where manufacturing industries only use inputs from other manufacturing
industries is not a bad assumption.
We can further decompose the network-adjusted labor intensity of manufacturing into
network-adjusted high-skill, medium-skill, and low-skill intensity. These are plotted in
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Figure 1.11: Decomposition of network-adjusted labor intensity of the manufacturing industries of the US
using WIOD data from 1995-2009.
figure 1.12. Here, we see the same pattern as in the rest of the data: high-skill use has trended
upwards as medium and low-skill use has trended down. We see that the compositional
changes, which include increased import competition, have had their biggest impact on
medium-skill labor use of manufacturing.
39
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Change in US manufacturing‘s high−skill labor share
 
 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Change in US manufacturing‘s medium−skill labor share
 
 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−14
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3Change in manufacturing‘s low−skill labor share
 
 
consumption
supply−chain
labor intensity
high−skill intensity
consumption
supply−chain
labor intensity
med−skill intensity
consumption
supply−chain
labor intensity
low−skill intensity
Figure 1.12: Network-adjusted labor intensity of the manufacturing industries of the US using WIOD data
from 1995-2009.
1.5 Countercyclical Fiscal Policy
Now that we understand the accounting applications of network-adjusted labor intensi-
ties, let us consider some of their policy implications. Received wisdom from Keynesian
macroeconomics is that governments can use fiscal policy to stimulate employment at the
zero-lower bound (for instance, see Christiano et al., 2011; Farhi and Werning, 2012). The
question of exactly how they should do this is often left unexplored.
In section 1.3, I showed that the network-adjusted labor intensity tells us how more
household demand for an industry’s output eventually ends up as more demand for labor.
In the neoclassical model of section 1.3, this information did not help us ask any normative
policy questions because the equilibrium was efficient. However, we may think that in reality
there are times when the government may want to pursue policies to raise employment.
One such case, much studied in the literature, is in the context of a New Keynesian model
at the zero-lower bound. In such a scenario, labor may be idle and government policy that
expands employment can be welfare improving.
In this section, I show, in the context of a model with a production network, the
network-adjusted labor intensity determines how much employment expands with in-
creased government spending. When I introduce a nominal friction that causes involuntary
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unemployment, optimal government policy will be to target those industries with the high-
est network-adjusted labor intensities. I will begin by deriving theoretical results linking
the employment multiplier to the network-adjusted labor intensity, and then calculate how
different types of government spending are expected to effect aggregate employment.
1.5.1 Neoclassical Benchmark
Before introducing any frictions, let us first see how the benchmark neoclassical model of
section 1.3 responds to changes in fiscal policy. Since I focus on perturbations to the steady
state of this model, changes in government policy are permanent changes to the steady state
of the model. This implies that government spending has very strong crowding-out effects,
since household’s permanent income adjusts one-for-one with government expenditures.
Definition 1.5.1. The relative employment multiplier of government spending in industry i
is defined as dl/dδi, where l is equilibrium employment and δi is the share of government
expenditures in industry i, holding fixed the total size of the governments’ budget.
Proposition 1.5.1. Government employment multipliers satisfy
dl/dδi
dl/dδj
=
α˜i − δ′α˜
α˜j − δ′α˜ . (1.7)
Proof. See Appendix I. 
Proposition 1.5.1 shows that the relative multipliers from government spending are
pinned down by the network-adjusted labor intensities. So, the government can boost
employment by redirecting spending towards sectors with higher network-adjusted la-
bor intensities. In other words, network-adjusted labor intensities also allow us to map
how changes in final demand by the government translate into changes in equilibrium
employment. Similar results hold for consumption taxes:
Proposition 1.5.2. The employment multiplier from consumption taxes satisfy
dl/dτi
dl/dτj
=
βiα˜i
β jα˜j
(1+ τj)2
(1+ τi)2
.
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Proof. See Appendix I. 
The employment response of a consumption tax is determined by how intensively an
industry uses labor α˜ and how intensively households consume that good β. This is because
if households consume very little of a good, a consumption tax on that good will have
small effects on employment even if that good uses labor intensively. This proposition
demonstrates how targeted consumption taxes or subsidies, like “Cash for Clunkers,” affect
equilibrium employment. Proposition 1.5.2 shows that the efficacy of such government
programs depends on the size of the subsidies, the household’s tastes for the good being
subsidized, and the network-adjusted labor intensity of the final industry producing the
good.
Of course, in the benchmark model, there is no reason for the government to manipulate
employment. The first welfare theorem holds and the optimal level of government taxation
and expenditures is zero. However, once we allow for involuntary unemployment, these
positive predictions become prescriptive. In the next section, I consider a second-best world
where the zero-lower bound constrains the central bank, and neither the fiscal or monetary
authority can commit to taking actions in the future. Furthermore, the only tools available
to the fiscal authority are direct purchases by the government.
1.5.2 Keynesian Model Setup
Following the distinction made by Werning (2011), countercyclical fiscal policy can be
optimal for opportunistic or stimulus reasons. Intuitively, opportunistic fiscal policy occurs
when the government can provide useful goods and services to the household, and a
recession is a particularly cheap time for the government to provide these goods and
services. On the other hand, stimulus fiscal policy occurs when government expenditures
are not directly valuable but still raise utility through a Keynesian multiplier effect. This
is because government expenditures stimulate households to spend more and this raises
private consumption. I add a few ingredients to the benchmark model in section 1.3 to
study the model’s normative properties for both types of fiscal policy.
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To allow for opportunistic stimulus, I allow government purchases to enter the house-
hold’s utility function directly. This gives fiscal policy a motive to increase expenditures
during recessions. Second, I allow for heterogeneity in household types: specifically, there
are some credit-constrained households that violate Ricardian equivalence, and consume
a constant fraction of their contemporaneous income. The presence of these households
allows fiscal policy to have pure “stimulus” effects. Last, I make wages downwardly rigid
so that the equilibrium after a shock is not necessarily efficient.
Households
As in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), suppose there are two representative households
with differing discount factors. The more patient household is called the saver and the less
patient one the borrower. The fraction of savers in the population is 1− χ and the fraction
of borrowers is χ.
Let the saver maximize
∑
t
ρt [(1− λ) log(cst) + λ log(Gt)] , λ ∈ (0, 1)
where
cst =∏
k
(
cst,k
)βk ,
is private consumption by the saver, and
Gt =∏
i
gφiit .
is government consumption services. We maintain the assumption that ∑k βk = 1. Since the
government consumption good is additively separable from the household’s private con-
sumption, the government’s consumption behavior does not directly distort the household’s
consumption choices through the utility function. The saver has budget constraint
∑
k
pt,kcst,k + Bt + Dt = (wtlt + rtKt) (1− χ) + (1+ it−1)[Dt−1 + Bt−1]− τst ,
where pt,k is the price of good k in time t. Nominal government bonds are Bt and debts of
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other households are Dt. The nominal net interest rate on debt is it. The household receives
labor income wtlt and capital income rtKt in proportion to its share of the population.
Households are endowed with an exogenous amount of labor and capital. Finally, savers
face lump sum taxes τst .
The borrower, who has a smaller discount factor, faces the same problem as the saver
but is subject to a borrowing limit on its debt:
Dt ≤ D
h
1+ it
pt+1
pt
,
where pt is the ideal price index for the households in period t.
Firms
The firms behave exactly as before. That is, the firms are competitive and rent capital and
labor on spot markets from the household and reoptimize every period. Therefore, their
problems are static.
max
yit,lit,xijt
pityit −∑
j
pjtxijt − wtlit − rtkit,
such that
yit = (lit)αi k
ηi
it ∏ x
(1−αi−ηi)ωij
ijt .
The government
The government faces the budget constraint
Bt = (1+ it−1)Bt−1 +∑
k
pt,kGt,k − τt,
where τt is income from lump sum taxation. The government cannot target its tax base, so
that taxes levied on borrowers and savers are proportional to their share of the population.
Furthermore, the government cannot use consumption taxes, since, as shown by Correia
et al. (2013), a government with access to a rich-enough set of taxes could replicate negative
interest rates and achieve the first-best outcome. Unlike the household, the government is
not subject to an exogenous borrowing limit (or at least, this limit does not bind for the
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purposes of our policy exercise).
Market clearing
Prices are flexible and the market for the goods and services clears:
pt,kyt,k = pt,k(cst,k + c
b
t,k + gt,k) +∑
j
pt,kxt,j,k.
The rental rate of capital is also flexible and so capital is always fully employed. The bond
market also clears; however, the price of bonds are set by the central bank according to a
Taylor rule:
1+ it = max{1, (1+ Rnt )
(
pt+1
pt
)φ
},
where Rnt is the net Wicksellian natural rate of interest and φ > 1. The model can feature
multiple equilibria, and we will discuss equilibrium selection later.
The labor market is subject to a nominal friction. Specifically, wages are downwardly
rigid in the spirit of Patinkin (1965), Malinvaud (1977), and more recently Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2011). That is
lt ≤ l, wt−1 ≤ wt, (wt − wt−1)(lt − l) = 0.
Here, l is an exogenous endowment of labor, and wt is the nominal wage in period t. This
is a transparent and tractable way of adding nominal frictions into the model. The key
assumption here is that in the event of a shortfall in nominal demand, it is the labor market
that fails to clear, and not the capital market. Partial equilibrium in the labor market is
shown in log-log terms in figure 1.13, where the sales of firms are held constant. There are
two admissible regions: (1) wt ≥ wt−1 and the labor market clears, and (2) wt = wt−1 and
the labor market fails to clear with lt ∈ (0, l).
There is considerable empirical evidence for downward stickiness in wages, see for
instance Barattieri et al. (2010), Baqaee (2014a), Dickens et al. (2007), and Bewley (1999).
Downward wage rigidity is a particularly convenient modelling device in this paper since it
makes the intuition for government intervention very transparent – there is idle labor and a
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Figure 1.13: The labor market with downward wage rigidity. The blue line is labor supply and the red line
is labor demand. The vector s is the sales of each industry, while the vector α is the gross labor share of each
industry.
unique efficient level of full employment. Such a stark assumption is not strictly necessary
however, since similar forces operate as long as output is inefficiently low and labor (rather
than capital) is the factor that adjusts. This can be accomplished with, for example, an elastic
labor supply curve and sticky prices, and I sketch a version of this model in Appendix V.
1.5.3 Scenario I: Opportunistic Spending
In this section, I analyze optimal fiscal policy during a one-period liquidity trap with only
the Ricardian households. In other words, I assume that the fraction of the population
corresponding to impatient borrowers is zero. Under this assumption, there is no neoclassical
multiplier effect of government spending since labor supply is inelastic (so there is no wealth
effect of taxation). There is also no Keynesian multiplier effect for private consumption
since we have a one-period shock. Therefore, the results of this subsection pertain to pure
opportunistic fiscal policy.
The shock that pushes the economy into the zero lower bound, as is common in the
representative agent zero-lower bound literature, following Krugman (1998), is a one-period
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unexpected discount factor shock. Suppose that there is an unexpected discount factor
shock so that for the next period ρ∗ > 1. I analyze the government’s fiscal policy without
commitment – that is, the government reoptimizes its expenditure plans each period.
Lemma 1.5.3. Aggregate labor demand lt when the zero lower bound binds is upward sloping in
wage inflation, and is given by
lt =
1
ρ∗
wt+1
wt
l − 1
ρ∗
δ′t+1α˜τt+1 − (β− δt)′α˜τt. (1.8)
Proof. See Appendix I. 
Lemma 1.5.3 shows how government spending today τt, by deviating from private
spending (β− δt), can increase employment.
Equilibrium employment is given by combining aggregate demand for labor with the
aggregate supply curve for labor. Aggregate supply for labor is defined by wt+1/wt ≥ 1 and
lt ≤ l. This situation is graphically depicted in figure 1.14. There are two equilibria. One is
the neoclassical equilibrium where the wage rises by exactly enough tomorrow to ensure
we maintain full employment. In this case, the government need not intervene to boost
employment and government expenditure shares are equal to the Cobb-Douglas parameters.
The second equilibrium, which is the equilibrium of interest, features no wage inflation,
wt = wt+1, and positive unemployment.
In the non-neoclassical equilibrium, government policy can affect employment. We focus
on this second equilibrium since it is the one in which fiscal policy is relevant, and the one
that features an employment problem.4
Proposition 1.5.4. The optimal share of expenditures by the government in industry i relative to
industry j satisfies
δi
δj
=
φi
φj
(
const+ (µ1 − µ2)α˜j
const+ (µ1 − µ2)α˜i
)
, (1.9)
4It turns out that the full employment equilibrium is also locally unstable since the aggregate supply relation
is steeper than aggregate demand. See Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) for more details on the stability of these
equilibria.
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Figure 1.14: Zero-lower bound is binding and aggregate demand is upward sloping. The y-axis is wage
inflation and the x-axis is employment.
where µ1 and µ2 are lagrange multipliers corresponding to the labor and capital markets. When we are
at the full employment steady state µ1 = µ2, so that spending shares are equal to the Cobb-Douglas
parameters. When there is unemployment µ1 < µ2, so government tilts in favor of firms with higher
network-adjusted labor intensities.
Proof. See Appendix I. 
The key intuition of this section is that when the zero lower bound binds, the government
has an opportunity to provide goods and services to the household more cheaply than
usual. Furthermore, the higher the network-adjusted labor intensity of an industry, the more
cheaply the government can supply that good to the household. Therefore, the government
tilts its expenditures in favor of industries with high network-adjusted labor intensity.
Equation (1.9) is intuitive to interpret. The production of each good uses a certain
combination of labor and capital, directly and indirectly through inputs. When there is
unemployment, there is idle labor that is essentially free to use for the government. However,
capital is not free. Therefore, the government tilts its consumption of goods towards those
that use labor more heavily than capital, since any capital used by the government crowds
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out the private sector, and bids up rents rather than expand production. The existence of
a wedge between private and public spending decisions follows from the logic set out by
Farhi and Werning (2013).
The intuition for (1.9) can be illustrated by considering an extreme example with only
two goods: one good only uses labor and the other only uses capital with no intermediaries.
When there is unemployment, the government can use the labor-intensive good without
reducing the household’s consumption of labor. However any capital used by the govern-
ment crowds out the household. Therefore, the government will use all the unemployed
labor, but only use enough of the capital intensive good to equalize the marginal utility of
government and household consumption.
1.5.4 Scenario II: Stimulus Spending
Now, let us consider the case where government expenditures have zero direct value, but
since there are credit-constrained borrowers, multiplier effects of government spending
give the government a motive to spend during a liquidity trap. Following Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012), an exogenous debt limit on borrowers makes them non-Ricardian and
forces them to behave as what Galí et al. (2007) call “hand-to-mouth consumers.” The
assumption that a fraction of households’ consumption tracks their current income rather
than permanent income accords with the empirical findings of Campbell and Mankiw
(1990).
Set the fraction of borrowers to χ to be nonzero. To shut down the opportunistic channel,
set the utility-value of government consumption λ = 0, so that government expenditures
have no intrinsic value to the household. The only reason why government expenditures
may be beneficial in this context is then the stimulus effect of spending due to the presence
of non-Ricardian households.
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Deleveraging Shock
Since the borrower has a smaller discount factor, the steady-state equilibrium of this model
sees the borrower borrow up to his borrowing constraint from the household. We focus on
the steady-state equilibrium with no inflation and no government spending or taxation.
Now suppose that a borrowing limit falls unexpectedly in period t so that
Dt−1 =
Dh
1+ it−1
pt
pt−1
, Dt =
Dl
1+ it
pt+1
pt
,
where Dh > Dl . Assume that the borrower has to delever immediately to the new borrowing
limit.
I analyze the equilibrium where the steady-state equilibrium features zero inflation, full
employment, and no government spending and constant government taxes.
Lemma 1.5.5. Aggregate demand for labor lt when the zero lower bound binds is upward sloping in
wage inflation and given by
wtlt =
β′α˜
ρ
(
wt+1l + rt+1k
)
+ β′α˜
Dl − ρDh
ρ(1− χ) +
(
β′α˜
[
1− (1− ρ)(1− χ)
ρ(1− χ) − 1
]
+ δ′α˜
)
pgt gt.
(1.10)
Proof. See Appendix I. 
Equation (1.10) shows that aggregate demand for labor can be stimulated in two ways
by the government. The first channel is the same as the one in the Ricardian model: if the
government buys labor intensive goods (δ′tα˜ > 0), then the government increases nominal
demand for labor directly.5 However, there is now a new, non-Ricardian channel. If χ > 0,
then there is a secondary effect because increased government spending increases the
contemporaneous income of borrowers and therefore increases private expenditures.
The term [
1− (1− ρ)(1− χ)
ρ(1− χ) − 1
]
,
5There is no crowding-out of the private sector because we are at the zero-lower bound, and current private
nominal consumption is pinned down by the Euler equation.
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is the government multiplier on nominal private GDP. As long as the fraction of borrowers
χ is nonzero, this is greater than zero, and so there is a pure stimulus effect to government
spending. If we set the fraction of borrowers to be zero, then the model is Ricardian and, as
shown in the proof of proposition 1.5.6 in appendix I, the government multiplier on private
nominal GDP is exactly zero.
Combining the aggregate demand equation (1.10) with the the aggregate supply relation
gives the situation in figure 1.14. Once again, as we see from the graph, there are two
equilibria. In the first, there is no inflation, positive unemployment, and increases in
government spending increase output and weakly increase inflation. The other equilibrium
is the neoclassical equilibrium where we have positive inflation equal to exactly the reciprocal
of the gross natural interest rate, full employment, and increased government spending
reduces inflation. In the neoclassical equilibrium, the government need not intervene
and government spending should be zero. This is the uninteresting equilibrium for our
purposes. Therefore, we focus instead on the non-neoclassical equilibrium with positive
unemployment.
By inspection of (1.10), we can see that the biggest bang for buck in terms of the
government boost to employment comes from maximizing the size of the government’s
network-adjusted labor intensity δ′α˜. Maximizing employment is not the government’s
objective however. Optimal government policy seeks instead to maximize real GDP net of
government consumption.
Proposition 1.5.6. Optimal government spending in the period of the deleveraging shock has the
government spend entirely on the industry with the highest network-adjusted labor intensity.
The intuition here is that the industry with the highest network-adjusted labor intensity
not only has the largest employment multiplier, since it employs the most amount of idle
labor, but it is also the cheapest resource to waste (since all government spending is wasteful).
Therefore, the industry with the highest network-adjusted labor intensity is targeted.
In this setup, borrowers and savers derive the same income from labor and capital. If
we modify the model so that borrowers derive more income from labor than capital, as is
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empirically more relevant, these results would become even stronger. Then not only will
high network-adjusted labor intensity imply that those goods are cheaper to waste, but it
also means that their owners have higher marginal propensities to consume, and therefore,
will have even higher multipliers.
Furthermore, labor is homogenous in this model. A simple extension of the model with
different labor types would have the government target sectors that more intensively use
low-skilled labor, both because it is cheaper to waste and because it gives larger multipliers.
The relevant criteria for the target would be the network-adjusted labor intensity by type.
1.5.5 Practical Application
All three scenarios point to the government targeting its stimulus towards sectors with
higher network-adjusted labor intensities. Table 1.4 reports the network-adjusted labor
intensity for broad categories of final-use spending, including various types of government
spending, assuming Cobb-Douglas functional forms. The network-adjusted labor intensities
can be interpreted as determining the relative employment multipliers of an extra dollar of
spending from the different final use sectors. Crucially, these numbers are also the fraction
of each dollar of spending that is eventually spent on labor — or in other words, labor’s
share of income from that final-use sector.
If the government has the ability to finely tune stimulus spending, then the industry-level
rankings discussed in section 1.3 are the relevant statistics for designing stimulus. If the
government used value-added rankings instead, it would, to pick an extreme example,
erroneously think that the multiplier for “Soybean and other oilseed processing” is 13 times
larger than that of “other residential structures,” since the former has a value-added labor
share of 0.903, while the latter’s value-added labor share is only 0.069. However, using
the network-adjustment, we find that Soybean and other oilseed processing has a labor
share of 0.247, while other residential structures has a labor share of 0.350 – a reversal in
rankings. Generally, we think that governments are unable to perfectly fine-tune stimulus
spending, for reasons outside of the model. Therefore in table 1.4, we look at broad classes
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of government spending.
Table 1.4: Network-adjusted and gross labor intensities of various final goods consuming sectors using the
BEA’s detailed purchase price benchmark input-output table for 2007.
Final-Use Network-adjusted Value-Added
Personal consumption expenditures 0.503 0.537
Private fixed investment 0.572 0.594
Federal Government defense: Consumption expenditures 0.484 0.432
Federal Government defense: Gross investment 0.638 0.726
Federal Government nondefense: Consumption expenditures 0.747 0.796
Federal Government nondefense: Gross investment 0.685 0.800
State and local government consumption expenditures 0.747 0.880
State and local government gross investment 0.584 0.644
Since the data in table 1.4 is very heavily aggregated, we should expect the network
structure to matter less for the rankings. Nonetheless, even with this level of aggregation, we
see some interesting patterns. Namely, the network-adjusted labor intensities are much closer
to one another than the value-added measures. We also see that nondefense investment is
less labor intensive than nondefense consumption, despite the value-added measure being
larger. The implied relative ranking of multipliers for defense and non-defense spending
may help to explain why the literature estimating government multipliers tends to find
smaller multipliers for defense spending than other types of government spending. For
a summary of the contrasting estimates of defense and non-defense multipliers see Yang
et al. (2012). They find that non-defense multipliers are 1.5-2.0 times larger than defense
multipliers.
1.5.6 Who Gets Paid?
The fact that unemployment rates vary significantly with education levels suggests that this
exercise will be more informative if we focus on the multipliers associated with the lower skill
types since those labor markets are more likely to experience high cyclical unemployment.
In table 1.5, I report each labor type’s share of income by final-use normalized by that
labor type’s share of aggregate income. A number less than one implies that the final-use
sector uses that labor type less intensively than average, whereas a number greater than
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one implies the opposite. Table 1.5 effectively answers the question of where the money
for different kinds of government spending goes – a question that cannot be satisfactorily
answered without the use of network-adjusted labor intensities.
Table 1.5: Fraction of final use expenditures going to each type of labor normalized by that labor type’s share of
total GDP. A number greater than (less than) 1 indicates the final sector in that row spends more (less) heavily
on that labor type compared to total GDP. This table combines data from the 2007 American Community
Survey from IPUMS-USA with the detailed Benchmark Input-Output table using purchaser prices for 2007
published by the BEA.
Final-Use Grades 0-9 Grade 10-12 1-2 years of college 4 years of college 5+ years of college
Personal consumption expenditures 0.902 0.908 0.938 0.911 0.935
Private fixed investment 1.338 1.243 1.016 1.016 0.715
Federal defense consumption 0.513 0.655 0.793 0.928 1.382
Federal defense investment 0.906 1.041 1.090 1.402 1.145
Federal nondefense consumption 0.569 0.855 1.185 1.523 2.347
Federal nondefense investment 0.851 1.002 1.164 1.608 1.304
State and local government consumption 1.090 1.227 1.304 1.271 1.405
State and local government investment 1.948 1.484 1.043 0.839 0.544
Table 1.5 shows that private fixed investment and state and local government investment
use low-skill labor much more and high-skill labor much less than average. On the
other hand, federal consumption (defense and nondefense) are overwhelmingly tilted
towards high-skill types. Table 1.5 implies that a uniform reallocation of funds from
private consumption towards federal government spending would increase high-skilled
labor’s share of income at the expense of low-skilled labor. To the extent that low-skilled
labor markets are experiencing greater slack, this table helps to explain why estimates of
fiscal multipliers for state and local government expenditures, like those of Shoag (2010)
and Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) tend to find larger effects than estimates from federal
expenditures.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper introduces the network-adjusted labor intensity as the relevant notion of labor
intensity in an interconnected production economy. This captures how intensively a good or
service uses labor in production by taking into account how heavily its entire supply chain
relies on labor. Doing this adjusts for the artificial drop in the gross labor intensity resulting
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from fragmentation of the production process across industries.
The network-adjusted labor intensity plays a key role in determining how sectoral
disturbances translate to aggregate employment, and this has both short-run and long-run
implications. For instance, labor’s share of income, a central object of interest in the study
of growth and inequality, is a weighted average of network-adjusted labor intensities. This
allows us to decompose labor’s share of income into disaggregated components representing
changing consumption patterns, changing supply chains (including trade), and changing
capital/labor shares. In a sample of 34 countries over the past 15 years, this decomposition
shows that the overwhelming driver of the secular decline in the labor share is a decline in the
gross labor share of all industries. This contrasts with the usual value-added decomposition,
which over the sample, attributes the drop to changing industrial composition.
The network adjustments also allow us to study individual industries, like manufac-
turing, without discarding information about changes in their supply chains. For the US
manufacturing sector, increasing globalization and changing consumption patterns do ex-
plain a sizeable fraction of the decline in manufacturing’s network-adjusted labor share, but
these effects are not sizeable when aggregated up to the whole economy.
Over the short run, the network-adjusted labor intensities pin down the relative boost
to employment from a marginal increase in spending in one industry versus another. This
makes network-adjusted labor intensities important to policy makers interested in boosting
employment through fiscal policy. I show that if in a recession labor is the factor that adjusts
in production, then when the zero lower-bound binds, optimal fiscal stimulus should tilt in
favor of stimulating demand in industries with higher network-adjusted labor intensities.
The intuition is that, in a recession, the government should aim to expand production rather
than to simply bid up rents. The way to expand production is to stimulate industries that
are most reliant on unemployed resources. In my model, the unemployed resource is labor
and the relevant notion of “reliant” is the network-adjusted labor intensity.
We can also compute measures of how intensively different types of government expen-
ditures use different types of labor. I find that state and local government expenditures are
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much more reliant on low-skilled labor than average. On the other hand, federal government
expenditures, defense and nondefense, are far more heavily reliant on very high-skilled
workers with more than 4 years of college education than average. Furthermore, I find that
on the whole defense expenditures are less reliant on labor than other types of government
expenditures. These findings go some way towards explaining the heterogeneity in estimates
of the effect of government expenditures on employment found in the literature.
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Chapter 2
Cascading Failures in Production
Networks1
2.1 Introduction
In this paper I show how the extensive margin of firm entry and exit can dramatically alter
the properties of macroeconomic models with production networks. I model cascades of
failures among firms linked through a production network, and show how the network
propagates and amplifies shocks through supply and demand chains. This paper contributes
to the literature on the microeconomic sources of aggregate business cycle fluctuations.
In a recent paper Acemoglu et al. (2012) relate the following anecdote, which illustrates
the basic mechanism that I model and demonstrates its real-world relevance:
In the fall of 2008, rather than asking for government assistance for Ford, Alan R.
Mulally, the chief executive of Ford Motor Co., requested that the government
supports General Motors and Chrysler. His reasoning for asking government
support for his company’s traditional rivals was that the failure of either GM or
Chrysler would lead to the potential failure of their suppliers, and because Ford
depended on many of the same suppliers as the other two automakers, it would
also find itself in perilous territory.
1Co-authored with my other advisor
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A government bailout of GM and Chrysler in 2009 prevented the failure of GM and Chrysler
(see Goolsbee and Krueger, 2015). However, the scenario Mulally described, which was
averted through government intervention in the United States, did come to pass in Australia.
In May 2013, Ford Australia announced that they would stop manufacturing cars in 2017.
Seven months later, GM Australia announced they would also stop manufacturing cars in
2017. Three months after that, in February 2014, Toyota Australia also announced that it
would close its manufacturing plants at the same time. This effectively ended automobile
manufacturing in Australia. The Australian government predicts that this will result in the
loss of over 30,000 jobs, a figure they arrived at by adding the number of people directly
employed by the three automakers and the Australian car parts industry.
While these examples demonstrate that firm exit (and entry) can have important spill-
overs on other firms, standard macroeconomic models do not allow for this possibility. In
this paper, I explicitly incorporate the extensive margin of firm entry into an input-output
model of production. I show how the extensive margin alters the quantitative and qualitative
properties of the model. First, I show that the standard input-output macroeconomic models
that follow Long and Plosser (1983), like Acemoglu et al. (2012), Atalay (2013), or Baqaee
(2014c) have the property that their responses to productivity shocks can be summarized
in terms of a few exogenous sufficient statistics. Once we compute the relevant sufficient
statistics, which are closely related to the equilibrium size of firms, we can discard the
network structure. In other words, I show that there are disconnected economies, with
different structural parameters (and sometimes exogenous wedges), that behave precisely
like the network models. This means that, without the extensive margin, it is not the
interconnections per se, but how those interconnections affect a firm’s size that determines a
firm’s systemic importance. If we can arrive at the same sufficient statistics using a different
(perhaps degenerate) network-structure, the equilibrium responses will be the same. This
fact explains why the theoretical implications of the granular hypothesis of Gabaix (2011),
where business cycles are driven by large firms, are observationally equivalent to the
theoretical implications of the network hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2012), where business
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cycles are driven by well-connected firms. Furthermore, in canonical input-output models,
systemic importance depends only on a firm’s role as a supplier. As long as firms i and j
have the same strength connections to the same customers, then their systemic influence
will be the same, regardless of what i and j’s supply chains look like.
When we allow for entry and exit, the sufficient-statistic approach breaks down. This is
because the extensive margin makes “systemic importance” an endogenously determined
value that is not well-approximated by equilibrium size or prices. A firm that may seem like
a small player, when measured by sales, can have potentially large impacts on aggregate
outcomes. On the other hand, a firm that may seem like a key player, as measured by
sales, can have relatively minor effects on the equilibrium. Furthermore, the endogenously-
determined measures of systemic influence depend on a firm’s role as both a supplier and
as a consumer, as well as on how many close substitutes there are for the firm.
This allows us to combine the granular hypothesis of Gabaix (2011) and the network
hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2012) in a new and interesting way. In particular, I show
that once firms have positive mass, extensive margin shocks can be locally amplified via
interconnections. In other words, when a large and well-connected firm exits, it can set
off an avalanche of firm failures that actually gets larger as it gathers steam. This type
of amplification is not possible unless we have both granularity and network connections.
With positive mass, the model satisfies the criteria of Scheinkman and Woodford (1994) for
self-organized criticality: it exhibits strong local interactions that are significantly nonlinear.
This paper also contributes to the wider literature on diffusion on social networks, by
bridging the gap between two alternative modelling traditions. Loosely speaking, there
are two popular approaches to modelling diffusion on social networks. First, there are
continuous input-output type models like Acemoglu et al. (2012). Here, nodes influence
each other in continuous ways – shocks travel away from their source like waves and slowly
die out. The strength of the connections between the nodes controls the rate of decay. Such
shocks, sometimes called pulse processes, are characterized by geometric sums. I show
that these models are incapable of local amplification: a productivity shock to an industry
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will always have its largest effect at its source, and the shock decays as it travels through
the connections. These structures were first studied by Leontief (1936) in his input-output
model of the economy.
The other camp consists of models that behave discontinuously, as typified by Morris
(2000) or Elliott et al. (2012). In this class of models, sometimes called threshold models,
each node has a threshold and is either active or inactive. When a node crosses its threshold
it changes states and, by changing states, pushes its neighbors closer to their thresholds.
Such models are frequently used to study the spread of epidemics, products, or even ideas.
One of the earliest and most influential threshold models is the Schelling (1971) model of
segregation. Threshold models do not have wave-like properties since the rate at which
shocks decay are not geometric. Crucially, these models are capable of generating local
amplification – that is, shocks can be amplified as they travel through the network; however
these models are notoriously difficult to analyze.
In this paper, I consider a model that bridges the gap between the continuous and
discrete models. Specifically, I explicitly account for the mass of firms in a given industry.
Industries with a continuum of firms behave continuously – the mass of firms responds
continuously to shocks. On the other hand, lumpy industries, with only a few firms,
behave discontinuously. For instance, a negative shock to an unconcentrated industry, say
hairdressing, will result in some fraction of hairdressers exiting. The fraction exiting will be
a continuous function of the size of the shock. The effect on a neighboring industry will be
attenuated by the strength of its connections to hairdressing. However, a negative shock
to a highly concentrated industry, like automobile manufacturing, will have no effect on
the number of firms unless it is large enough to force an exit. But once a large firm exits, it
imparts an additional impulse to the size of the shock which can trigger a cascade. Because
the model is flexible enough to express both behaviors, I can provide conditions under
which we can expect a continuous approximation to a discontinuous model to perform
badly.
The idea of cascading – domino-like – chain reactions also appears outside of economics.
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In particular, models of contagion and diffusion like the threshold models considered by
Kempe et al. (2003) have these features. In these models, notions of connectedness play a
key role since the only way contagion can spread is via connections between nodes. An
interesting implication of embedding a contagion model into a general equilibrium economy
is the role prices and aggregate demand play – a role that does not have analogues in
other threshold models. Typically, in a threshold model, shocks can only travel along edges.
Contagion can only spread to nodes who are connected to an infected node. This important
intuition breaks down in general equilibrium models since all firms are linked together via
aggregate demand. This means that general equilibrium forces can act like long-distance
carriers of disease. Shocks in one fragile industry, like the financial industry, can jump via
aggregate demand, to a different fragile industry like automobile manufacturing even if
these two industries are not connected.
The structure of paper is as follows. In section 2.2, I set up the model and define
its equilibrium. In section 2.3, I characterize the equilibrium conditional on the mass of
entrants in each industry and define some key centrality measures. In section 2.4, I study
how the model behaves when the extensive margin of firm entry and exit is shut down. I
prove results showing that the network structure can be summarized by sufficient statistics
related to size. I also show that we can think of these models as non-interconnected models
with different parameters. Finally, I show that this class of models is incapable of local
amplification of shocks. In section 2.5, I allow firm entry and exit. First, I characterize the
model’s responses to shocks in the limit where all firms are massless. I show that sufficient
statistics are no longer available and that systemic importance is endogenous. Then, I
consider the case when firms can have positive mass, and show that with atomistic firms,
shocks can be locally amplified. I prove an inapproximability result showing conditions
under which we should expect a continuous approximation to a discontinuous model to
perform badly. In section 2.6, motivated by the Ford example I discuss above, I consider
conditions under which firms’ incentives align with those of society. Specifically, when can
we trust one firm’s testimony about whether or not another firm should be bailed out. I
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conclude in section 2.7.
2.2 Model
In this section, I spell out the structure of the model and define the equilibrium. There
are three types of agents: households, firms, and a government. Each firm belongs to an
industry, and there are N industries.
The households in the model are homogenous with a unit mass. The representative
household maximizes utility
U(c1, . . . , cN) =
(
N
∑
k=1
β
1
σ
k c
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
,
where ck represents composite consumption of varieties from industry k and σ > 0 is the
elasticity of substitution across industries. The composite consumption good produced by
industry k is given by
ck =
(
Nk
∑
i=1
∆kc(k, i)
εk−1
εk
) εk
εk−1
,
where c(k, i) is household consumption from firm i in industry k and εk > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution across firms within industry k. Here, Nk is the number of firms active in
industry k and ∆k is the mass of each firm. The assumption that ∆k is constant for all firms
in industry k means firms in each industry are homogenous. The total mass of firms in
industry k is given by Mk = Nk∆k. The household’s budget is given by
∑
k,i
p(k, i)c(k, i) = wl +∑
k,i
pi(k, i)− τ,
where p(k, i) is the price of firm i in industry k and pi(k, i) is firm i in industry k’s profits.
The wage is w and labor is inelastically supplied at l. For the rest of the paper, and without
loss of generality, we take labor to be the numeraire so that w = 1, and fix the supply of
labor l = 1. Lump sum taxes by the government are denoted τ.
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Let firm i in industry k maximize profits
pi(k, i) = p(k, i)y(k, i)−
N
∑
l=1
Nl
∑
j
p(l, j)x(k, i, l, j)− wl(k, i)− w fk + τk,
where p(k, i) is the price and y(k, i) is the output of the firm. Inputs from firm j in industry
l are x(k, i, l, j) and labor inputs are l(k, i). Finally, in order to operate, each firm pays a fixed
cost fk in units of labor and the firm potentially receives a lump sum subsidy τk. The mass
parameter ∆k controls how finely the fixed costs of industry k can be split up – in other
words, it captures increasing returns to scale at the industry level. The firm’s production
function (once the fixed cost has been paid) is constant returns to scale
y(k, i) =
(
α
1
σ
k (zkl(k, i))
σ−1
σ +
N
∑
l=1
ω
1
σ
k,lx(k, i, l)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
.
Here, σ > 0 is again the elasticity of substitution among inputs, and ωkl is the CES share
parameter for how intensively firms in industry k use composite inputs from industry l.
The N × N matrix of ωkl determine the network-structure of this economy. One can think
of this matrix as the adjacency matrix of a weighted directed graph. The parameter αk > 0
gives the intensity with which firms in industry k use labor.
Labor productivity shocks, like the ones considered by Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Atalay
(2013) are denoted by zk. Note that when σ , 1, a productivity shock zk to industry k is
equivalent to changing that industry’s labor intensity from αk to αkzσ−1k . Therefore, as long
as σ , 1, we can think of αk as including both the productivity shock and the labor intensity.
This way we do not need to directly make reference to the shocks z since they are just
equivalent to changing α. This equivalence breaks down when σ = 1, and in those cases, we
shall have to work directly with z. For the majority of this paper, I focus on the propagation
of productivity shocks. When the elasticity of substitution is equal to one, these are precisely
the shocks considered by Acemoglu et al. (2012). The same methods can easily be used to
study other shocks. I defer the discussion of how other shocks, like fixed-cost shocks or
demand shocks, would affect the results to the end of the paper.
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The composite intermediate input from industry l used by firm i in industry k is
x(k, i, l) =
(
Nl
∑
j=1
∆lx(k, i, l, j)
εl−1
εl
) εl
εl−1
,
where ε l is the elasticity of substitution across different firms within industry l. Note that
the elasticities of substitution are the same for all users of an industry’s output.
The government runs a balanced budget so that
∑
k
τk = τ.
We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In period 1, entry decisions are made
simultaneously. In period 2, firms play monopolistic competition conditional on period 1’s
entry decisions.
Definition 2.2.1. A monopolistically competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices p(i, k),
wage w, and input demands x(i, k, l, j), outputs y(i, k), consumptions c(i, k) and labor
demands l(i, k) such that for mass of entrants {Mk}Nk=1 and vector of productivity shocks zk,
(i) Each firm maximizes its profits taking as given the industrial price level and industrial
demand,
(ii) the representative household chooses consumption to maximize utility,
(iii) the government runs a balanced budget,
(iv) markets for each good and labor clear.
Note that the productivity shock is known at the start of the game. Changing the
information structure to study the effects of uncertainty on the actions of agents is an
interesting extension that I leave for future work.
Let Π : RN+ ×RN+ → RN be the function mapping the masses of entrants M and vector
of productivity shocks z to industrial profits assuming monopolistic competition in period
2. In theorem 2.3.3, I analytically characterize this function.
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Definition 2.2.2. A vector of integers {Nk}Nk=1 is an equilibrium number of entrants if
Πi(Mi, M−i, z) ≥ 0 > Πi(Mi + ∆i, M−i, z) (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}),
where Mj = Nj∆j, for all j.
Intuitively, a vector of integers is an equilibrium number of entrants if all firms make
non-negative profits, and the entry of an additional firm in any industry results in firms in
that industry making negative profits.
Notation
Let ei denote the ith standard basis vector. Let Ω be the N × N matrix whose ijth element is
equal to ωij. Let α and β be the N × 1 vectors consisting of αis and βis. Let M˜ be the N × N
diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is equal to M
1
εi−1
i , and let M be the N × N
diagonal matrix whose ith element is Mi. Finally, let µ be the N × N diagonal matrix whose
ith diagonal element is the mark-up ε i/(ε i − 1) charged by firms in industry i. Let ◦ denote
the element-wise or Hadamard product, and diag : RN → RN2 be the operator that maps a
vector to a diagonal matrix.
Definition 2.2.3. An economy E is defined by the tuple E = (β,Ω, α, ε, σ, f ,∆). The vector
β contains household taste parameters, Ω captures the input-output share parameters, α
contains the industrial labor share parameters, ε > 1 is the vector of industrial elasticities
of substitution, σ > 0 is the cross-industry elasticity of substitution, f is the vector of fixed
costs, and ∆ is the vector of masses of firms in each industry.
Before analyzing the model, it helps to define some key statistics. These are standard
definitions from the literature on monopolistic competition. See, for example, Bettendorf
and Heijdra (2003).
Definition 2.2.4. The price index for industry k is given by
pk =
(
Nk
∑
i
p(k, i)1−εk
) 1
1−εk
,
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and the total composite output of industry k is given by
yk =
(
Nk
∑
i
y(k, i)
εk−1
εk
) εk
εk−1
.
The consumer price index, which represents the price level for the household, is given by
Pc =
(
N
∑
k
βk p1−σk
) 1
1−σ
,
and total consumption by the household is given by
C =
(
N
∑
k=1
β
1
σ
k c
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
,
which is just the utility of the household.
These are the “ideal” price and quantity averages for each industry. The reason we do
not simply average prices to get a price index or add outputs to get total output is because
even within each industry, each firm is producing a slightly different product. When the
elasticity of substitution εk = 0, then the price index for that industry is simply the sum of
all the prices since there is no substitution and a consumer of this industry must buy all the
varieties. When the elasticity of substitution εk → ∞, the price index for an industry is just
the minimum price, since households will only purchase from the cheapest firm in each
industry. An important special case is when εk → 1, where the price index is a geometric
average of the industrial prices.
2.3 Monopolistic Competition Subgame
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium in the monopolistic competition subgame of
period 2, conditional on the number of entrants in each industry. Before stating any results,
it helps to define some key industrial statistics.
Let us define supply-side and demand-side centrality measures.
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Definition 2.3.1. The supplier centrality is
β˜′ = β′Ψs,
where
Ψs = (I − M˜σ−1µ−σΩ)−1 =
∞
∑
n=0
(
M˜σ−1µ−σΩ
)n
.
This captures the frequency with which each industry appears in supply chains. The kth
element of β˜ captures demand from the household that reaches industry k, whether directly
or indirectly through other industries who use k’s products. The following helps establish
why we might care about β˜
Lemma 2.3.1. In equilibrium,
β˜i =
(
pσi yi
Pσc C
)
,
where Pc is the ideal price index for the household, C is total consumption by the household, pi is
industry i’s ideal price index and yi is industry i’s composite output.
Note that in the Cobb-Douglas limit, where the elasticity of substitution across industries
σ is equal to one, β˜i is precisely an industry’s share of sales. In the Cobb-Douglas case, β˜
coincides with the influence measure defined by Acemoglu et al. (2012).
There are two reasons to think of β˜ as a supplier centrality. First, since it measures how
frequently an industry appears in other agents’ supply chains, it means that star suppliers
have high β˜. Secondly, as we shall see, β˜ captures the response of output to productivity
shocks. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2012) show that in a Cobb-Douglas model without
an extensive margin, β˜ captures the extent to which industry-specific labor productivity
shocks affect output. Furthermore, since β˜ is share of sales in a Cobb-Douglas economy, the
work of Hulten (1978) implies that β˜ maps marginal TFP shocks to aggregate output. The
intuition for these results is clear: if a firm is supplying a large fraction of the economy, then
its productivity shocks have a large impact on output.
Note two important facts about β˜. First, if there is no entry, so that M˜ is constant, then
β˜ is exogenous with respect to productivity shocks. Second, note that β˜k depends only on
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industry k’s consumers, and not on industry k’s suppliers. That is, two industries with the
same demand-chain will have the same β˜ regardless of their own supply chains (I formally
show this in the next section).
An analogous demand-side centrality measure can also be defined.
Definition 2.3.2. The consumer centrality is
α˜ = Ψdα,
where
Ψd = (I − µ1−σM˜σ−1Ω)−1µ1−σM˜σ−1 =
∞
∑
n=0
(
µ1−σM˜σ−1Ω
)n
µ1−σM˜σ−1.
This is the flip-side to the supply-side centrality measure. It captures how frequently an
industry appears in demand-chains. Whereas β˜k depended only on who bought from k, the
consumer centrality α˜k depends only on who k buys from. Baqaee (2014c) shows that, in a
model without an extensive margin, α˜ captures the response of output to demand shocks.
As the following lemma shows, consumer centrality α˜ is a transformation of an industry’s
price:
Lemma 2.3.2. In equilibrium, ( pi
w
)1−σ
= α˜i,
where pi is industry i’s price index and w is the nominal wage.
Since prices are collinear with marginal costs, this means that α˜ is a measure of marginal
costs. This makes clear why α˜k depends on industry k’s supply-chain, since the it is suppliers
and not consumers, who contribute to marginal costs.
In defining the consumer centrality α˜ and proving lemma 2.3.2, I have not made any
reference to the productivity shocks z. As alluded to earlier, this is an abuse of notation,
because I treat αk as already incorporating the productivity shock. This is because when
σ , 1, a productivity shock zk to industry k is equivalent to changing that industry’s labor
intensity from αk to αkzσ−1k . Therefore, as long as σ , 1, we can think of αk as including
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both the productivity shock and the labor intensity. When σ = 1, the consumer centrality is
trivially equal to a vector of ones regardless of the productivity shocks.
A key result, that delivers much of the intuition of the results in the paper, is the following
characterization of active firms’ profit functions in terms of supplier and consumer centrality
measures:
Theorem 2.3.3. The payoffs of firm i in industry k are equal to
pi(k, i) =
1
εk Mk︸  ︷︷  ︸
industrial competition
× Pσc Cw1−σ︸       ︷︷       ︸
GE terms
× β˜k︸︷︷︸
supplier centrality
× α˜k︸︷︷︸
consumer centrality
− w fk︸︷︷︸
fixed cost
.
Note that Mkpi(k, i) gives industry k’s profits Πk.
Without loss of generality, we can set the nominal wage w = 1. The expression in
theorem 2.3.3 tells us that the profits of a firm are determined by a few intuitive key
statistics. The product of β˜k and α˜k, which are the supply-side and demand-side centrality
of the industry give us an industry’s share of sales. The term Pσc C is an economy-wide
shifter of all industry’s profits, akin to aggregate demand. The division by εk converts an
industry’s sales into profits since the within-industry elasticity of substitution determines
mark-ups. Dividing gross industrial profits by the mass firms Mk in that industry turns
gross industrial profits into gross firm-level profits. Finally, we arrive at a firm’s profits by
subtracting the fixed costs of entry from its gross profits.
Path Example
Before moving on to an analysis of the equilibrium, first let us demonstrate the intuition so
far using a simple example of a production chain, shown in figure 2.1.
Begin by computing the supplier-centrality for node k in this chain:
β˜k = β
′(I − M˜σ−1µ−σΩ)−1ek,
=
k−1
∏
i=0
(1− αi)M
σ−1
εi−1
i
(
ε i
ε i − 1
)−σ
.
First, note that β˜k is a product. Therefore, if any industry i < k disappears Mi = 0, then the
69
HH
1 2 · · · N
l1 + pi1
l2 + pi2
li + pii
lN + piN
Figure 2.1: A production path example. The solid arrows represent the flow of goods and services, and the
dashed arrows indicate the flow of money. The household HH buys from industry 1 who buys from industry 2
and so on. Each industry in turn pays labor income and rebates profits to the household.
supplier centrality of industry k drops to zero. This intuitive, since if a downstream industry
collapses, that cuts all upstream industries off from any demand. The centrality of k as a
supplier is increasing in the strength of its downstream connections (1− α) and decreasing
in the size of downstream markups ε i/(ε i − 1). The latter represents double-marginalization
in this economy. Note that as long as the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1, an
industry’s supplier centrality is increasing in the mass of downstream industries. Intuitively,
when the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, more industries downstream attract
more demand from the household. Lastly, observe that kth industry’s supplier centrality
depends purely on its customers, customers’ customers, and so on. It does not depend on
its suppliers. This is a general property of the supplier centrality, and we shall prove it in
section 2.4.
Now, compute the consumer-centrality for node k in this chain:
α˜k = e′k(I − M˜σ−1µ1−σΩ)−1M˜σ−1µ1−σα,
=
N
∑
j=k+1
(
j−1
∏
i=k
(1− αi)M
σ−1
εi−1
i
(
ε i
ε i − 1
)1−σ)
αj + αk M
σ−1
εk−1
k
(
εk
εk − 1
)1−σ
.
The consumer centrality is slightly more complex. It is an arithmetico-geometric. The
intuition is that even if an upstream supplier i for industry k disappears, industry k still has
access to all suppliers j where j < i. But any supplier j > i also drops out. This gives rise to
the arithmetic series, where each term is a product. Once again, the consumer centrality is
increasing in the strength of the connection. And as long as the elasticity of substitution is
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greater than one, consumer centrality is decreasing in markups and increasing in the mass
of upstream firms.
When the elasticity of substitution is less than one, consumer centrality is increasing in
upstream markups. This sounds perverse until we recall that proposition 2.3.1 implies that
α˜k =
( pk
w
)1−σ
.
Therefore, when the elasticity of substitution is less than one, higher consumer centralities
indicate higher prices, not lower prices. Therefore, it is intuitive that in this case, higher
upstream markups correspond to higher consumer centrality, since this corresponds to
higher prices. Finally, note that, consumer centrality of a firm depends only on who it
buys from, and not on who it sells to. Once again, this is a general property of consumer
centrality that we discuss in more detail later.
Analysis of the Full Equilibrium
Our analysis of the equilibrium of this model, and its responses to the shocks, will proceed
in parts. First, we fix the mass of firms in each industry to isolate the intensive margin
responses. Firms may make nonzero profits in equilibrium, and the model is a generalization
of the models in Acemoglu et al. (2012) or Long and Plosser (1983). With the entry margin
shut down, I show that the relevant notion of a firm’s systemic importance is exogenous
and is approximated by its share of sales. Furthermore, a firm’s importance depends only
on that firm’s role as a supplier of goods. A firm’s role as a consumer of inputs is irrelevant.
Lastly, I show productivity shocks can never be amplified in this class of models. This is
because a shock is always largest at its source – as it travels through the network, the shock
is attenuated and the aggregate impact of the shock is a convergent geometric sum. The
more influential the firm, the slower the decay. However, there are no cases where the shock
actually gets bigger as it travels through the network.
After analyzing the model without entry, I allow free-entry but consider the limit of the
model when firms have no mass, ‖∆‖ → 0. In this case, systemic importance is endogenous
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and can change depending on economic conditions. Furthermore, importance is no longer
well-approximated by size. Finally, a firm’s systemic importance depends not just on its
importance as a supplier of inputs but also as a consumer of inputs. In this sense, both the
in-degrees and out-degrees matter. However, in this limit, the model still cannot amplify
shocks. As in the model without an extensive margin, shocks decay geometrically as they
travel from the source.
Finally, I consider the case when ‖∆‖ > 0. This model features amplification mechanisms,
and cascading failures, that are not present in the continuous model. This model can be
thought of as an interpolation between discontinuous threshold models and continuous
pulse models. To solve for the discontinuous model’s equilibrium, we need to solve a
computationally intractable integer programming problem. Most of the time, this model’s
behavior can be approximated by its continuous limit. However, in certain cases, its behavior
is very different. This is because in some cases, a small shock can cause a systemically
important firm to discontinuously exit. This can snowball into further failures and build on
itself. I prove an inapproximability result that gives conditions for when the continuous
model behaves very differently to the discrete model, along with some informative examples.
2.4 No Extensive Margin
In this section, we consider the behavior of this model when the extensive margin is shut
down. This assumption means that this model is a generalization of the canonical input-
output model of Long and Plosser (1983). I show that in this class of models, an industry’s
influence on other industries and on the aggregate economy is exogenously determined,
and that it is only dependent on how important the industry is as a supplier of inputs.
Furthermore, I show that a firm’s size is an important determinant of a firm’s influence.
Last, I show that this class of models is incapable of local amplification. A shock to a firm
or industry will always decay as it travels from the source to its neighbors. This makes clear
why systemically important industries must be large ones, since the decaying propagation
of shocks means that a shock’s aggregate impact is necessarily limited by its immediate
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impact.
2.4.1 Perfect Competition
Standard models that lack an entry margin are typically perfectly competitive, with no fixed
costs, so that the representative firm in each industry makes zero profits. To get to this
benchmark, let fi = 0 for every industry so that there are no fixed costs; and let ε i → ∞ so
that all industries are perfectly competitive and firms have no market power. Then, due
to constant returns to scale, the size of firms in each industry is indeterminate. Without
loss of generality, we can fix M = I so that there is a unit mass of firms in each industry.
Technically, there may be entry or exit, but since firms in each industry are completely
homogenous, entry and exit is observationally equivalent to firms getting larger or smaller.
That is, the extensive and intensive margins are indistinguishable.
Note that in this special case Ψs = Ψd = (I − Ω)−1. To simplify notation, let Ψ =
(I − Ω)−1. In subsection 2.4.2, I show how allowing for fixed costs and monopolistic
competition, but not allowing entry, would affect the results of this section.
First, let us consider real GDP C as a function of productivity shocks z for a Cobb-
Douglas economy E.
Proposition 2.4.1 (Productivity shock). Let the elasticity of substitution across industries be equal
to one, then
log(C(z|E)) = β˜′(α ◦ log(z)) =
N
∑
k=1
wlk
GDP
log(zk).
That is, the network-structure Ω which has N2 parameters is summarized by N sufficient statistics.
These sufficient statistics are each industry’s expenditures on labor as a share of GDP.
This proposition is a slight generalization of results in Acemoglu et al. (2012). If we
assume that each industry’s labor share is constant, so that αi = α for all i, and household
expenditure shares are uniform so that βi = 1/N, then we exactly recover the result in
Acemoglu et al. (2012), which tells us that the effect of a productivity shock on real GDP
depends on share of sales.
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Corollary (Productivity shock). Let the elasticity of substitution across industries be equal to one,
and all industries have the same labor share α, then
log(C(z|E)) = α
N
∑
k=1
pkyk
GDP
log(zk).
That is, the network-structure Ω which has N2 parameters is summarized by N sufficient statistics.
These sufficient statistics are each industry’s share of sales.
These propositions imply that when σ = 1, the supplier centrality β˜ is a sufficient statistic
for translating productivity shocks into real GDP. In particular, the aggregate impact of a
vector of shocks depends on the supplier centrality weighted average of the productivity
shocks. As lemma 2.3.1 shows, β˜k is equal to industry k’s share of sales. Therefore, the
bigger the industry in equilibrium, the larger the impact of its productivity shocks on GDP.
The exact nature of the network-structure is irrelevant since an industry i could be big
because it sells a lot to the household (large βi) or because it supplies many other firms (the
ith column of Ψ is large).
These intuitions also carry over to the case where σ , 1. When the elasticity of
substitution across industries σ , 1, productivity shocks to labor are isomorphic to changes
in the labor share parameters α. In particular, a productivity shock zk to industry k is
equivalent to changing industry k’s labor share parameter from αk to αkzσ−1k . Therefore, we
simply investigate changes to α.
Proposition 2.4.2 (Productivity shock). When the elasticity of substitution across industries is
not equal to one, then
C(α|E) = (β˜′α) 1σ−1 .
That is, the network-structure Ω, which has N2 parameters, is summarized by N sufficient statistics:
β˜.
Outside of the Cobb-Douglas case, the supply-side centrality β˜′ = β′Ψs is no longer an
industry’s share of sales. Lemma 2.3.1 shows that it is still related to an industry’s share of
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sales however. In fact, even though β˜′ is not equal to share of sales globally, it is still closely
related to share of sales.
Proposition 2.4.3. Around the steady-state, where zk = 1 for all k, we have that
β˜k
β˜l
=
pkyk
plyl
,
so although β˜ is not equal to share of sales everywhere, at the steady-state, it does reflect an industry’s
size.
This is a consequence of that fact that in the steady-state with no markups or productivity
shocks, all firms have the same price. And, as long as all firms have roughly the same price,
we can interpret β˜ as being roughly equal to share of sales. Away from this steady state, β˜
is still the relevant sufficient statistic, although it is no longer equal to the share of sales.
Even though β˜ no longer corresponds to an industry’s size everywhere, it is still exoge-
nous, and depends solely on the amount of household demand that reaches the industry,
whether directly through retail sales, or indirectly through other industries. As before, the
exact nature of the network-structure is irrelevant since an industry i could be big because
it sells a lot to the household (large βi) or because it supplies many other firms (the ith
column of Ψs is large).
Furthermore, not only is this statistic exogenous with respect to productivity shocks, but
it also depends only on the industry’s role as a supplier to other agents. If two industries
sell the same amount to the same group of industries, they will have the same β˜ regardless
of who they themselves are buying from. We can formally state this intuition as follows.
Proposition 2.4.4. Consider two industries k and l such that
ωjk = ωjl , (j = 1, . . . , N), and βk = βl ,
then β˜k = β˜l . In other words, if two industries have the same immediate customer base, their
supplier-centralities are the same.
In light of these propositions, we can state the following result.
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Theorem 2.4.5. For every household share parameter vector β and input-output share parameter
matrix Ω, there exists a different economy with household share parameter vector β˜ and degenerate
input-output share parameter matrix 0, such that
C(α|β,Ω) = C(α|β˜,0).
This result means that the existence of input-output connections is isomorphic to a
change in household share parameters. This underlies the earlier claim that, it is not the
interconnections themselves, but how intensively the household ultimately consumes goods
from each industry that determines the model’s equilibrium responses to shocks.
Local Amplification
One reason why a firm’s size matters for its impact on aggregate outcomes is the continuous
nature of shock propagation in this class of models. In input-output models, a shock to
industry k has the largest impact on industry k. The shock influences k’s neighbors, but
the effect of the shock is attenuated by the weakness of its connections. The effect of the
shock on k’s neighbors’ neighbors is further attenuated by the weakness of its connections’s
connections. The shock decays geometrically with a decay rate controlled by the input-
output matrix Ω. This implies that the shock has its greatest impact at its source.
To show this, first we need the following technical lemma, which is a novel result in
linear algebra.
Lemma 2.4.6. Let A be a non-negative N × N matrix whose rows sum to one. Let a, b, c be N × 1
vectors in the unit cube with c = a + b. Let B = (I − diag(1− c)A)−1. Then
e′iBei
e′iBa
≥
e′jBei
e′jBa
(i , j),
where ei is the ith standard basis vector. When a is strictly positive, then the inequality is strict.
The following proposition shows that the equilibrium effect of a productivity shock zi to
industry i’s sales, in percentage change terms, is greatest for industry i. Furthermore, the
effect on other industries decays geometrically according to the sum of geometric matrix
76
series Ψ. Since sales are proportional to gross profits, the proposition also applies to gross
profits.
Proposition 2.4.7. Consider the semi-elasticity of firm i’s sales relative to firm j’s sales with respect
to a shock to firm i’s productivity around the steady state z = 1:
d log(salesi)
dzσ−1i
− d log(salesj)
dzσ−1i
= αi
(
Ψii −Ψji
)
> 0.
This proposition formalizes the intuition that a shock has to decay as it travels, and
the input-output connections Ω control the rate of decay. The rate of decay can be slow
enough to overturn the law of large numbers, as shown by Acemoglu et al. (2012). However,
even though the network can slow the decay, proposition 2.4.7 shows that shocks cannot be
amplified as they travel out from their source. In order for shocks to industry k to have a big
impact, industry k must have strong connections to the household, or strong connections
to other industries that have strong connections to the household, and so on. But having
strong connections to the household implies that the industry has to be large in equilibrium.
The lack of local amplification means that size and influence are closely linked in this class
of models. This, and the earlier results in this section, show that as long as firms are small,
and they do not supply large fractions of the economy, then shocks to them cannot have
significant aggregate effects.
2.4.2 No Extensive-Margin and Monopolistic Competition
So far, we have assumed that there are no fixed costs of entry and all industries are perfectly
competitive. In this subsection, I consider the case where there is no entry but firms have
some market power and positive fixed costs. This makes it easier to understand how adding
the extensive margin will affect the results, since the extensive margin will only matter
once we have fixed costs and product differentiation. I state a few key propositions in this
subsection to show how the intuition of the previous section will carry over to this case.
First, let us consider the special case where the elasticity of substitution across industries
σ = 1, which is the Cobb-Douglas case.
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Proposition 2.4.8 (Productivity shock). Let the elasticity of substitution across industries be equal
to one, then
log(C(z|E)) = const+ β′(I −Ω)−1(α ◦ log(z)).
That is, the network-structure Ω, which has N2 parameters, is summarized by N sufficient statistics.
These sufficient statistics are β′(I −Ω)−1 = β′Ψd.
The sufficient statistic β′Ψd is closely related to the sales shares β˜ = β′Ψs. To see this,
note that
β˜ = β′
∞
∑
t=0
(
µ−1Ω
)t
,
where µ is the diagonal matrix of mark-ups. Whereas,
β′Ψd = β′
∞
∑
t=0
(Ω)t .
Therefore, the relevant statistics β′Ψs are the sales shares that would prevail if there were no
mark-ups. Intuitively, they are still an exogenous supplier-centrality measure.
Proposition 2.4.9 (Productivity shock). When the elasticity of substitution across industries is
not equal to one and there is no entry or exit, then
C(α|E) = 1−M
′ f
1− diag(ε)−1 β˜′α˜/β′α˜
(
β′α˜
) 1
σ−1 ,
= f (β′ΨsΨdα, β′Ψdα) = f (β˜′Ψdα, β′Ψdα).
That is, the network-structure Ω, which has N2 parameters, is summarized by 2N sufficient statistics:
β′Ψd and β˜′Ψd.
β˜ is just the supplier centrality we have dealt with previously. It is an exogenous supplier
centrality, and depends solely on the amount of household demand that reaches the industry,
whether directly through retail sales, or indirectly through other industries. As before, the
exact nature of the network-structure is irrelevant since an industry could be big because it
sells a lot to the household (large β) or because it supplies many other firms (large Ψdei).
The Cobb-Douglas case constitutes a very special knife-edge scenario where, because
expenditure shares are exogenous, the length of supply chains do not matter. Once we
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allow for market power εk < ∞, and endogenous expenditure shares σ , 1, each time funds
flow from one industry to another, they are attenuated by monopoly profits. Longer chains
accrue larger mark-ups, and this changes the expenditure shares. Due to this effect, we
need a measure that not only takes the intensity of supply chains into account, but also
their length. This is the role that the second sufficient statistic β′ΨsΨd = β˜′Ψd plays.
To see this, suppose that we have a unit mass of firms in each industry M = I and that
all mark-ups are zero. In this extreme case, Ψd = Ψs. So, we can interpret
ΨdΨs = (I −Ω)−2 = I + 2Ω+ 3Ω2 + 4Ω3 + . . . .
This calculation gives some intuition for why β′ΨsΨd is a supply-side centrality measure
that controls for the length of the supplier relationship as well as its intensity.
Local Amplification
The following proposition shows that the equilibrium effect of a productivity shock zi to
industry i’s sales, in percentage change terms, is greatest for industry i. Furthermore, the
effect on other industries decays geometrically according to the sum of geometric matrix
series Ψs. Since sales are proportional to gross profits, the proposition also applies to gross
profits.
Proposition 2.4.10. For any economy E, if we fix the mass of firms in each industry, we have
d log(salesi)
dzi
− d log(salesj)
dzi
=
Ψsiiαi
α˜i
−
Ψsjiαi
α˜j
≥ 0.
2.5 Extensive Margin
Now that we understand the properties of the model without the extensive margin, let
us consider how entry and exit changes the model’s properties. In this case, the network
structure is endogenous since the number of firms in each industry is endogenous. This
means that our notions of centrality β˜ and α˜ are determined in equilibrium, and they change
in response to shocks. It is no longer the case that an industry’s influence is exogenous,
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nor is it the case that only its role as a supplier matters. In other words, an industry’s
influence depends both on its in-degrees and its out-degrees, and its degrees are determined
in equilibrium depending on the mass of firms in other industries. Two firms with identical
roles as suppliers can have markedly different effects on the equilibrium depending on their
roles as consumers.
Our analysis will proceed in steps. First, we consider the limiting case of the model
where all firms have zero mass. This means that the mass of firms in each industry will
continuously adjust to ensure that all active firms make zero profits in equilibrium. This
will allow for sharp analytical results about the equilibrium response to marginal shocks.
Once we have characterized the properties of the continuous limit, we consider the case
where firms can have positive mass ∆ > 0. In this case, the model inherits some of the
cascading and amplification properties of linear threshold models like Schelling (1971), but it
also retains the linear geometric structure of Leontief (1936). Most of the time, the model can
be expected to behave like its continuous limit; however, occasionally, this approximation
can dramatically break down. The intuition is that each industry can support an integer
number of firms. If firms are sufficiently small and there are many of them in an industry,
then a shock to the industry will continuously perturb the mass of firms in that industry.
However, if there are few firms in an industry, then shocks below a certain threshold are
attenuated and will not result in any change to the number of active firms. However if
shocks are bigger than that threshold, they will cause a firm to discontinuously exit or
enter. This adds an additional impulse to the original shock, which will now travel to the
neighbors of the affected industry with more force. This process can feed on itself as a small
firm’s failure can trigger a chain reaction that results in a large of mass of firms exiting.
A full characterization of the equilibrium of the model with lumpy firms is not possible.
A natural solution is to use the continuous model to approximate the behavior of the model
with lumpy firms. However, I show conditions under which the continuous limit provides a
bad approximation to the discontinuous model. I show that the network can make firm’s
payoffs non-monotonic in each other’s entry decisions. So, there are regions where entry
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decisions are strategic complements and and regions where they are substitutes. I show
that when a shock puts us close to this intermediate region, the approximation error will
explode.
To foreshadow the formal model, consider the extreme toy example in figure 2.2. The
household HH is served by three industries: GM, F, and L. Two of these industries share a
common supplier D. To make the intuition transparent, suppose that each industry consists
of one firm. Recall that theorem 2.3.3 implies that in order for a firm to remain profitable,
its sales β˜iα˜iPσc C have to be greater than an exogenous threshold ε i fi. Each term of β˜, α˜,
and Pσc C can respond to a shock. Therefore, the shock to a firm can travel via network
connections β˜ and α˜ or it can travel through household demand Pσc C.
The example in figure 2.2 demonstrates. In panel 2.2a, I show a negative shock to L’s
fixed cost so that L is forced to exit. Then, through the effect of L on Pσc C, it can be the case
that GM is forced to exit, and this is shown in panel 2.2b. GM exiting will cause D’s supplier
centrality β˜D to fall, and so D can be forced out, shown in panel 2.2c. Finally, once D is
gone, this can cause F’s consumer centrality α˜ to drop, which can cause them to also exit. Of
course, this is not a realistic calibration of the model, and the assumptions of monopolistic
competition are hard to justify with single-firm industries. However, this stark example
does illustrate the forces operating in the model. In a canonical input-output model, like
the one in section 2.4.2, a change to the fixed costs of L would have no network effects and
simply lower real GDP C by the amount of the fixed cost.
This example shows that the model is capable of formalizing the intuition for why a
bail-out of GM may have been crucial. As pointed out by Goolsbee and Krueger (2015), in
this scenario, it might be “essential to rescue GM to prevent an uncontrolled bankruptcy
and the failure of countless suppliers, with potentially systemic effects that could sink the
entire auto industry.”
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HH
GM F
D
L
(a) L exists due to increased fixed costs.
HH
GM F
D
L
(b) Effect on GM through household.
HH
GM F
D
L
(c) Effect on D through GM.
HH
GM F
D
L
(d) Effect on F through D.
Figure 2.2: A toy representation of an economy where the direction of arrows denote the flow of funds. The
node HH denotes the household. This shows how the shock can travel in both directions on the extensive
margin.
2.5.1 Massless Limit
To begin with, let us first consider the equilibrium of the model in the limit where ∆→ 0.
Computationally, this corresponds to the case where the mass of firms Mk in industry k will
adjust so that firms in industry k make exactly zero profits. This can be seen by taking the
limit of the expression in definition 2.2.2 as ∆ → 0. The primary motivation for looking
at this limit is analytical tractability. By considering massless firms, we can glean useful
intuition about the marginal effects of shocks on the equilibrium.
In this subsection, I show that once we allow for firm entry and exit, the model’s
equilibrium responses can no longer be characterized in terms of sufficient statistics. The
intuition is simple: the centrality measures β˜ and α˜ are functions of the masses of firms
in each industry. Since the mass of firms responds to shocks, the centrality measures also
respond to shocks. Furthermore, I show that an industry’s impact on supplier centralities
depends on the industry’s own supplier centrality and its role as a consumer of inputs. On
the other hand, an industry’s impact on consumer centralities depends on the industry’s own
consumer centrality and its role as a supplier of inputs. So, although the supplier (consumer)
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centrality only depends on out-degrees (in-degrees), the way supplier (consumer) centrality
changes in response to more entry depends on both the out-degrees and the in-degrees.
First to get intuition for the general model, let’s consider a very special case – the case
where the elasticity of substitution is equal to one. In this case, all expenditure shares are
exogenous. In this Cobb-Douglas case, we have the following result.
Proposition 2.5.1. When the elasticity of substitution is equal to one
C(z, f ) = β˜′
(
α ◦ log(z)− 1
ε− 1 ◦ log( f )
)
+ const.
Therefore, the network-structure is summarized by N sufficient statistics β˜. Furthermore, in
equilibrium
β˜i =
piyi
GDP
.
This shows that with Cobb-Douglas, the share of sales, which is exogenous, is again a
sufficient statistic. Once again, the details and the complexity of the network are irrelevant,
once we know each industry’s share of sales. This is a knife-edge case. Once we deviate
from Cobb-Douglas, expenditure shares respond to relative prices, and centrality measures
become endogenous. This special case shows that the mechanism for our upcoming results
depends crucially on the fact that expenditure shares respond to relative prices.
Out-of-Equilibrium Effect
To get intuition for the model’s properties, let’s consider the following out-of-equilibrium
comparative statics: how does industry k’s supplier centrality change when there is entry
in industry i , k? This comparative static holds fixed the mass of firms in all industries
except industry i. In equilibrium, of course, the masses in other industries would respond,
but it helps our understanding if we first isolate the partial equilibrium effect. If we had
lags in entry and exit, these partial equilibrium results would be relevant for understanding
short-run effects. Once we have characterized the out-of-equilibrium effects, we turn our
attention to the equilibrium responses of the model.
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Lemma 2.5.2. The derivative of β˜k with respect to a percentage change in the mass of firms in
industry i, holding fixed the mass of firms in all other industries is given by
1
Mi
∂β˜k
∂Mi
=
(
σ− 1
ε i − 1
)
β˜i(Ψsik − 1(i = k)).
This expression is very intuitive. The impact to industry k’s centrality as a supplier
depends on i’s importance as a supplier, and on how much i buys from k (whether directly
or indirectly). So big effects are felt if i is a key supplier and i buys a lot from k. Note
that if the elasticity of substitution σ = 1, then these derivatives are identically zero, which
explains the neutrality result in proposition 2.5.1.
For ease of notation, let
∂β˜
∂ log(M1)
= Ψ1,
then the result in lemma 2.5.2 can be written in matrix notation as
Ψ′1 = diag(β˜)diag
(
σ− 1
ε− 1
)
(Ψs − I) .
Similar results apply to the consumer centrality measure.
Lemma 2.5.3. The derivative of α˜k with respect to a percentage change in the mass of firms in
industry i, holding fixed the mass of firms in all other industries is given by
∂α˜k
∂Mi
= M1−σi
(
σ− 1
ε i − 1
)(
ε i
ε i − 1
)σ−1
α˜iΨdki,
This expression is the demand-side analogue to lemma 2.5.2. The impact to industry k’s
centrality as a consumer depends on on i’s importance as a consumer, and on how much i
sells to k (whether directly or indirectly). So big effects are felt if i is a key consumer and
i sells a lot of k. Once again, the impact to industry k’s consumer centrality depends on
industry i’s suppliers and i’s customers.
For ease of notation, let
∂α˜
∂ log(M1)
= Ψ2,
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then from lemma 2.5.3 we can write Ψ2 in matrix notation,
Ψ2 = Ψddiag(α˜)diag
(
σ− 1
ε− 1
)
µσ−1diag(M)1−σ.
Path Example
Before moving on to an analysis of the equilibrium, first let us demonstrate the intuition of
our partial equilibrium results using a simple example of a production chain depicted in
figure 2.3.
1 2 . . . N
HH
Figure 2.3: The arrows represent the flow of goods and services. Let ωk−1,k be constant for all k, and βk, αk
and εk be constant for all k.
In this example, each industry k sells some goods directly to the household, and some
goods to the industry below it k− 1. For ease of exposition, consider β˜ and α˜ at the point
where all industries have a unit mass of firms. In this example, β˜k is increasing in k and α˜k is
decreasing in k. That is, industry N is the most central supplier and least central consumer,
and industry 1 is the most central consumer and least central supplier.
Now consider changing the mass of firms in industry N. Industry N is the most central
supplier so β˜N > β˜k for k , N. However,
∂β˜k
∂MN
= 0,
because industry N buys from no other industries. Therefore, its impact on supplier
centralities is zero despite being the most central supplier.
Now consider changing the mass of firms in industry 1. Industry 1 is the most central
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consumer so α˜1 > α˜k for k , 1. However,
∂α˜k
∂M1
= 0 (k > 1),
because industry 1 sells to no other industries. Therefore, its impact on consumer centralities
is zero despite being the most central consumer.
This simple example illustrates why both the in-degrees and the out-degrees will matter
for how the centrality measures will respond to a change in the mass of firms in each
industry. Being a central supplier does not mean that entry or exit in your industry will
have any effects on the supplier centralities of other industries. Similarly, being a central
consumer does not imply that entry or exist in your industry will have any effects on the
consumer centralities of other industries. To be influential, a firm must be central both as a
consumer and as a supplier.
Equilibrium Impact of Shocks
So far, we have been focusing on out-of-equilibrium results. However, using lemmas 2.5.2
and 2.5.3, we can also analyse the general equilibrium impact of a productivity shock to an
industry.
Proposition 2.5.4. The derivative of the equilibrium mass of firms in each industry M with respect
to a labor productivity shock in industry k is given by(
d log(M)
dzk
)
= (I − diag(β˜)−1Ψ1 − diag(α˜)−1Ψ2)−1
(
1dPσc C/dzk
Pσc C
+ diag(α˜)−1Ψdek
)
.
So we see that in equilibrium, a productivity shock to industry k will first affect the
masses in all other industries through its effect on the aggregate objects Pσc C and through
its effect on the marginal costs of anyone who buys from k. However, the initial change in
masses results in the supplier and consumer centralities of all industries to change (captured
by Ψ1 and Ψ2). This change in centrality measures, in turn, causes the masses to adjust
again, and this changes the centralities again, and so on ad infinitum. This gives rise to a
geometric series and the equilibrium effect is the sum of this geometric series.
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For ease of notation, let
Λ =
d log(β˜) + log(α˜)
d log(M)
= diag(β˜)−1Ψ1 + diag(α˜)−1Ψ2.
Note that log(β˜) + log(α˜) is proportional to each industry’s share of sales. Therefore, Λ is
the elasticity of industry sizes relative to the mass of firms in each industry. Now we can
see the intuition of 2.5.4 most clearly by expressing the derivative as(
d log(M)
dzk
)
=
∞
∑
t=0
Λt
(
1dPσc C/dzk
Pσc C
+ diag(α˜)−1Ψsek
)
=
∞
∑
t=0
Λt
(
1dPσc C/dzk
Pσc C
)
︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
GE effect
+
∞
∑
t=0
Λt
(
diag(α˜)−1Ψsek
)
︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
network-structure effect
.
The term
diag(α˜)−1Ψsek
is the intensive-margin effect of a productivity shock to industry k. If industry k is more
productive, that increases the productivity of any industry that buys inputs from k. The
degree to which an industry downstream from k is affected depends on how intensively it
uses inputs from k (directly or indirectly). This is precisely the effect of a shock when the
extensive margin is shut down as shown in proposition 2.4.10. Therefore, we can think of
this as the traditional input-output effect.
With the extensive margin, the initial change in α˜ also causes the mass of firms to
change. This change in the mass of firms causes further changes in the masses of firms. The
cumulative effect on the equilibrium of these changes is captured by the “network-structure
effect” term. The shock also has an effect on the general price level and real GDP, and the
second “GE effect” captures this general equilibrium effect. It is a simple matter to show
that in equilibrium, dPσc C/dzk is just a weighted average of the network-structure effects.
As alluded to earlier, this complexity depends on the endogeneity of expenditure shares.
For the Cobb-Douglas case, these formulas lose their interesting properties, and we only
have the aggregate general equilibrium effects.
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Proposition 2.5.5. If Cobb-Douglas, then the matrix is diagonal, and we have
dMi/dzk
dMj/dzk
=
1
β˜i
+ 1α˜i +
1
Mi
1
β˜ j
+ 1α˜j +
1
Mj
,
because entry in industry i in response to shock to industry k is controlled just by exposure to
aggregate objects and not via network interactions.
Now, let us analyze how real GDP responds to productivity shocks in this massless limit.
This result should be compared to proposition 2.4.9, which gave the response when there
was no extensive margin of entry and exit.
Proposition 2.5.6. With free entry,(
d log(C)
dzk
)
= scalar β′Ψ2(I −Λ)−1
(
diag(α˜)−1 + I
)
Ψdekαkzσ−2k ,
where
scalar =
[
β′α˜+ β′Ψ2(I −Λ)−11
]−1
.
It helps to compare this result to our earlier results. The presence of Λ, which depends
on Ψ1 and Ψ2, and therefore depends on in-degrees and out-degrees, shows that the most
influential industry is not simply the industry who supplies the most or consumes the most.
Furthermore, all these matrices are now endogenous objects and depending on how many
firms are in each industry, they will take different values. This means that the sufficient
statistics approach of the earlier sections will no longer work. Furthermore, the influence
measure
β′Ψ2(I −Λ)−1
(
(diag(α˜))−1 + I
)
Ψd,
which maps industrial shocks to movements in real GDP is not tied to sales.
To isolate the effect of the shocks to just the extensive margin, we could look at shocks to
the fixed costs fk rather than to labor productivity. Such shocks only propagate through the
network due to the change in masses, and therefore give rise to cleaner analytical expressions.
However, to keep the results comparable to standard models, I have restricted my attention
to productivity shocks (which have both intensive and extensive margin effects).
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The results in this section show show that the extensive margin is an important channel
through which the network structure affects the equilibrium. However, despite the influence
measures being endogenous and related in more realistic ways to the network-structure,
this model is still incapable of generating local amplification.
Local Amplification
Now we can turn our attention to the behavior of a shock as it travels through the network.
The equilibrium impact of a change in an industry’s productivity at the firm level is very
stark.
Proposition 2.5.7. In equilibrium, the effect of a productivity shock zk on the sales of firm i in
industry k is the same as its effect on firm j in industry l.
d log(saleski)
dzk
− d log(salesl j)
dzk
= 0.
At the firm level, the mass of firms in each industry adjusts to ensure that all firms are
equally exposed to productivity shocks. At the industry-level, the conclusion is less stark.
Proposition 2.5.8. In equilibrium, the difference in the response of the profits of industry k relative
to industry j to a productivity shock to industry k is given by
d log(sk)
dzk
− d log(sj)
dzk
= (ek − ej)′(I −Λ)−1
(
diag(α˜)−1Ψsek
)
. (2.1)
Numerical simulations suggest that, in equilibrium, this expression is always negative.
In other words, the model is still incapable of amplifying shocks locally, and shocks decay
as they move away from their source.2 The intuition for equation (2.1) is the following: The
initial impact of a productivity shock to k, holding fixed the mass of firms in each industry, is
given by diag(α˜)−1Ψsek – this is the traditional input-output effect which captures the total
intensity with which each industry uses inputs from industry k. However, with entry, the
traditional input-output effect must be multiplied by a new term (I −Λ)−1. This captures
2The proof of this result is work in progress.
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how the industry’s sizes change in response to the intensive margin shock. Recall that
Λ =
∂ log(β˜) + log(α˜)
∂ log(M)
∝
∂ log(share of sales)
∂ log(M)
,
where the proportionality sign follows from lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Therefore, (I −Λ)−1
captures the cumulative effect of the shock on the size of the industries.
2.5.2 Lumpy Firms
In this section, we consider the equilibrium where ‖∆‖ > 0. The equilibrium we focus on is
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where firms make a simultaneous entry decision in
period 1, and in period 2 they play monopolistic competition general equilibrium. Note that
for tractability, I restrict the firms’ pricing strategies to take the aggregate industry price
level and output to be exogenous.
An equilibrium will now feature as many firms in each industry as possible, in the sense
that adding a firm to any industry would drive that industry’s profits to be negative.
Proposition 2.5.9. A mixed strategy equilibrium always exists.
Pure-strategy equilibria need not exist. Technically, the non-existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium means that this model of the economy has non-fundamental or non-exogenous
randomness. Intuitively, pure-strategy equilibria can fail to exist due to cycling, where the
entry of a firm causes the profits of another firm to go negative. Once that firm exists,
another firm can enter that causes the profits of the first entrant to be negative, and so on.
Proposition 2.5.10. If N > 2, then a pure-strategy equilibrium does not always exist.
We do not focus on non-existence or multiplicity of equilibria in this paper, although
these issues are present. Instead, we focus on equilibria that, if they exist, converge to an
equilibrium of the non-atomistic economy when we take the limit ‖∆‖ → 0.
An equilibrium when ‖∆‖ > 0 is a solution to a nonlinear integer programming
problem. Results from computational complexity theory show that we cannot hope to fully
characterize the set of equilibria. A naive brute-force computation would become infeasible
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very rapidly, since with even a few hundred firms, we may need to consider more cases
than there are atoms in the observable universe! Instead, our approach here will be to
compare the discontinuous model’s equilibria to the equilibria of the continuous model. To
demonstrate some of the subtleties, consider the following example illustrated in figure 2.4.
6 5 4 3 2
1
HH
.9 .9 .9 .9 2/5
3/5
Figure 2.4: Two production lines selling to the household HH. Industries 2− 6 form on production line and
industry 1 forms a second (degenerate) production line. The direction of arrows represent the flow of goods and
services.
β = (2/5, 2/5, 0, 3/5)′ ,
f = (0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, f6),
σ = 1.1,
ε = (1.2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3).∆ = (0.5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
Let us consider the equilibrium mass of entrants M(∆, f6) for different values of f6 and
mass vector ∆. First, let us consider the massless limit,
M(0, 0.04) =

15.7
17.6
10.1
5.8
3.3
1.2

, M(0, 0.05) =

16.9
16.2
9.4
5.3
3.0
0.8

, M(0, 0.06) =

17.8
15.4
8.7
4.9
2.7
0.6

, M(0, 0.07) =

18.7
14.6
8.2
4.6
2.5
0.5

.
We see how increasing the fixed costs of the final supplier of the chain reduces the mass
of firms active in the long chain and increases the mass of firms in the competing short
chain in a continuous and intuitive way.
91
Now, let us consider this same equilibrium away from the massless limit.
M(∆, 0.04) =

16
17
10
5
3
1

, M(∆, 0.05) =

19
15
8
4
2
0.5

, M(∆, 0.06) =

19
14
8
4
2
0.5

, M(∆, 0.07) =

33
0
0
0
0
0

.
In going from f6 = 0.04 to f6 = 0.05, the discontinuous model amplifies the impact of
the shock because the shock is large enough to force a discontinuous change. From f6 = 0.05
to f6 = 0.06 however, the discontinuous model attenuates the impact of the shock since the
firms are large enough that they can absorb the losses without exiting. This represents a
phase transition since shocks below a threshold are attenuated, and above that threshold,
they are amplified. In going from f6 = 0.06 to f6 = 0.07, the interior equilibrium disappears,
and the long supply chain collapses. Furthermore, this is the unique equilibrium, so this is
not a coordination failure resulting from equilibrium switching. The situation is illustrated
in figure 2.5.
This example illustrates that most of the time, we can expect the model to behave like its
continuous limit. However, some shocks are amplified when a discontinuous change occurs
and other shocks are attenuated. Furthermore, occasionally, when whole industries exit,
the discontinuous equilibrium can be very different. These differences are not only large,
but they can also be very complex. Figure 2.5 illustrates that when dealing with firm entry
and exit, the size or mass of firms in an industry is not a good guide to how important
those industries are to the equilibrium. It also illustrates the fact that bailout policy is very
important in this model.
2.5.3 Approximation Error
To formalize the approximation error, we need a few definitions. These definitions have
some resemblance to the concepts of natural friends and natural enemies in international trade
theory. Motivated by the Stolper and Samuelson (1941) result, Deardorff (2006) defines
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Figure 2.5: Masses of industries with different levels of f6. Note that the discrete model amplifies the shock
when going from the first panel to the second panel, attenuates it in going from the second to the third, and
experiences a chain reaction in going from the third to the fourth.
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an industry to be a natural friend (enemy) of a factor when an increase in its prices will
increase (decrease) the returns to that factor. Inspired by these terms, I define the following.
Definition 2.5.1. Let pii(M1, . . . , MN) be the profit function of industry i. Industry j is an
enemy of industry i when
∂pii
∂Mj
< 0,
and industry j is a friend of industry i when
∂pii
∂Mj
> 0.
Industry j is a frenemy of industry i when
∂pii
∂Mj
takes both positive and negative values.
Although the definition is reminiscent of the one in Deardorff (2006), these definitions
are out-of-equilibrium. In other words, we change the mass of firms in one industry without
changing the masses in other industries.
When industries are frenemies, the entry decisions of firms in one industry are strategic
substitutes for some regions and strategic complements for other regions. I show that
frenemies can only occur with non-degenerate (non-diagonal) input-output connections.
Proposition 2.5.11. Let σ > 1. When the network structure Ω is degenerate (diagonal), all
industries are enemies. When the network is non-degenerate, industries can be frenemies.
We can say more than this.
Proposition 2.5.12. If industry j is a frenemy of industry i, then initially industry i’s profits are
increasing in Mj and eventually industry i’s profits are decreasing in Mj.
It turns out that we can guarantee that approximating the discontinuous model with a
continuous limit will be bad when firms are frenemies.
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Theorem 2.5.13. Let M(∆) correspond to the mass of firms in each industry in an equilibrium
where firm-level masses are given by ∆. Let M(0) denote equilibrium masses in each industry when
∆→ 0. Then
‖M(∆)−M(0)‖ ≥ ‖Dpi(M˜)‖−1‖pi(M(∆))‖,
where M˜ ∈ co{M(0), M(∆)}. Here, co refers to the convex hull and Dpi to the derivative of pi(M)
as a function of M.
In particular, the error gets larger when the profit functions have flat slopes, which can
only occur if industries are frenemies. When σ > 1, this can only happen with network
connections, because a model with no network has monotone profit functions. The network
makes the profit functions non-monotonic even when industry outputs are substitutes σ > 1.
2.5.4 Endogenous Markups
So far we have made very strong assumptions about the firms’ pricing decisions. Firms in
industry k face the following demand function
y(i, k) =
(
p(i, k)
pk
)−εk
yk,
=
(
p(i, k)
pk
)−εk (
βk
(
pk
Pc
)−σ
C +∑
l
ωlk Ml
(
pk
λl
)−σ
y(l, j)
)
,
=
(
p(i, k)
pk
)−εk
p−σk
(
βkPcσC +∑
l
ωlk M
σ−1
εl−1
l λ
σ
l yl
)
.
I have so far assumed that a firm only internalizes their effect on demand via its direct
effect on p(i, k). That is, the firm assumes that demand is isoelastic with elasticity εk and
therefore charges constant markups. This assumption is fully rational when firms have zero
mass, since they cannot affect the industry-level aggregates by changing their prices. The
assumption is also defensible when there at least a handful of firms in the industry, since
the firm’s effect on the industry-level statistics is negligible.
However, in some of the examples I discuss, I consider cases where there is only one or
two firms in an industry, and these firms do have appreciable effects on the industry-level
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aggregates. One might fear that if these firms were more sophisticated, they could avoid
exit by endogenously increasing their markups as they gain more market power. In other
words, perhaps, Ford can take greater advantage of its market power once it is the only firm
left in an industry, and by charging higher markups, it can withstand greater shocks.
A relatively simple way to address this concern is to have the firm internalize its effects
on the industry-level aggregates pk and yk (but not on economy-wide aggregates like Pc and
C) when it sets its prices. Then we can write the profit function of firm i in industry k as
being proportional to
p(i, k)1−εk pε−σk − λk p(i, k)−εpε−σk .
Maximizing this gives the optimal price as
p(i, k) =
εkNk − (εk − σ)
(εk − 1)Nk − (εk − σ)λk.
In the limit, as Nk → ∞, this gives an exogenous markup of εk/(εk − 1). In the case where
the firm is a monopolist, and Nk = 1, this gives the markup σ/(σ− 1). To make this sensible,
we need that εk > σ > 1.
2.6 Bail-outs and the Nature of Externalities
The examples in the previous section suggest that bail-outs and government interventions
may be desirable, since the failure of an important firm or industry can take down entire
parts of a network. However, figuring out which failures are efficient and which ones are
not is impracticable. To implement the optimum, a social planner would not only need
access to an infeasible amount of information, but it would also have to solve an intractable
computational problem.
In this section, we imagine a scenario where the policy-maker can, in response to a
shock, ask firms if other firms should be rescued. The industries will truthfully tell the
policy-maker whether a rescue would increase their profits or decrease their profits. Under
this assumption, we can investigate conditions under which the profits of an industry align
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with those of society.
This exercise is inspired by the example in the introduction, where the president of
Ford Motor Company testified in favor of General Motors. The results in this section give
sufficient conditions under which the policy-maker can trust a firm’s recommendation. The
results of this section should not be taken literally as a guide to policy. Rather, this thought
experiment tells us about the nature of externalities in this model. The aim of this section
will be to prove a series of “innocent by-stander” results, which imply that firms’ requests
for the bail-outs of other firms can only be trusted if the firms are not reliant on one another.
To start with, we need to define the following notion of connectedness.
Definition 2.6.1. Two firms u and v are connected if there exists a directed path from u to v
or a directed path from v to u, on a directed graph defined by Ω.
This lemma will be the workhorse result for the rest of the section.
Lemma 2.6.1. If firm u and firm v are not connected, then in the event that u fails, and we hold
fixed the number of firms in all other industries, β˜v and α˜v remain constant.
Now we are in a position to state our first result.
Theorem 2.6.2. Let B be the set of firms not connected to v. If all firms in B prefer for v to be
rescued, then it is Pareto-efficient for v to be rescued. If the firms in B disagree with each other, it
must be because the firms who want v to be rescued are badly affected through a cascade.
Consider the example in figure 2.6. Theorem 2.6.2 implies that in the event that GM,
and only GM, is about to fail, Ford, Toyota, and Mitsubishi will agree with each other
about whether or not GM should be rescued. Furthermore, if they agree that GM should
be rescued, then the rescue is Pareto-efficient. However, if Ford, Toyota, and Mitsubishi
disagree, then it must be that Ford is adversely affected by GM’s failure through the
failure of their common supplier Dunlop Tires. Furthermore, the efficiency of the bailout
is ambiguous. The welfare implication of theorem 2.6.2 is that Ford’s plea that GM be
bailed out can only be trusted if Ford is worried about aggregate demand, not cascades. In
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GM F
HH
D
M TM
B
Figure 2.6: A stylized example of a supply chain. HH is household; GM is General Motors; F is Ford Motor
Company; D is Dunlop Tires; M is Mitsubishi Motors; T is Toyota; and, B is Bridgestone Tires, a Japanese tire
manufacturer. The arrows represent the flow of goods and services.
his December 2008 testimony to Congress, Mulally referred to both the general economic
downturn, as well as their overlapping supply base, as the reason why GM and Chrysler
should be bailed out.
We can sharpen theorem 2.6.2 into the following “innocent by-stander” principle.
Theorem 2.6.3. Let u and v be two firms. Suppose that the only undirected path from u to v goes
through the household. Then if u prefers for v to be rescued, rescuing v increases the utility of the
household.
Note that theorem 2.6.3 considers undirected paths, meaning that we disregard the
direction of the arrows. So, while F and GM are unconnected according to definition 2.6.1,
there does exist an undirected path from F to GM that does not go through the household.
Theorem 2.6.3 implies that, in the example of figure 2.6, Ford’s profits may not be aligned
with societal preferences. However, the profits of Ford may be aligned with society when
considering the bail-out of an unconnected firm like Lehman Brothers. That is, in a network
like the one in figure 2.7, if a shock to L causes F’s profits to go down, we can safely infer
that we should have bailed L out.
Unfortunately, the cases where we can trust a firm are precisely the cases where we
would expect that firm to not be well-informed about the consequences of a failure. These
results cast doubt on the idea that we reliably implement bailout policy by surveying a
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Figure 2.7: A toy representation of Detroit’s economy with GM, Ford, Chrysler, and a Bank selling to a
representative household.
firm’s direct rivals.
Bounding Inefficiency
Although the asking mechanism I investigate is simple to understand, it does not necessarily
achieve first-best. In particular, asking is sufficient but not necessary for an efficient bail-out.
We can bound the losses from using this simplistic mechanism relative to first best, or other,
more elaborate mechanisms that can implement first-best.
Theorem 2.6.4. The fraction of utility lost by asking mechanism relative to utility maximizing
fraction of utility lost ≤
(
w f b/P f bc
wAc /PAc
)σ
− 1,
where Pac is the consumer price index under the asking equilibrium and P
f b
c is the consumer price
index under the first best equilibrium.
This theorem give us a sense of how large the “mistakes” will be in terms of the real
wage.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of firm entry and exit in propagating and amplifying
shocks in a production network. I show that without the extensive margin, canonical
input-output models have several crucial limitations. First, a firm’s influence depends solely
on the firm’s role as a supplier to other firms, and its role as a consumer is irrelevant.
Second, each firm’s influence measure is exogenous, and the exogenous influence measures
are sufficient statistics for the input-output matrix. In this sense, for every input-output
model, there exists a non-interconnected model with different parameters that has the same
equilibrium responses. Third, a firm’s influence is well-approximated by the firm’s size, so
the nature of interconnections does not matter as long as it results in the same distribution
of firm sizes. Finally, I show that canonical input-output models lack the ability to locally
amplify shocks. That is, a shock to one industry always has the largest impact at its source,
and its effect decays geometrically as it travels away from its source. This shows why a firm
has to be large in order to have a meaningful aggregate impact.
However, when the mass of firms in each industry can adjust endogenously, all of these
properties disappear. The influence of an industry is endogenous, depends on its role as
a supplier and as a consumer of inputs, and is not well approximated by its size. Two
industries with the same demand-chains can have very different effects on the equilibrium
if their supply-chains are different, and vice versa. Furthermore, there are no sufficient
statistics that summarize the network. In this sense, the model is not isomorphic to a
non-network model with different parameters.
Despite these features, I show that in the limit where all firms have zero mass, the model
with entry still lacks the ability to locally amplify shocks. The size of each industry responds
smoothly to shocks and the effects still decay geometrically as a shock travels from its source.
However, when firms in some industries are “granular,” then a failure of one of these firms
can snowball into an avalanche of failures. I show that we can expect these cascades to
occur when firms’ entry decisions switch from being strategic substitutes to being strategic
complements.
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Finally, motivated by the possibility of catastrophic failure in this model, I show condi-
tions under which the objectives of a firm are aligned with those of society. In principle,
this would allow a policy-maker to formulate bail-out policy by surveying other firms.
Unfortunately, the results show that we should not be very optimistic about this strategy,
since the only circumstances when firms are trustworthy are precisely those circumstances
where we would expect them to be as uninformed as the policy-maker. This is because a
firm’s incentives are only aligned with society when a firm’s exposure to the failure of the
other firm is through general equilibrium effects. In other words, in cases where the firm is
not directly linked to the troubled industries. Despite this, these results do show that the
welfare consequences of shocks that travel from one firm to another are different depending
on whether they arrive via network connections or general equilibrium effects.
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric Inflation Expectations,
Downward Rigidity of Wages, and
Asymmetric Business Cycles
3.1 Introduction
Keynesian macroeconomic theory posits that sticky wages are a crucial feature of labor
markets. Rigid wages can cause involuntary unemployment, amplify fluctuations in em-
ployment at business cycle frequencies, and break monetary neutrality. In recent years, a
large number of empirical papers have shown not only that wages are very sticky, but that
there is a clear asymmetry in the way that wages are sticky. In particular, wages appear
more flexible when they are rising than when they are falling. Examples include Barattieri
et al. (2010), Dickens et al. (2007), Daly and Hobijn (2013), as well as the seminal contribution
by Bewley (1999). Furthermore, recent work by Kaur (2012) shows that downward nominal
rigidities distort labor market outcomes in rural India.
In this paper, I argue that informational frictions for households can help to explain
the asymmetric adjustment of wages during the business cycle. This paper makes two
main contributions: (1) it documents the existence of a statistically robust asymmetry in
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how households form their expectations of inflation; in particular, I show that households
are much better at anticipating accelerations in the inflation rate than decelerations. In a
typical model, this asymmetry in household beliefs feeds into asymmetry in wage-setting
where wages respond more vigorously to inflationary forces than disinflationary forces.
This makes demand-driven business cycles asymmetric. Positive monetary policy shocks (or
more generally positive demand shocks) are highly inflationary but do not increase output
by very much, whereas negative monetary policy shocks (or negative demand shocks) are
not very disinflationary but cause large unemployment. I show that this asymmetry in
beliefs are unique to households and are not present for professional forecasters. (2) I
micro-found the source of asymmetric belief formation in an equilibrium model where
households are ambiguity-averse and are trying to make robust decisions. I show that with
this microfoundation, optimal monetary policy is still subject to the Lucas critique, and the
central bank does not have a systematic inflationary bias despite the existence of downward
rigidities.
The intuition for my microfoundation is simple. When negotiating their wages, workers
observe their nominal wages perfectly, but foresee the real cost of the goods and services
that they will consume imperfectly. As in Lucas (1973), workers face a signal extraction
problem when trying to determine their purchasing power. However, households’ signals of
the general price level are subject to Knightian uncertainty, since households do not know
precisely how informative their signals are. This means that they will be more sensitive to
inflationary news than disinflationary news because, for a fixed nominally denominated em-
ployment contract, inflationary news lowers their purchasing power whereas disinflationary
news raises it (relative to their prior expectations). This asymmetry of beliefs can then show
up in wage-setting since distrustful workers will, to the extent that they can, refuse wage
cuts in the presence of deflation, but demand wage increases in the presence of inflation.
This distrustful attitude of workers towards the inflation rate is attested to in many
surveys. For example, according to Shiller (1997), the “biggest gripe about inflation”
expressed by 77% of the general public is that “inflation hurts my real buying power. It
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makes me poorer.” Interestingly, only 12% of economists chose this answer.1 The households’
answer makes sense in partial equilibrium, since over short horizons, households can treat
their wages as known and exogenous to the inflation rate.
I embed ambiguity into a general equilibrium model and find that monetary shocks
have very asymmetric effects on wage inflation and output. In particular, positive monetary
shocks result in high wage inflation and small booms, since households react strongly to the
inflationary signals by demanding wage increases. On the other hand, negative monetary
shocks cause large unemployment and relatively small disinflation, since households distrust
the disinflationary signals and refuse wage cuts. I verify the model’s predictions about the
asymmetric impact of monetary policy on output and wage inflation using time series data
for the US.
The asymmetry implied by the model substantially alters the welfare costs of business
cycles when compared to Lucas (1987). Whereas in the Lucas model, positive shocks cancel
out with negative shocks so that the welfare cost of fluctuations is second order, in this
model, positive demand shocks do not cancel with negative demand shocks, so stabilization
policy reaps first order gains. This harks back to the point made by De Long and Summers
(1988) that demand stabilization may fill in the troughs without shaving the peaks. Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2011) have also recently drawn attention to this point. I also investigate
optimal monetary policy in my model. The received wisdom in the literature, following
Akerlof et al. (1996), is that if wages are downwardly rigid, then central banks should have an
inflationary bias to “grease the wheels” of the labor market. This way real wage cuts can be
masked by a positive inflation rate. Unfortunately, in this model, inflationary biases from the
central bank are not helpful since household expectations adjust to take them into account.
Any inflationary bias built into central bank policies are undone by endogenously-formed
household expectations. In other words, the model predicts an asymmetric equilibrium but
the central bank is powerless to do anything about the asymmetry.
1Instead, the most popular reason given by economists was “inflation makes it hard to compare prices,
forces me to hold too much cash, and is inconvenient.” Only 7% of households chose this answer.
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Other theoretical treatments of downwardly rigid wages often take the rigidity as given
and investigate its consequences (e.g. Daly and Hobijn (2013); Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2011); Kaur (2012); Akerlof et al. (1996); Hall (2005)). These models are usually motivated by
an exogenous fairness norm, and assumptions about the function relating wages to worker
effort. Akerlof (1982) is a seminal paper in this strand of the literature. Other attempts to
microfound downward wage rigidity are based on implicit contracts, where firms insure
their workers against fluctuations by uncoupling the real wage from marginal product of
labor; A leading example is Holmstrom (1983), but this literature is focused on real wages
and does not bring inflation into the analysis. The theory I propose delivers downward
rigidity that is broadly consistent with the data at the micro level, but it also has novel
macro implications. The model predicts that monetary policy has asymmetric effects on
output and wage inflation. There is already evidence that monetary policy has asymmetric
effects on output, for example in De Long and Summers (1988), Cover (1992), and Angrist
et al. (2013). I present new evidence that monetary policy also has asymmetric effects on
wage inflation consistent with the model’s prediction.
The model of Knightian uncertainty I use in this paper is the one axiomatized by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In this framework, workers have multiple priors about the
information content of their signals, and they act according to their worst-case prior when
making decisions. A similar modelling device is used by Epstein and Schneider (2008) in the
context of asset pricing to model skewness in asset returns. Kuhnen (2012) finds empirical
evidence in support of asymmetric learning in the context of financial markets, where agents
are overly pessimistic in the loss region. Another recent paper that incorporates ambiguity
aversion into a macroeconomic model is by Ilut and Schneider (2012). However my results
differ markedly from theirs both in terms of the research question and the set up of the
model. 2
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 3.2, I set out a basic partial equilibrium
2Ilut and Schneider (2012) are interested in how ambiguity about the level of productivity affects an economy,
whereas I am interested in how ambiguity about the informativeness of price signals affect wage setting.
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model with ambiguity aversion that demonstrates my mechanism. In section 3.3, I endo-
genize prices and output, and study the effects of monetary shocks on real and nominal
variables. In section 3.4, I present empirical evidence in favor of asymmetric adjustment of
beliefs, and time series evidence that wage inflation responds asymmetrically to positive
and negative monetary shocks as predicted by the model. I also discuss the extent to which
the model can explain the cross-sectional distribution of wage-changes. In section 3.5, I
investigate a simple optimal policy problem and compute the welfare cost of business cycles.
In section 3.6, I embed my mechanism into a standard New Keynesian model with sticky
wages, draw out some of its implications. I find that time-varying Knightian uncertainty can
act like a cost-push shock in the economy, creating a tradeoff between inflation and output
stabilization for the central bank even though there are no supply shocks in the model. I
summarize and conclude in section 3.7.
3.2 Partial Equilibrium Model
Consider the following partial equilibrium model that establishes the intuition for the rest
of the paper. Suppose that there is an employer and a worker. The worker has log utility in
his real wage, is endowed with a unit of labor, and an exogenous outside option d (I take
this to be the utility of leisure). In other words, his preferences are given by
u(wt/pt, xt) = log(wt/pt)1(xt = 1) + d1(xt = 0),
where xt is a binary variable for whether or not he works, wt is the nominal wage, pt is the
price level in period t and d is an exogenous outside option. The employer makes a nominal
wage offer wt to the worker, who then chooses whether or not to work. If the worker does
not work, he receives the exogenous outside option d.
The worker chooses to work if
Et
(
log
(
wt
pt
))
≥ d,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the worker’s information set. Since the
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nominal wage is always known with certainty, we can rearrange this expression to get that
the lowest wage for which the worker will work is
wt = exp (d + Et(log(pt))) . (3.1)
Suppose that workers receive a public signal st about the inflation rate. Then we can rewrite
(3.1)as
log(wt) = d + log(pt−1) + E(log(pit)|st),
where pit is the inflation rate from period t − 1 to t and workers are assumed to know
the price level in the previous period. This equation makes clear that the wage inherits
the properties of the conditional expectation function when viewed as a function of the
signal st. If households’ expectations of inflation are, for some reason, asymmetric (they rise
more quickly than they fall), then the wage will also behave asymmetrically with respect to
inflationary pressures.
The basic mechanism of the model in this paper is that households place greater weight
on inflationary news than disinflationary news. To motivate this assumption, we can look
for evidence of this asymmetry by using inflation expectation surveys of households. I
use the Michigan survey of inflation expectations. Denote inflation in period t by pit and
median household inflation expectations of inflation 12 months ahead by pˆit+12|t. In figure
3.1, expected revisions to the inflation rate pˆit+12|t − pit are plotted against actual changes
to the inflation rate pit+12 − pit. As expected, we see a steep convexity, indicating that the
median household’s expectations of inflation are more responsive to positive rather than
negative changes to inflation. This finding is a direct confirmation of the model’s underlying
mechanism.
In figure 3.2, we see that the median forecasts made by professional forecasters do not
exhibit this convexity. This suggests that source of the asymmetry, at least in the United
States, is in how households process information, rather than in the information itself.
Furthermore, the fact that there is an asymmetry in the beliefs of households is unique to
this model and would not be found in preference-based theories that rely on loss-aversion
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or fairness norms. This empirical finding is in the same spirit as the experimental results
of Fehr and Tyran (2001) who emphasize that subjects respond weakly to deflationary
shocks and strongly to inflationary shocks, although my results are about accelerations and
decelerations in the inflation rate.
To demonstrate how ambiguity-aversion can deliver convex conditional expectations,
suppose that the price level pt is given by
log(pt) = µ+ εt, εt ∼ N (0, σ2),
and both the worker and the employer know µ. Let st be a noisy public signal of the price
shock εt,
st = εt + εs, εs ∼ N (0, σ2s ).
Note that
εt|st, µ, σ2, σ2s ∼ N
(
σ2
σ2 + σ2s
st,
σ2s σ
2
σ2 + σ2s
)
.
This means we can rewrite the work condition (3.1) as
wt ≥ exp
(
d + µ+
σ2
σ2 + σ2s
st
)
.
Now Suppose that there is ambiguity about how informative the signal st is. That is, the
signal-to-total variance ratio σ
2
σ2+σ2s
is unknown. For example, suppose that the worker
knows only that σs ∈ [σs, σs]. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have axiomatized and provided
a representation theorem for the preferences of such agents. In particular, such agents follow
a minmax procedure, where they make decisions that maximize their worst-case expected
utility. In other words, when information quality is ambiguous, expression (3.1) becomes
wt = max
σs∈[σs,σs]
exp (d + µ+ E(log(pt)|st))
= exp
(
d + µ+max
σs
E(log(pt)|st)
)
= exp
(
d + µ+ E˜(log(pt)|st)
)
. (3.2)
For notational convenience, I denote the expectations taken with respect to the worst-case
108
−
2
0
2
4
6
Fo
re
ca
st
ed
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 in
fla
tio
n 
pi
∧
t+
12
|t 
−
 
pi
t
−10 −5 0 5
pit+12 − pit
Figure 3.1: Forecast revisions of the annual inflation rate by the median household in the Michigan Survey
of Inflation Expectations from 1983-2012, plotted against realized changes in the annual inflation rate as
measured by the CPI.
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Figure 3.2: Forecast revisions by the median professional forecaster in the Michigan Survey of Inflation
Expectations from 1983-2012, plotted against realized changes in the annual inflation rate as measured by the
CPI.
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prior by E˜. Maximizing worst-case expected outcomes in this way is very similar to the
“Robustness” framework proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2011). The specific information
structure I use is similar to the one posited by Epstein and Schneider (2008), who use it to
study skewness in asset prices.
In this section, the source and nature of the ambiguity is not important. It could be due
to Knightian uncertainty about official statistics, or a reduced form representation of the
fact that consumers have idiosyncratic consumption baskets and there is ambiguity about
the extent to which official statistics are relevant to one’s individual consumption basket.
Alternatively, we could assume that there is ambiguity about σ2, to capture Knightian
uncertainty about demand shocks. A final interpretation is that households are playing a
game against the statistical agency in the country, and political pressures on the statistical
agency result in the public signals being less informative in the presence of inflation than
disinflation. We will return to these issues later, for now, let us take (3.2) as given.
Expression (3.2) implies that σs = σs when st ≥ 0, and σs = σs when st < 0. In
figure 3.3, we see an asymmetry in the adjustment of wages to signals of the price level.
In particular, wages increase much more rapidly in response to inflationary signals than
they fall in response to disinflationary signals. Similar results obtain for the more general
constant-relative-risk-aversion utility case, and in the case with ambiguity in the variance of
the monetary shock σ instead of ambiguity in the variance of the noise term σs.
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Figure 3.3: Critical wage as a function of s.
The intuition for this result is that households take inflationary news very seriously,
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since the worst case scenario is that bad news is very informative. On the other hand,
households distrust or ignore disinflationary news, since the worst case scenario is that
good news is uninformative.
3.3 A simple general equilibrium model
So far, I have used a partial equilibrium model to draw out the implications of asymmetric
expectations and ambiguity for the individual workers and employers. In this section, I show
that the insights of the previous section survive in general equilibrium with endogenous
prices and output.
Consider a two period model with a representative firm and a continuum of identical
households. In period 1, nature sets money supply M, and there is a noisy public signal s
of M. The firm posts a nominal wage W conditional on the signal, and households decide
whether or not to apply for a job. In period 2, M becomes common knowledge, the firm
chooses the fraction of the population it wishes to employ, and workers spend the money
supply on consuming the output. Intuitively, in period 2, nominal wages are fixed, but the
price level changes – this proxies a world where nominal wages are fixed over the length of
a contract while prices continue to change.
In period 1, following our earlier discussion, the firm sets the wage to equate the utility
of working with the outside option
E˜(u(C)|s) = d, (3.3)
where C is consumption of workers when employed and d is the exogenous outside option
in utility terms. Let households have log utility so that the wage, in period 1, is given by
E˜(u(C)|s) = E˜(log(C)|s) = E˜(log(W/P)|s) = d. (3.4)
This makes the households indifferent between working and consuming their outside option.
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Rearrange this for the wage to get
log(W) = d + E˜(log(P)|s). (3.5)
In period 2, the stock of money is revealed, the firm sets marginal product of labor equal to
the real wage
f ′(L) =
W
P
. (3.6)
To give a role to money, suppose that households have a cash-in-advance constraint, so that
their total expenditures have to equal the money supply
PC = M. (3.7)
Market clearing for the consumption good implies that
C = f (L).
Let the firm’s production technology be given by
f (L) = Lα, α ∈ (0, 1),
then the firm’s first order condition (3.6) implies that
f (L) = Lα =
(
W
αP
) α
α−1
.
Combine this with market clearing, and (3.7) to get
M
P
= C = Lα =
(
W
αP
) α
α−1
. (3.8)
Rearrange this to get
P =
M1−αWα
αα
, (3.9)
so the equilibrium price is a geometric average of the money stock and the wage. Substitute
this expression for P into the wage setting equation (A.2) to get
log(W) =
d
1− α + E˜ (log M|s)−
α
1− α log(α) (3.10)
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as the wage in equilibrium. To get equilibrium output, substitute the equilibrium price (3.9)
into (3.7) to get
C =
M
P
=
ααM
M1−αWα
=
(
αM
W
)α
.
Finally, equilibrium labor is given by using the production function Lα = C to get
L = α
M
W
. (3.11)
Equations (3.10) and (3.11) show that if, for whatever reason, conditional expectations of
the money shock as a function of the signal are more convex than the signal is as a function
of the money shock, we should observe asymmetries in wage-setting and in employment
fluctuations. As before, ambiguity aversion towards the underlying shocks to the money
supply can deliver the asymmetric conditional expectation function seen in figure 3.1.
Suppose that s is a normal noisy signal of the shock to log(M). Denoting logs in lower case
letters,
m|s ∼ N
(
µ+
σ2
σ2 + σ2s
s,
σ2σ2s
σ2 + σ2s
)
.
Denote the signal-to-total variance ratio σ
2
σ2+σ2s
by ψ, and note that ψ ∈ [ψ,ψ]. Then the
equilibrium wage (3.10) is
w =
d
1− α + µ+ ψs1(s ≥ 0) + ψs1(s < 0)−
α
1− α log(α),
and equilibrium employment (3.11) is
l =
1
1− α log(α) + m−
d
1− α − µ− ψs1(s ≥ 0)− ψs1(s < 0). (3.12)
In the benchmark case of full information, ψ = ψ = 1, employment is independent of
monetary shocks and the wage is a linear function of the size of the monetary shock.
This corresponds to the neoclassical case without frictions. In the case with no ambiguity,
0 ≤ ψ = ψ < 1, the nominal wage and the level of employment are linear in monetary
shocks. The intuition here is the same as for the Lucas (1973) islands model. In the case
with ambiguity, 0 ≤ ψ < ψ ≤ 1, shown in figure 3.4, we have asymmetric nominal wage
adjustment and employment fluctuations in response to monetary shocks. So we recover the
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intuition from the partial equilibrium model in section 3.2, but with additional predictions
about the level of employment and the effects of monetary policy (both of which were
absent in the partial equilibrium model).
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Figure 3.4: The nominal wage and employment as a function of shocks to money supply.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we look at the extent to which this stylized model is consistent with patterns
found in the data. I present three types of evidence: (1) direct evidence of asymmetry
in household beliefs towards inflation; (2) time-series evidence from the United States
relating wage and price inflation to monetary shocks; (3) evidence from the cross-sectional
distribution of wage changes in different countries and different time periods;
3.4.1 Evidence on Asymmetric Expectations
The basic mechanism of the model is that households place greater weight on inflationary
news than disinflationary news. We can try to test for this mechanism directly by using
inflation expectation surveys of households. Technically, the expectations of the agents in
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the model are not unique, since they have multiple priors. So, I assume that individuals
report their “worst-case” or “effective” beliefs in surveys – these are the beliefs that would
rationalize their behavior if they were Bayesians.
I use the Michigan survey of inflation expectations. Denote inflation in period t by pit
and median household inflation expectations of inflation 12 months ahead by pˆit+12|t. As
mentioned previously, figure 3.1 plots expected revisions to the inflation rate pˆit+12|t − pit
against actual changes to the inflation rate pit+12 − pit. As expected, we see a kink at zero,
indicating that the median household’s expectations of inflation are more responsive to
positive rather than negative changes to inflation. The asymmetry is a direct confirmation
of the model’s underlying mechanism. A placebo test, plotted in figure 3.2, shows that the
median forecasts made by professional forecasters do not exhibit a kink or convexity.
A regression version of these graphs will allow us to control for covariates and do a
formal hypothesis test of the piecewise linear conditional expectation function generated
by ambiguity-aversion. To that end, consider the following reduced-model for household
inflation expectations
pˆit+12|t = c0 + c1pˆit+11|t−1 + c2st1(st ≥ 0) + c3st1(st ≤ 0) + c4pit−1 + εt.
So, the median household’s expectations of future inflation are a linear function of the
median household’s expectations last month, the value of inflation last month, which reflects
the publicly available information in period t, and a piecewise linear function of the signal.
In table 3.1, I proxy for the signal received by the households by using the realized change
in the inflation rate. In other words, I set
st = pit+12 − pit.
The results of this regression are reported in table 3.1. In both specifications, we can reject
the null hypothesis that c2 = c3 at the 1% significance level. All of the results on beliefs
are entirely robust to controlling for the demographic characteristics of the respondents,
namely, their age group (18-34, 35-54, 55+), their region (West, North Central, North East,
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South), their gender, their income group (bottom tertile, middle tertile, top tertile), and their
education level (high School or less, some college, college).
In table 3.1, I proxy for the signal received by households using the realized change in
the inflation rate. Therefore, my estimates suffer from attenuation bias, since the realized
change is an imperfect measure of the signal received by the household. An alternative
approach is to suppose that the signal received by households and professional forecasters
is the same. After all, the information used by professional forecasters is mostly publicly
available. Denote the forecasts of headline inflation 12 months ahead made in period t by
piet+12|t. I use the change in inflation predicted by professional forecasters
expert+t = (pi
e
t+12|t − pit)1(piet+12|t − pit ≥ 0), expert−t = (piet+12|t − pit)1(piet+12|t − pit ≥ 0)
as my measure for the signal received by households. To the extent that this is a better
measure of the signal received by households (say the signal received by households is
literally the median forecast), then this regression should suffer from less attenuation bias.
The results of this test are reported in table 3.2. As before, we can reject the hypothesis
that positive and negative news are treated symmetrically at the 5% or 1% significance level
depending on the specification. The general lesson we learn from these results is that in
the US, households are much better at anticipating accelerations in the inflation rate than
decelerations.
Since the supporting data is from after the Great moderation, one may may question the
extent to which such asymmetries can persist in countries with high (but stable) inflation
rates. Using household expectations data from Argentina, I verify that that higher average
inflation does not appear to affect the existence of the asymmetry. To this end, I run the
same regression with data from Argentina and present the results in table 3.3. As predicted
by the theory, the point estimate for c2 is much larger than for c3. Since we have many
fewer observations, the parameters are imprecisely estimated, and we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the coefficients are the same. The inflation data used here are from a private
consulting firm, used in the study by Perez-Truglia et al, and are not official figures from
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Table 3.1: Responsiveness of Household Inflation Forecasts to Positive and
Negative Shocks
(1) (2)
pˆit+12|t pˆit+12|t
pˆit+11|t−1 0.957∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.06)
(pit+12 − pit)1(pit+12 − pit ≥ 0) 0.062∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
(pit+12 − pit)1(pit+12 − pit < 0) −0.019 −0.001
(0.02) (0.03)
pit−1 0.164∗∗∗
(0.04)
Constant 0.100∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08)
Observations 407 407
Newey-West t statistics in parentheses with lag parameter 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns regress median 12-months ahead inflation ex-
pectations of households on realized positive and negative
changes to the actual headline CPI inflation rate and other co-
variates. The inflation expectation data comes from the Michi-
gan Survey of Consumers and the inflation data comes from
the BLS. The question households are responding to in the
Michigan survey is “During the next 12 months, do you think
that prices in general will go up, or go down, or stay where
they are now? By what percent do you expect prices to go up,
on the average, during the next 12 months?” Column (1) and
Column (2) are the same except that column (2) controls for
the lagged inflation rate. In both specifications, the coefficient
on positive changes to the inflation rate have larger magnitude
than the one for negative changes in the inflation rate at the 1%
significance level. Hats indicate forecasts, subscripts indicate
time periods. The sample period is monthly data from January
1978 to December 2012. Observations are at the month level.
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Table 3.2: Responsiveness of Household Inflation Forecasts to Professional
Forecasts
(1) (2) (3)
pˆit+12|t pˆit+12|t pˆit+12|t
pit 0.430∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
expert+t 0.312
∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04)
expert−t −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
pit−1 0.164∗∗∗ 0.057
(0.05) (0.05)
pˆit+11|t−1 0.565∗∗∗
(0.06)
Constant 1.686∗∗∗ 1.719∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
Observations 415 414 414
Newey-West t statistics in parentheses with lag parameter 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns regress median 12-months ahead inflation ex-
pectations of households on positive and negative changes to
the inflation rate forecasted by the median professional fore-
caster and other covariates. The inflation expectation data for
households and experts comes from the Michigan Survey of
Consumers and the inflation data comes from the BLS. The
question households are responding to in the Michigan sur-
vey is “During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in
general will go up, or go down, or stay where they are now?
By what percent do you expect prices to go up, on the aver-
age, during the next 12 months?” All columns control for the
actual inflation rate. Column (2) also controls for the lagged
inflation rate, and Column (3) controls for the lagged inflation
rate and the lagged median household inflation forecast. For
column (1) and (2) we can reject the hypothesis that the coef-
ficient on expert+ and expert− are the same at the 1% signifi-
cance level, and for column (3) we can reject this hypothesis
at the 5% significance level. Hats indicate forecasts, subscripts
indicate time periods. The sample period is from January 1978
to December 2012. Observations are at the month level.
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the government (which are widely known to be unreliable).
Further supportive evidence of asymmetry is found in the working paper by Perez-
Truglia et al. They perform a randomized controlled experiment on Argentinean households
and find that household expectations respond more (almost five times more strongly) to
inflationary news than disinflationary news. This asymmetry disappears if instead of news
about the inflation rate, households are given news about the change in the price of a
specific set of goods. This indicates that the source of ambiguity might be in how aggregate
statistics relate to one’s individual consumption basket, rather than the conduct of monetary
policy or the source of the information.
3.4.2 Evidence from aggregate time-series
Next, we look at time series evidence of the relationship between wage inflation, price
inflation, and monetary policy shocks. The model implies that wage inflation should
respond more strongly to positive monetary shocks than negative ones. To test this, I use a
measure of structural monetary shocks from Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). Following
Romer and Romer (2004), I estimate the following reduced form model
piwt = a0 +
J
∑
j=1
ajpiwt−j +
K
∑
k=0
bkε+t−k +
L
∑
l=0
clε−t−l + νt,
where piwt is annual wage inflation, ε
+
t and ε
−
t are positive and negative monetary shocks,
and νt is the error term. The measure of wage inflation is the seasonally adjusted annual
percent change of average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees for
the total private sector taken from Federal Reserve Economic Database.
We can then test the hypothesis that
K
∑
k=0
bk +
L
∑
l=0
cl = 0,
or that the cumulative effect of a positive shock on wage inflation is the same as the
cumulative effect of a negative shock. I use the BIC to select the autoregressive lag length J,
although the results are robust to changing the number of lags to be higher (for example,
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Table 3.3: Responsiveness of Household Inflation Expectations to Positive
and Negative Shocks in Argentina
(1) (2)
pˆit|t pˆit|t
pˆit−1|t−1 0.778∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.04)
pit−1 0.195∗
(0.08)
(pit − pit−1)1(pit − pit ≥ 0) 0.909∗ 1.015∗∗
(0.37) (0.38)
(pit − pit−1)1(pit − pit < 0) 0.365 0.185
(0.62) (0.60)
Constant 0.910 1.843
(1.01) (1.08)
Observations 79 79
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns regress median contemporaneous infla-
tion expectations of households on positive and negative
changes to the inflation rate as measured by a private con-
sulting company. The inflation expectation data and the
inflation data were kindly shared by Perez Truglia et al
(2014). Both columns control for the lagged expected in-
flation rate. Column (2) also controls for the lagged infla-
tion rate. The hypothesis that the coefficients for positive
and negative changes are equal in magnitude cannot be
rejected. Hats indicate forecasts, subscripts indicate time
periods. The sample period is from August 2006 to March
2013. Observations are at the month level.
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Table 3.4: Responsiveness of Wage Inflation to Monetary Policy Shocks
(1) (2) (3)
piwt pi
w
t pi
w
t
ε+t 0.234
∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
ε−t −0.110∗ −0.076 −0.081
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
ε+t1 0.132
∗ 0.126∗
(0.08) (0.07)
ε−t−1 0.025
(0.10)
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Number of autoregressive lags 4 4 4
Observations 471 471 471
Newey-West t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns regress wage inflation on positive and negative monetary pol-
icy shocks and other covariates. Wage inflation is seasonally adjusted annual
percent change of average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory
employees for the total private sector taken from the Federal Reserve Economic
Database. The monetary policy shocks are the structural shocks from Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2012). The number of autoregressive lags is chosen by max-
imizing the BIC. Column (1) has only the contemporaneous monetary policy
shock, while column (2) includes the first lag of the positive shock, and column
(3) includes lagged values for both the positive and negative shock. We can
reject symmetry at either the 10% or 5% significance level for all specifications.
The sample is monthly data from March 1969 to December 2008.
the results are virtually unaffected by using 12 autoregressive lags). The results are in table
3.4. On the whole, the positive shocks are much larger in magnitude and more statistically
significant. We can reject symmetry at either the 10% or 5% significance level depending on
the specification.
The prediction that these shocks should have asymmetric effects on wage inflation is
a purely nominal implication of this model that is not generated by alternative theories
of asymmetric business cycles like the ones driven by financial frictions that only bind in
recessions.
As a further check on these results, I conduct a placebo test by replacing wage inflation
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with headline CPI inflation and report the results in table 3.5. The model predicts that price
inflation should exhibit smaller asymmetries than wage inflation in response to monetary
shocks. In table 3.5, the point estimates in the specifications for contemporaneous positive
and negative monetary shocks are virtually identical, including specifications with no
autoregressive lags or differing numbers of lags for the monetary shock, and the hypothesis
that positive and negative shocks have the same impact cannot be rejected.
3.4.3 Cross-sectional distribution of wage changes
Next, we look at the cross-sectional distribution of wages in different countries and time
periods. Dickens et al. (2007) demonstrate that the cross-sectional distribution of wage
changes is both skewed towards the right, and exhibits bunching at zero.
Figure 3.5: Dickens et al (2007) cross sectional distribution of wages in different countries and time periods.
Dickens et al. (2007) identify two forms of wage rigidity. The first, which they call
“nominal rigdity”, is a large point mass at zero wage change, the second, which they call
“real rigidity”, is an asymmetric distribution of wage changes around the average inflation
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Table 3.5: Responsiveness of Price Inflation to Monetary Policy Shocks
(1) (2) (3)
pit pit pit
ε+t 0.073 0.065 0.052
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
ε−t −0.069 −0.056 −0.077
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
ε+t−1 0.059 0.021
(0.07) (0.07)
ε−t−1 0.134
(0.10)
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Number of autoregressive lags 4 4 4
Observations 475 475 475
Newey-West t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns regress headline annual CPI inflation on pos-
itive and negative monetary policy shocks and other covari-
ates. CPI inflation data is from the Federal Reserve Economic
Database. The monetary policy shocks are the structural shocks
from Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). The number of lags
of the inflation rate are chosen to mimic the ones in table 3.4,
though the results are robust to including more lags. Col-
umn (1) has only the contemporaneous monetary policy shock,
while column (2) includes the first lag of the positive shock,
and column (3) includes lagged values for both the positive
and negative shock. We cannot reject the hypothesis of symme-
try. The sample is monthly data from March 1969 to December
2008.
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rate. An illustration of this can be seen in figure 3.5, taken from Dickens et al. (2007). We
see that the UK in 1984, where both current and last years’ inflation rates were around
five percent, had an asymmetry at five percent. On the other hand, in countries where the
inflation rates were lower and less stable, the asymmetry was at zero.
The model presented in section 3.2 has a degenerate cross-sectional distribution, but
it can easily be extended to have cross-sectional heterogeneity. Following Lucas (1973),
consider a continuum of islands indexed by elements of the [0, 1] interval, with each island
inhabited by a worker and an employer. Worker-employer pair i observe a noisy island
specific signal si = ε+ ε i of the log price level p = µ+ ε, and then write a wage contract.
Crucially, we assume that the worker considers the signal-to-noise ratio to be ambiguous.
As before, when worker utility is log, the prevailing log wage w in island i is
wi = µ+
σ2
σ2 + σ2s (si)
si + d.
where σs(si) = σs whenever si ≤ 0, and σs otherwise. This means that the cross-sectional
distribution of wages will be discontinuous around the expected price level µ, with higher
variance on the right-hand side and bunching on the left-hand side. If the aggregate
shock ε is sufficiently large, the discontinuity and bunching disappear. That is, when the
unexpected monetary shock is large (high surprise inflation), no asymmetry is observed in
the cross-sectional distribution, see figure 3.6.
Crucially, the model implies that the key point of asymmetry is the ex-ante expected
price level (the price level before the signal is observed). This means that, in this model, there
is nothing special about zero per se, unless households believe that they are in a very low
inflation environment and that absent any signal, prices are not going to change. Conversely,
in environments with high and stable inflation, we would observe an asymmetry not at zero,
but around expected inflation. Where the asymmetry appears will depend on household
expectations in the absence of any new information. It is difficult to infer this from the data
available, but the empirical evidence presented in Dickens et al. (2007) is consistent with the
idea that the location of asymmetry is higher than zero in environments with persistently
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Figure 3.6: Theoretical cross-sectional wage-change distributions for different aggregate monetary shocks.
high inflation. Furthermore, if the model presented in this paper is augmented with agents
who exhibit asymmetric money illusion (as argued by Fehr and Tyran (2001)) then we
can capture both the asymmetry around the expected inflation rate and the bunching at
wage-freezes using only the price-expectations of households without invoking loss-aversion
or fairness norms.
A further finding by Dickens et al. (2007), as well as Holden and Wulfsberg (2009), is that
the degree of real wage rigidity is strongly correlated with union density. Again, the basic
model in section 3.2 can naturally be extended to account for this finding. In particular, note
that the degree of rigidity does not solely depend on the degree of ambiguity, but also on the
relative elasticities of labor supply and labor demand – or, loosely speaking, the bargaining
power of workers and employers. The kinked beliefs of the workers only affect their wage
to the extent that workers can withdraw labor in response to their perceived real wage. In
particular, the model in section 3.2 assumed that the workers’ outside option is exogenous
and constant. This makes labor supply completely elastic, since workers effectively make an
ultimatum to the the employers and refuse to supply any labor when wages are lower than
what they demand. Consider, instead the following log labor supply curve
l = γ(w− E˜(p|s)− d),
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where l is log labor and the elasticity of labor supply is given by γ. When γ tends to infinity,
we recover the previous set up. On the other hand, when γ = 0, labor supply is completely
inelastic at fixed supply. Let log labor demand be given by
l =
1
1− α (log(α) + E(p|s)− w),
easily derived from profit maximization with a Cobb-Douglas production function. The
equilibrium log wage is given by
w = κ (log(α) + E(p|s)) + (1− κ) (E˜(p|s) + d) ,
where κ = 1
γ(1−α)+1 ∈ [0, 1].
The equilibrium nominal wage is a convex combination of the beliefs of the workers
and the beliefs of the employers. In the extreme case of infinitely elastic labor supply,
γ = ∞, only the beliefs of the workers matters and we get maximum rigidity. In the other
extreme of completely inelastic labor supply, γ = 0, only the beliefs of the employer matter.
In particular, in the completely inelastic labor supply case, ambiguity has no effect on
equilibrium wages. This is intuitive: if workers cannot withdraw their labor in response to
the wage offer, then wages are determined solely through competition between employers. If
employers are not adversely affected by inflation, then the equilibrium wage will not exhibit
a discontinuity around the expected inflation rate even if employers are ambiguity-averse.
So, the degree of bargaining power, captured here by the workers’ ability to withdraw
labor when wages fall, affects the degree of rigidity in wages. This is consistent with the
empirical findings of Dickens et al. (2007) who find that countries where unions have more
power exhibit more wage rigidity of the kind generated by this model (i.e. asymmetry
around the expected inflation rate).
3.4.4 Is Ambiguity-Aversion Necessary?
While ambiguity aversion is consistent with the evidence I provided, it is not the only
theory that could generate these predictions. In particular, any theory that delivers convex
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conditional expectations will generate similar predictions. The simplest alternative theory is
a Bayesian expected-utility maximizer. Since professional forecasters exhibit no convexity
in their beliefs, there must then be something unusual about the priors of the households.
In particular, priors that assume the signal is more accurate when there is accelerations of
the inflation rate than decelerations will generate very similar results to mine. However,
these priors will be incorrect and hard to justify intuitively. Furthermore, the professional
forecasters will be objectively doing a better job.
The virtue of ambiguity-aversion, other than its tractability, is that that there is no sense
in which households are acting irrationally or making a mistake. If households do not
know the precise mapping between aggregate statistics and the prices relevant for them,
it is reasonable for them to rely on robustness heuristics – indeed, this was the original
motivation for axiomatic theories of ambiguity-aversion.
3.5 Normative Analysis
One of the advantages of having a microfoundation for downward wage rigidity is that it
allows us to deal with normative questions in a more satisfying manner. In this section 3.5.1,
I derive optimal monetary policy, and in section 3.5.2, I analyse the welfare costs of business
cycles.
3.5.1 Optimal Monetary Policy
It is typically assumed that downward wage rigidity implies that the central bank should
have an inflationary bias. Inflation is said to “grease the wheels” of the labor market since it
allows wage cuts to take place that would otherwise not have occurred. In this section, I
show that this intuition holds in my model if we take the conditional expectation function of
the households as exogenous, but fails if we account for the fact that household expectations
will react to the change in policy.
Consider a scenario where the central bank has some, but not complete, control over the
distribution of demand shocks that hit the economy. Crucially, suppose that although the
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central bank can affect the distribution of shocks, it has no control over the distribution of
the public signal. In other words, the central bank chooses a distribution of demand shocks
to minimize expected losses, taking as given the information content (and ambiguity) of a
noisy signal.
Most central banks are tasked with maintaining price stability and full employment. In
a model like the one sketched above, with only aggregate demand shocks, price stability
and deviations from first-best employment are both log-linear functions of the level of the
monetary surprise. In particular, if we denote first-best employment by l f b, then
l − l f b = 1
1− α (m− E˜(m|s)),
where first-best employment is employment in the perfect information world. On the other
hand, m− E˜(m|s) also captures price instability. So, I assume that the central bank’s loss
function is given by
L(g) := Eg
((
m− E˜(m|s))2) ,
where g is the marginal distribution of demand shocks m, and the expectation is taken
with respect to g. I assume that if the central bank takes no action, demand shocks will
have a reference distribution q. The central bank chooses g to minimize its losses subject
to the requirement that g is not too different from q. I formalize “not too different” using
the Kullback-Leibler divergence, an analytically tractable measure of difference between
probability distributions.
Naive Policy
In this section, I consider the problem of a central bank who takes the function mapping
signals to beliefs of the household as given, and does not internalize the fact that changing
the distribution of demand shocks will affect how signals are mapped to conditional
expectations. In other words, the central bank solves the following problem
min
g(m)
"
(m− φ(s))2 f (s|m)g(m)dsdm
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such that
∫
q(m) log(g(m))dm−
∫
q(m) log(q(m))dm ≤ K∫
g(m)dm = 1,
where q is the distribution of demand shocks when the central bank is passive, f (s|m) is
the density of the signal conditional on the monetary policy shock, and φ(s) is household
expectations of the demand shock conditional on the signal, which the bank takes as
exogenous. The first constraint requires that the distribution of demand shocks the bank
chooses be sufficiently close to the reference distribution q in Kullback-Leibler terms. The
second constraint ensures that the chosen density implies a valid probability distribution.
The slack non-negativity constraints have been suppressed since they are implied by the
first constraint.
The Lagrangian is given by
min
g(m)
"
(m− φ(s))2 f (s|m)g(m)dsdm− λ
∫
q(m) log(g(m))dm− µ
∫
g(m)dm.
The first order condition is given by
d
dt
"
(m− φ(s))2 f (s|m)(g(m) + th(m))dsdm
− λ
∫
q(m) log(g(m) + th(m))dm− µ
∫
g(m) + th(m)dm
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= 0, ∀h
At the optimum, g(m) solves the following equation
∫
(m− φ(s))2 f (s|m)− λ q(m)
g(m)
− µ = 0.
Rearrange this to get
g(m) =
λq(m)∫ (
m− E˜(m|s))2 f (s|m)ds− µ , (3.13)
where E˜(m|s) is substituted for φ(s).
This first order condition is very intuitive to interpret. Draws of the monetary shock
m with large expected squared error in the household’s forecast, E((m− E˜(m|s))2|m), are
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less likely to occur relative to the reference distribution q. In other words, if households are
more likely to have incorrect beliefs during deflationary episodes than inflationary episodes,
then the central bank will reduce the probability of deflationary shocks. This is despite the
fact that the central bank’s loss function treats under- and over-employment symmetrically.
Since we found household beliefs to be more likely to be incorrect after disinflationary
periods than inflationary periods, equation (3.13) suggests that the central bank should
maintain an inflationary bias in policy. This is in keeping with the intuition, and the advice,
found in papers like Akerlof et al. (1996) or Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), that recommend
positive steady state inflation in the presence of downwardly sticky wages. However, in
the context of this model, this line of reasoning is susceptible to the Lucas critique if the
conditional expectations of households respond endogenously to the distribution of demand
shocks.
Before proceeding to the case with endogenous expectations, let us get a better sense for
how the solution behaves with the following numerical example. This example shows that,
the naive optimal policy will feature an inflationary bias. Suppose that the signal s is given
by
s = m + ε,
where ε is a mean-zero normally distributed noise term with variance σ ∈ [σ, σ]. Then
E˜(m|s) = max
σ∈[σ,σ]
∫
m
f (s|m, σ)g(m)
f (s|σ) dm, (3.14)
where
f (s|m, σ) = 1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (s−m)
2
2σ2
)
, (3.15)
and
f (s|σ) =
∫
f (s|m, σ)g(m)dm. (3.16)
Equations (3.13), (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16) determine the equilibrium of this economy.
Let the reference distribution q be a standard normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance 1. By calibrating σ, σ, and λ we can compute the equilibrium distribution of
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monetary shocks. We can calibrate σ and σ by fitting a piecewise linear regression to the
expectations data. The slope of the piecewise linear function ψ gives the signal-to-total
variance ratio, which in turn pins down σ and σ. A good estimate seems to be σ = 0.7 and
σ = 2. Calibrating λ is harder, so we can plot solutions for a range of λ to get a sense of what
the optimal solution looks like. In figure 3.7, we see that as the constraint on the central
bank becomes looser, the distribution of shocks becomes more positive and concentrated.
For comparison, figure 3.8 shows that without ambiguity, the distribution simply becomes
more concentrated, but there is no inflationary bias. This lines up with the received wisdom
that central banks should have an inflationary bias because of downward wage rigidity.
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Figure 3.7: The marginal distribution of monetary shocks
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Figure 3.8: The marginal distribution of monetary shocks with no ambiguity.
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Sophisticated Policy
The intuitive result in the previous section is in line with other work in recommending
inflationary bias in the presence of downward wage rigidity. However, this result depends
crucially on the assumption that the function mapping signals to conditional expectations
for the households is fixed. If the central bank takes into account the fact that changing the
distribution of monetary shocks changes the signal-extraction problem faced by households,
then the inflationary bias disappears.
To that end, consider a central bank that faces the following problem:
min
g(m)
"
(m− φ(s))2 f (s|m)g(m)dsdm
such that
∫
q(m) log(g(m))dm−
∫
q(m) log(q(m))dm ≤ K∫
f (m)dm = 1,
φ(s) = max
σ∈[σ,σ]
∫ m f (s|m, σ)g(m)
f (s|σ) dm.
The first order condition (omitted) for this problem is harder to interpret. Instead I plot
example solutions using a normal error term and a normal reference distribution in figure
3.9. Unlike the previous section, we see no inflationary bias in the central bank’s optimal
response, even though the degree of the asymmetry is very extreme. The reason is that
if the central bank attempted to skew the distribution towards more inflationary shocks,
conditional expectations of households would take this skew into account when interpreting
the signal.
The results of this section do not prove that zero percent inflation is the optimal inflation
rate. In fact, in this model, the mean value of the inflation rate, as long as it is known by all
agents, has no effect on welfare, since wages and prices are flexible. In practice, there are
other reasons why we might want to implement a positive inflation target, ranging from
concerns about hitting the zero lower bound to other causes of downward wage rigidity
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besides the one studied here (for instance a nominal fairness norm).
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Figure 3.9: The optimal distribution of monetary shocks.
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3.5.2 Costs of Business Cycles
In this environment, demand shocks are more costly to welfare than in standard models of
business cycles. Lucas (1987), in a highly influential study, performs a back-of-the-envelope
calculation that implies that the welfare costs of ordinary business cycles, measured in units
of life-time consumption, are extremely small (around one-twentieth of one percent). The
basic intuition underlying this result is that negative shocks are cancelled out by positive
shocks, resulting in second order gains from demand-management policies. However, as
pointed out by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011), in a world with asymmetric rigidities, such
calculations need not be true. In the present environment, as seen in figure 3.4, negative
shocks cause far larger drops than positive shocks – therefore, demand-management policy
can reap first-order gains.
To formalize this intuition, we can replicate the calculation in Lucas (1987) for the present
model. Let
cdett = c0e
gt
represent a deterministic consumption path growing at rate g starting from c0. Let the
stochastic consumption stream be
ct = c0egt exp (κ1(εt ≤ 0)εt + κ1(εt > 0)εt) ,
where εt is a Gaussian-(0, σ2) demand shock, and κ > κ corresponds to the piecewise-linear
slopes of (3.12). This is equilibrium consumption in a model like the one presented above
that also features deterministic growth. To measure the welfare costs of demand shocks in
permanent consumption units, set
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(λcdett ) = E
(
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
)
,
and solve for λ. Note that the expectation on the right-hand side features no ambiguity-
aversion, but is the objective probability distribution of {ct}∞t=0 given normally distributed
demand shocks. Following Lucas (1987), assume CRRA utility with risk aversion parameter
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γ. Then we can derive the following analytical expression for λ
(1+ λ)1−γ =
1
2
{
exp
(
(γ− 1)κ(1+ (γ− 1)κ)σ2) [1+Φ(1+ 2(γ− 1)κσ
2
√
2
)]
+
exp
(
(γ− 1)κ(1+ (γ− 1)κ)σ2) [1−Φ(1+ 2(γ− 1)κσ
2
√
2
)]}
,
where Φ is the CDF of a standard normal distribution. Note that if we set κ = κ = 1, we
recover the original calculation done by Lucas. To get a sense for how large this cost is,
Lucas calibrates his model by letting γ ∈ [1, 4] and σ = 0.032. The standard deviation of
the shocks are taken from the residuals of a linear regression. The present model implies
that such a procedure would underestimate the variance of the true underlying shocks.
This harks back to the debate between Romer (1986) and De Long and Summers (1988)
about whether macroeconomic policy reduces the variance of shocks or fills in the troughs
without shaving the peaks. In the table below, I take σ = 0.032 and κ = 1, to make my
results directly comparable with those of Lucas (1987), with the caveat, that re-estimating
σ would result in even larger differences. In particular, the variance of the consumption
process I specify is (1+ κ2)σ2/2 which is strictly less than the variance used by Lucas as
long as κ < 1.
Table 3.6: The ratio of λ in this model to that in Lucas (1987).
γ
1 2 3 4
κ
0 25.28 25.62 25.98 26.34
0.1 22.86 23.24 23.63 24.03
0.2 20.45 20.87 21.3 21.74
0.3 18.03 18.5 18.98 19.47
0.4 15.6 16.13 16.67 17.21
0.5 13.18 13.77 14.36 14.97
0.6 10.75 11.41 12.07 12.74
0.7 8.315 9.048 9.787 10.53
0.8 5.88 6.695 7.514 8.337
0.9 3.441 4.345 5.251 6.159
The results of the calibration are in table 3.6. We see that even a modest amount of
asymmetry can substantially increase the welfare costs of demand shocks for the US. In
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particular, if we calibrate κ using table 3.1, then the welfare cost of demand-driven business
cycles are approximately 1% percent of life-time consumption, or about 20 times the cost
found by Lucas (1987). There are reasons to believe that these estimates are a lower bound
on the welfare costs even in the context of a complete markets, representative consumer
economy. First, according to the model, the variance of the underlying shocks in the data
is larger than what one would estimate from the residuals of a least squares regression.
Second, as we will see in the next section, in a dynamic model, ambiguous information can
cause distortions in the deterministic steady-state of a linearized model and make negative
shocks more persistent than positive shocks, further increasing the welfare costs of shocks
in the model.
3.6 New Keynesian Model with ambiguous sticky wages
In this section, I embed ambiguous information quality into a standard New Keynesian
model with sticky wages. Other than showing that our earlier intuitions survive in this
context, I show that in a New Keynesian model time-varying ambiguity is observationally
equivalent to a supply or cost-push shock. I also show that ambiguity not only causes the
amplitude of positive and negative shocks to be asymmetric, but it can also change their
persistence.
In a typical New Keynesian model with sticky wages, households are monopolistically-
competitive suppliers of their labor. In such a world, it is no longer the case that inflation is
bad news and disinflation is good news, since monopolists care about both the relative price
and the quantity of what they sell. Therefore, I impose kinked beliefs on the households
without deriving it from their preferences. This is an artifact of the way sticky wages
are modelled in the New Keynesian model – in real life, most households do not set
their own wages subject to downward sloping labor demand. One could get around this
problem by having firms set wages instead, as in the earlier model, however, it is also
interesting to put kinked household beliefs into the work-horse New Keynesian model since,
independent from the microfoundations, earlier empirical results imply that household
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inflation expectations are indeed kinked in the data.
Consider a continuum of households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Household seek to maximize
E˜t
(
∞
∑
t=t0
βt
C1−γit
1− γ −
L1+ϕit
1+ ϕ
)
,
where E˜t represents expectation with respect to kinked beliefs in period t. There is a
representative firm that produces the consumption good Y using technology
Yt = AtLt,
where At is a productivity shock and Lt is a CES aggregate of labor inputs
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
L
1− 1η
it di
) η
η−1
.
This implies that labor demand is given by
lit − lt = −η(wit − wt), (3.17)
where lower case variables are in logs, and wt is the log of the CES wage aggregate. Assume
that due to free-entry, the firm makes zero profits in equilibrium, therefore
wt − pt = at. (3.18)
Assume that firms are subject to a cash in advance constraint for the labor they purchase
wt + lt = θt, (3.19)
where θt is a stochastic process representing the money supply. Let
θt = θt−1 + vt, vt ∼ N (0, σ2v ).
Assume that agents receive a noisy public signal xt of the stance of monetary at the start of
the period
xt = vt + εt, εt ∼ N (0, σ2ε ).
As before, households do not know the true signal-to-noise ratio. Suppose agents only know
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that σε ∈ [σε − d, σε + d], where d > 0 is a parameter that captures the amount of ambiguity
or Knightian uncertainty.
The timing of this model will be similar to Angeletos and La’O (2009): at the beginning
of the period, an exogenous fraction 1− λ of households set their wages optimally subject
to their information set and Calvo frictions. At the end of the period, vt becomes common
knowledge, and consumption and production take place. I assume that a monopoly tax
eliminates the markup.
The log-linearized optimal reset wage is given by
wit = E˜t
[
(1− βλ)
∞
∑
k=0
(βλ)k
(
mrsi,t+k|t + pt+k
)]
, (3.20)
where mrsi,t+k|t is log marginal rate of substitution for household i at time t + k conditional
on the wage being set in t. Observe that
mrsi,t+k|t = γcit + ϕlit,
= γct + ϕlit,
= γyt + ϕ(lt − η(wit − wt)),
= γat + (γ+ ϕ)lt − ϕηwit + ϕηwt, (3.21)
where the second equality follows from complete insurance markets. Use (3.21), (3.18), and
(3.19) to get
mrsi,t+k|t + pt+k =
γ+ ϕ
1+ ϕη︸    ︷︷    ︸
α
θt +
ϕη − γ− ϕ+ 1
1+ ϕη︸                ︷︷                ︸
1−α
wt +
γ− 1
1+ ϕη
at︸       ︷︷       ︸
ξt
. (3.22)
Note that
E˜t θt = θt−1 + ψtxt,
where ψt = ψ = σ2v /(σ2v + σ2ε − d) if xt ≥ 0, and ψt = ψ = σ2v /(σ2v + σ2ε + d) if xt < 0.
Conjecture an equilibrium where
wit = b1wt−1 + b2ψtxt + b3θt−1 + b4ξt + b5. (3.23)
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Observe that, from aggregation,
wt = λwt−1 + (1− λ)wit,
= λwt−1 + (1− λ)(b1wt−1 + b2ψtxt + b3θt−1 + b4ξt + b5). (3.24)
Note that we can write (3.20) recursively
wit = (1− βλ) E˜t
(
mrsit|t + pt
)
+ βλ E˜t (wi,t+1) .
= (1− βλ) E˜t (αθt + (1− α)wt + ξt) + βλ E˜t (wi,t+1) ,
= (1− βλ) E˜t (αθt + (1− α)wt + ξt) + βλ E˜t (b1wt + b2ψt+1xt+1 + b3θt + b4ξt+1 + b5) .
(3.25)
Combine (3.25) and (3.24) and, by matching coefficients, derive expressions for b1, b2, b3, b4,
and b5. This requires noting that
E˜t ξt = ξt, Et(ψt+1xt+1) =
σx√
2pi
(ψ− ψ),
where σx denotes the time-varying variance of xt+1. Matching coefficients gives
b1 = (1− α)(1− βλ)(λ+ (1− λ)b1) + βλb1((1− λ)b1 + λ),
b2 = (1− βλ)α+ b2(1− α)(1− βλ)(1− λ) + b2βλb1(1− λ) + βλb3,
b3 = (1− βλ)α+ b3(1− α)(1− βλ)(1− λ) + b3βλb1(1− λ) + βλb3,
b4 = (1− βλ) + b4(1− α)(1− βλ)(1− λ) + b4βλb1(1− λ),
b5 = b5(1− α)(1− βλ)(1− λ) + b5βλb1(1− λ) + βλb5 + βλ
σx(ψ− ψ)√
2pi
.
Therefore, the wage-reset rule conjectured in (3.23) is an equilibrium. We can spot two
differences between the reset wage (3.23) and a standard New Keynesian model with sticky
wages. First is the presence of the asymmetric response of real variables to monetary shocks.
Second, is the presence of the constant term b5. This term is an ambiguity premium, and
has the same interpretation as ambiguity premia in asset pricing contexts. Ambiguity-averse
households try to insure themselves against monetary shocks in the future by setting higher
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wages than they otherwise would. This results in a steady state level of real wages that is
higher than, and output that is lower than, in the case with no ambiguity. This ambiguity
premium has exactly the same implications as a mark-up and it generates a distortion of
the steady state. Some impulse response functions can be seen in figures 3.11 and 3.12. As
expected, negative shocks cause larger changes than positive shocks. The persistence of
either type of shock, however, is identical, since after the first period, the shock becomes
common knowledge.
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Figure 3.11: The nominal wage and employment as a function of permanent positive shock to money supply.
3.6.1 Time-varying ambiguity
Consider a world where the degree of Knightian uncertainty d is a time-varying quantity,
suppose for example that d is a random walk. Then in equilibrium,
wit = b1wt−1 + b2ψtxt + b3θt−1 + b4ξt + b5(dt), (3.26)
where b5 is increasing in dt. This results in cost-push shocks, which increase wages and
reduce output, giving a new microfoundation for the existence of a meaningful policy
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Figure 3.12: The nominal wage and employment as a function of permanent negative shock to money supply.
tradeoff between output and inflation for the central bank and violation of the divine
coincidence.
3.6.2 New Keynesian Model with imperfect information and no Calvo frictions
If we eliminate the Calvo friction, the dynamics of the model become degenerate since there
is perfect information at the end of each period. An alternative way of endowing the model
with some persistence is to follow Woodford (2003). In this set up, ambiguity aversion
not only makes the shocks asymmetric on impact, but it also changes their persistence. In
particular, disinflationary signals take longer to be incorporated into agents’ beliefs with the
result that recessions are not just deeper, but also longer-lived, than booms.
Each period, agents receive a public signal xt as before, but now, instead of the true state
being revealed after one period, the true state is never revealed. On the other hand, we
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dispense with the Calvo friction so that wages can be reset every period. Now
E˜t(θt) =
∞
∑
j=0
(
j−1
∏
i=0
ψt−i
)
(1− ψt−j)xt−j,
where ψt corresponds to the Kalman gain coefficient under worst case beliefs. We can
substitute this into (3.24) to get
wt =
α
1− α
[
∞
∑
j=0
(
j−1
∏
i=0
ψt−i
)
(1− ψt−j)xt−j
]
+
1
1− αξt.
We see that now, the shock not only affects the magnitude, but also the persistence of the
shocks. In particular, negative shocks will on average take longer to be incorporated into
the price, which in turn will result in more persistent declines in output. This increases the
welfare costs of negative demand shocks.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that information frictions, coupled with ambiguity-aversion, can
result in household expectations of the price level that are more sensitive to inflationary
news than disinflationary news. The intuition is that households pay closer attention to
and respond more strongly to bad news that their purchasing power might be lower than
they thought than good news that their purchasing power is higher than they thought.
I confirm that this asymmetry exists in survey data of household inflation expectations,
and show that such asymmetric beliefs can give rise to downward rigidity in equilibrium
wages. A simple general equilibrium model then implies that nominal and real variables
respond asymmetrically to monetary policy shocks. In particular, negative monetary shocks
cause larger changes to output than positive monetary shocks. On the other hand, negative
monetary policy shocks cause smaller changes to wage inflation than positive monetary
shocks. I show that these predictions hold in time series data from the United States.
Normatively, the asymmetry induced by ambiguity aversion increases the welfare costs
of business cycles. Since positive and negative shocks do not cancel, reductions in variance
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reap first-order gains. A back of the envelope calculation shows that these costs are around
20 times higher than the ones in Lucas (1987). Furthermore, it is typically assumed that
downward wage rigidity should imbue the central bank with an inflationary bias, for
example in Akerlof et al. (1996) or Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009). However, this intuition
fails to hold in my model if household conditional expectations respond endogenously
to inflationary pressure from the central bank. In other words, the idea that in a world
with downward wage rigidity, positive inflation “greases the wheels” of the labor market
may be subject to the Lucas critique for reasons similar to the long-run Phillips curve.
Finally, I embed this type of ambiguity aversion into a standard New Keynesian model
with sticky wages and show that ambiguity about inflation is observationally equivalent
to cost push shocks. So one does not need a supply-side, or markups-driven, story to
derive a meaningful policy tradeoff between inflation and employment. Furthermore, in
a dynamic model, ambiguity aversion means that disinflationary signals take longer to be
incorporated into household beliefs and therefore demand-driven recessions are longer-lived
than demand-driven booms.
145
References
Acemoglu, D., Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H. and Price, B. (2013). Import Competition
and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s. Tech. rep., Mimeo.
—, Carvalho, V. M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2012). The network origins of
aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 80 (5), 1977–2016.
Akerlof, G. A. (1982). Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 97 (4), 543–569.
—, Dickens, W. T., Perry, G. L., Gordon, R. J. and Mankiw, N. G. (1996). The macroeco-
nomics of low inflation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1996 (1), pp. 1–76.
Angeletos, G.-M. and La’O, J. (2009). Incomplete information, higher-order beliefs and
price inertia. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56, S19–S37.
Angrist, J. D., Jordà, s. and Kuersteiner, G. (2013). Semiparametric estimates of monetary
policy: String theory revisited.
Atalay, E. (2013). How important are sectoral shocks? Manuscript, University of Chicago.
Baqaee, D. R. (2014a). Asymmetric Inflation Expectations, Downward Rigidity of Wages, and
Asymmetric Business Cycles. Working paper series, SSRN.
— (2014b). Cascading Failures in Production Networks. Tech. rep.
— (2014c). Labor intensity in an interconnected economy.
Barattieri, A., Basu, S. and Gottschalk, P. (2010). Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky
Wages. Working Paper 16130, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Berman, E., Bound, J. and Griliches, Z. (1994). Changes in the demand for skilled
labor within us manufacturing: Evidence from the annual survey of manufacturers. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 367–397.
Bettendorf, L. and Heijdra, B. J. (2003). The monopolistic competition revolution in retrospect.
Bewley, T. F. (1999). Why wages don’t fall during a recession. Harvard University Press.
Campbell, J. Y. and Mankiw, N. G. (1990). Permanent income, current income, and con-
sumption. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 8 (3), 265–279.
146
Chodorow-Reich, G., Feiveson, L., Liscow, Z. and Woolston, W. G. (2012). Does state
fiscal relief during recessions increase employment? evidence from the american recovery
and reinvestment act. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4 (3), 118–145.
Christiano, L., Eichenbaum, M. and Rebelo, S. (2011). When is the government spending
multiplier large? Journal of Political Economy, 119 (1), 78–121.
Coibion, O. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012). What can survey forecasts tell us about
information rigidities? Journal of Political Economy, 120 (1), 116–159.
Correia, I., Farhi, E., Nicolini, J. P. and Teles, P. (2013). Unconventional fiscal policy at
the zero bound. American Economic Review, 103 (4), 1172–1211.
Cover, J. P. (1992). Asymmetric effects of positive and negative money-supply shocks. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (4), 1261–1282.
Daly, M. and Hobijn, B. (2013). Downward nominal wage rigidities bend the phillips curve.
FRBSF Working Paper, (8).
De Long, J. B. and Summers, L. H. (1988). How does macroeconomic policy affect output?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988 (2), pp. 433–494.
Deardorff, A. V. (2006). Glossary of international economics. World Scientific.
Dickens, W. T., Goette, L., Groshen, E. L., Holden, S., Messina, J., Schweitzer, M. E.,
Turunen, J. and Ward, M. E. (2007). How wages change: Micro evidence from the
international wage flexibility project. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21 (2), 195–214.
Eggertsson, G. and Mehrotra, N. (2014). A Model of Secular Stagnation. Tech. rep.
Eggertsson, G. B. and Krugman, P. (2012). Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: A
fisher-minsky-koo approach*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (3), 1469–1513.
Elliott, M., Golub, B. and Jackson, M. (2012). Financial networks and contagion. Available
at SSRN 2175056.
Elsby, M. W., Hobijn, B. and S¸ahin, A. (2013). The decline of the us labor share. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2013 (2), 1–63.
Epstein, L. G. and Schneider, M. (2008). Ambiguity, information quality, and asset pricing.
The Journal of Finance, 63 (1), 197–228.
Estrada, n. and Valdeolivas, E. (2012). The Fall of the Labour Income Share in Advanced
Economies. Occasional Paper 1209, Bank of Spain.
Farhi, E. and Werning, I. (2012). Fiscal multipliers: liquidity traps and currency unions. Tech.
rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
— and — (2013). A theory of macroprudential policies in the presence of nominal rigidities. Tech.
rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
147
Fehr, E. and Tyran, J.-R. (2001). Does money illusion matter? American Economic Review, pp.
1239–1262.
Gabaix, X. (2011). The granular origins of aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 79 (3),
733–772.
Galí, J., López-Salido, J. D. and Vallés, J. (2007). Understanding the effects of government
spending on consumption. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (1), 227–270.
Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D. (1989). Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (2), 141 – 153.
Goldin, C. D. and Katz, L. F. (2009). The race between education and technology. Harvard
University Press.
Goolsbee, A. D. and Krueger, A. B. (2015). A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and Restructuring
General Motors and Chrysler. Working Paper 588, Princeton University.
Hall, R. E. (2005). Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness. American
economic review, pp. 50–65.
Hansen, L. P. and Sargent, T. J. (2011). Robustness. Princeton university press.
Holden, S. and Wulfsberg, F. (2009). Wage rigidity, institutions, and inflation.
Holmstrom, B. (1983). Equilibrium long-term labor contracts. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 98, pp. 23–54.
Hulten, C. R. (1978). Growth accounting with intermediate inputs. The Review of Economic
Studies, pp. 511–518.
Ilut, C. and Schneider, M. (2012). Ambiguous business cycles. Tech. rep., National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Katz, L. F. and Murphy, K. M. (1992). Changes in relative wages, 1963-1987: Supply and
demand factors. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (1), 35–78.
Kaur, S. (2012). Nominal wage rigidity in village labor markets.
Kempe, D., Kleinberg, J. and Tardos, É. (2003). Maximizing the spread of influence through
a social network. In Proceedings of the ninth ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining, ACM, pp. 137–146.
Kim, J. and Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2009). How much inflation is necessary to grease the wheels?
Journal of Monetary Economics, 56 (3), 365 – 377.
Krugman, P. R. (1998). It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 137–205.
Kuhnen, C. M. (2012). Asymmetric learning from financial information.
148
Leontief, W. W. (1936). Quantitative input and output relations in the economic systems of
the united states. The Review of Economic Statistics, pp. 105–125.
Long, J. B. and Plosser, C. I. (1983). Real business cycles. The Journal of Political Economy,
pp. 39–69.
Lucas, J., Robert E (1973). Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs.
American Economic Review, 63 (3), 326–34.
Lucas, R. E. (1987). Models of business cycles, vol. 26. Basil Blackwell Oxford.
Malinvaud, E. (1977). The theory of unemployment reconsidered, vol. 1985. Blackwell Oxford.
Morris, S. (2000). Contagion. The Review of Economic Studies, 67 (1), 57–78.
Neiman, B. and Karabarbounis, L. (2014). The global decline of the labor share. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (1), 61–103.
Oberfield, E. and Raval, D. (2012). Micro data and the macro elasticity of substitution. US
Census Bureau Center for Economic Studies Paper No. CES-WP-12-05.
Patinkin, D. (1965). Money, interest, and prices.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the 21st century.
Romer, C. D. (1986). Is the stabilization of the postwar economy a figment of the data? The
American Economic Review, 76 (3), pp. 314–334.
— and Romer, D. H. (2004). A new measure of monetary shocks: Derivation and implica-
tions. American Economic Review, pp. 1055–1084.
Scheinkman, J. A. and Woodford, M. (1994). Self-organized criticality and economic
fluctuations. The American Economic Review, pp. 417–421.
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of segregation†. Journal of mathematical sociology,
1 (2), 143–186.
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and Uribe, M. (2011). Pegs and Pain. Tech. rep., National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Shiller, R. J. (1997). Why do people dislike inflation? In Reducing Inflation: Motivation and
Strategy, University of Chicago Press, pp. 13–70.
Shoag, D. (2010). The impact of government spending shocks: Evidence on the multiplier
from state pension plan returns.
Stolper, W. F. and Samuelson, P. A. (1941). Protection and real wages. The Review of
Economic Studies, 9 (1), 58–73.
Timmer, M., Erumban, A., Gouma, R., Los, B., Temurshoev, U., de Vries, G. and Arto, I.
(2012). The world input-output database (wiod): contents, sources and methods. WIOD
Background document available at www. wiod. org.
149
Trefler, D. and Zhu, S. C. (2010). The structure of factor content predictions. Journal of
International Economics, 82 (2), 195–207.
Valentinyi, A. and Herrendorf, B. (2008). Measuring factor income shares at the sectoral
level. Review of Economic Dynamics, 11 (4), 820–835.
Werning, I. (2011). Managing a Liquidity Trap: Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Tech. rep., National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Woodford, M. (2003). Imperfect common knowledge and the effects of monetary policy.
Knowledge, Information, and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund
Strother Phelps, p. 25.
Woods, J. (1979). A note on hicks’ composite commodity theorem. Zeitschrift für Nation-
alökonomie, 39 (1-2), 185–188.
Yang, W., Fidrmuc, J. and Ghosh, S. (2012). Government Spending Shocks and the Multiplier:
New Evidence from the U.S. Based on Natural Disasters. Tech. rep.
150
Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of theorem 1.2.1. The fact that labor’s share of income is equal to 1 follows trivially
from considering the aggregate budget constraint:
wl − τ + τ =∑
i
pi(ci + gi).
To see that the distribution of government expenditures does not affect equilibrium employ-
ment, consider the cost minimization problem of firm i
c(xi;p, w) = min
xij,li
{
∑
j
pjxij + wli : Fi(xi1, . . . , xin, li) = xi
}
.
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Once again, note that since the problem of the firm is static, I have suppressed time
subscripts. Note that for any α > 0,
ci(αxi;p, w) = min
xij,li
{
∑
j
pjxij + wli : Fi(xi1, . . . , xin, li) = αxi
}
,
= min
xij,li
{
∑
j
pjxij + wli : Fi(xi1/α, . . . , xin/α, li/α) = xi
}
,
= min
xij,li
{
∑
j
αpj
xij
α
+ wα
li
α
: Fi(xi1/α, . . . , xin/α, li/α) = xi
}
,
= αmin
xij,li
{
∑
j
pj
xij
α
+ w
li
α
: Fi(xi1/α, . . . , xin/α, li/α) = xi
}
,
= αci(xi;p, w).
So the marginal cost of firm i is
∂ci
∂xi
= ci(1;p, w).
In other words, the marginal cost of firm i depends only on the wage and the prices of firm
i’s inputs.
In equilibrium, all firms must make zero profits, otherwise they would expand their size
to infinity or shrink to zero. In particular, this means that price must equal marginal cost for
each good
pi = ci(1;p, w). (A.1)
Furthermore, observe that pi scale one-for-one with the wage w. That is, if p solves (A.1),
then p˜ ≡ αp solves
p˜i = ci(1; p˜, αw).
So (A.1) implies that all prices are pinned down by technologies and the nominal wage. So
let p solve the following equations:
pi = ci(1;p, 1),
and note that any equilibrium price vector must be wp.
At the steady-state equilibrium with zero inflation, 1 + it+1 =
ρt
ρt+1
. This implies that
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consumption of each good and labor are the same at every period. To see this, observe that
the household’s problem can be written as
max
∞
∑
τ=t
ρτU(c1τ, . . . , cnτ, lτ),
subject to
∞
∑
s=1
(
∑
i
pit+scit+s + τt+s
)(
s−1
∏
τ=0
1
1+ it+τ
)
=
∞
∑
s=1
wt+slt+s
(
s−1
∏
τ=0
1
1+ it+τ
)
,
where profits have been dropped since they are always equal to zero. The first order
conditions, along with the assumption that 1+ it+1 = ρt/ρt+1 implies that
uit(c1t . . . , cnt, lt) = uit+1(c1t+1 . . . , cnt+1, lt + 1),
for every t and i, where uit is the marginal utility of good i in period t. Furthermore,
ult(c1t . . . , cnt, lt) = ult+1(c1t+1 . . . , cnt+1, lt + 1).
These relations imply that consumption and labor supplied are the same in every period.
This means that we can collapse the household problem into finding just the steady-state
values of consumption and labor. In particular, we simply need to solve
max u(c1, . . . , cn, l)
subject to
∑
i
pici = wl − τ,
since perfect consumption-smoothing means that there is no variation across periods.
Define
V(C, l) = max
{
u(c1, · · · , cN , l) :∑ pici = C
}
.
Note that the indirect utility of the household, defined as the solution to the household’s
problem (1.1) will coincide with the solution to
max
C,l
V(C, l)
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such that
wC = wl − τ
The first order condition to this problem is
−Vl(l − τ/w, l)
Vc(l − τ/w, l) =
w
w
, (A.2)
Now let labor be the numeraire so that w = 1. Then this equation pins down l. We see that
the only way in which government policy appears in these two expressions is via the size of
the government’s budget τ. In particular, the distribution of spending is irrelevant. 
The assumption of constant returns to scale and marginal cost pricing allow us to use the
logic of the Hicks-Leontief composite commodity theorem, see for example Woods (1979).
An extension of the logic of theorem 1.2.1 to demand shocks is possible if we assume
that the indirect utility function of the household V(C, l) is quasi-linear in the composite
consumption good.
Corollary. Suppose that
V(C, l) = const C− v(l),
then equilibrium employment depends only on the disutility of labor.
Proof. The assumption of quasi-linearity allows us to write (A.2) as
v′(l) = const.

In particular, corollary A.1 implies that changes in the utility function of the household
(demand-shocks) do not affect equilibrium employment so long as the indirect utility
function remains quasi-linear in consumption. The leading example of this scenario is when
the utility function is Cobb-Douglas or has the CES form in consumption. In that case,
changes to the share parameters will not affect equilibrium employment.
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Proof of Lemma 1.3.2.
1 = IΩ1,
= (diag(a + c) + diag(1− a− c))W1,
= diag(a + c)W1 + diag(1− a− c)W1,
= a + c + diag(1− a− c)W1.
Rearrange this to get
(I − diag(1− a− c)W1 = a + c,
or
1 = (I − diag(1− a− c)W)−1(a + c).

Proof of Proposition 1.3.3. Let si denote the sales of firm i. By definition,
pjxij = wijsi,
and
wli = aisi.
Goods market clearing implies that
yi = ci + gi +∑
j
xji,
or equivalently
si = pici + pigi +∑ sjwji.
Solve this system of linear equations for s to get
s′ = (H + G)′(I −W)−1,
where H is household expenditures net of taxes and G is government expenditures.
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Finally, labor market clearing implies that
wl =∑
i
wli = s′a. (A.3)
Hence,
wl = (H + G)′(I −W)−1a = (H + G)′ a˜. (A.4)

Proof of Proposition 1.3.4. For simplicity, assume the government’s budget is zero. Note that
labor market clearing requires that
lθ−1 =
w
PC
.
Rearrange this to get
lθ =
wl
PC
=
s′α
PC
=
β′ΨαPC
PC
= β′α˜.
Now simply differentiate implicitly with respect to the taste parameter βi to get
θlθ−1
dl
dβi
=
(
ei
∑j β j
− β
(∑j β j)2
)′
α˜.
Divide this by the same expression for β j to get the desired result:
dl/dβi
dl/dβ j
=
e′i α˜− β′α˜
e′jα˜− β′α˜
.

Proof of Proposition 1.5.1. For simplicity, let the consumption taxes be equal to zero so that
there is only lump-sum taxation. Firm cost minimization implies that
pjxij = (1− αi − ηi)ωij pixi,
and
rki = ηi piyi,
and
wli = αpiyi.
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Substitute firm i’s demand for inputs into its production function to get that
pi =
(
w
αi
)αi ( r
ηi
)ηi
∏
j
(
(1− αi − ηi)ωij
pj
)(1−αi−ηi)ωij
. (A.5)
Note that
log(pi) = αi(log(w)− log(αi))+ ηi(log(r)− log(ηi))+∑
j
(1− αi− ηi)ωij(log(pj)− log(ωij)).
Rearrange this to get
log(p) = (I − Ωˆ)−1(α log(w) + η log(r)−Θ), (A.6)
where
Ωˆ = diag(1− α− η)Ω,
and
θi = αi log(αi) + ηi log(ηi) +∑
j
(1− αi − ηi)ωij log((1− αi − ηi)ωij).
In the expressions above, logs of a vector or matrix are taken element by element. Equation
(A.6) is informative, since it implies that the relative prices of consumption goods in the
economy depend solely on the relative cost of the two factors and the technology.
Let si = piyi. Then labor market clearing implies that
l =∑
i
li =
s′α
w
. (A.7)
Rearrange this to get
w =
s′α
l
.
Plug this into the labor supply equation to get
l = min
{[
s′α
lPC
] 1
θ−1
, l
}
.
Rearrange this to get
l = min

[
∏
(
βi
pi
)βi s′α
C
] 1
θ
, l
 . (A.8)
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Similarly, capital market clearing implies that
K =∑
i
ki =
s′η
r
. (A.9)
Finally, goods market clearing implies that
yi = ci + gi +∑
j
xji.
By market clearing,
piyi = pi(ci + gi) +∑ pjxj(1− αj − ηj)ωji
Denote the vector of si’s by s. Then
s′ = (H + G)′(I − Ωˆ)−1, (A.10)
where H is the vector of household expenditure and G is the vector of government expendi-
ture.
Assume that l ≤ l and substitute (A.10) into (A.8) to get
l =
[
(H + G)′(I − Ωˆ)−1α
] 1
θ
(
1
PC
) 1
θ
. (A.11)
So, the equilibrium labor is given by (A.11), with prices that satisfy (A.6), (A.9), and the
normalization w = 1.
By changing the shares of government expenditures, the government affects equilibrium
employment through three different channels. First, the government directly changes the
demand for labor through its purchases. Second, the government changes demand for labor
by affecting the price of labor relative to capital, and therefore the relative prices of more
and less labor intensive goods. Lastly, the government changes the income of households.
Fortunately, all three of these forces can be expressed as multiples of the relative network-
adjusted labor intensities of the various sectors. This makes the clean expression in (1.7)
possible.
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Let labor to be the numeraire w = 1 to form the following expression
lθ =
(β′(l + rK− τ) + δ′τ)Ψα
PC
,
note that equilibrium employment l, rental rate of capital r, and household expenditures
PC all depend on δ. Implicitly differentiate this expression with respect to δi
θlθ−1
dl
dδi
=
(
β′Ψα
(
dl
dδi
+ K
dr
dδi
)
+ (ei − δ)′Ψατ
)
1
PC
(A.12)
− 1
(PC)2
(
dl
dδi
+ K
dr
dδi
) (
β′PC + δ′τ
)
Ψα, (A.13)
where ei denotes the vector with zeros everywhere except the ith element. From (A.9), note
that
K
dr
dδi
= β′Ψη
(
dl
dδi
+ K
dr
dδi
)
+ (ei − δ)′Ψη.
Rearrange this to get K drdδi and substitute that into (A.12). After some rearranging, we get
PC
[
θlθ−1 − (β′Ψα− β′Ψη) 1
PC
+
l
(PC)2
1
β′Ψα
]
dl
dδi
=[
(ei − δ)′τΨ(η + α)− 1PC l(ei − δ)
′Ψητ
1
β′Ψα
]
.
Divide the above expression for i by the same expression for k to get
dl/dδi
dl/dδk
=
(ei − δ)′τ
(
Ψη +Ψα− s′αPC 1β′ΨαΨη
)
(ek − δ)′τ
(
Ψη +Ψα− s′αPC 1β′ΨαΨη
) . (A.14)
By lemma 1.3.2, note that Ψη = 1−Ψα. Using this, we can simplify (A.14) to be
dl/dδi
dl/dδk
=
(ei − δ)′(Ψη +Ψα− s′αPC 1β′ΨαΨη)
(ek − δ)′(Ψη +Ψα− s′αPC 1β′ΨαΨη)
=
(ei − δ)′(1− s′αPC 1β′Ψα (1−Ψα))
(ek − δ)′(1− s′αPC 1β′Ψα (1−Ψα))
,
=
(ei − δ)′Ψα
(ek − δ)′Ψα .
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The final line follows from the fact that
e′i1
s′α
PC
1
β′Ψα
= δ′1
s′α
PC
1
β′Ψα
.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1.5.2. For simplicity, assume that the government only uses consumption
taxes and ensures a balanced budget with lump-sum taxes so there are no government
purchases. Then, as before, the sales industry i are given by
piyi = pici +∑
j
pixji.
Substituting household and firm input demands we get
piyi =
βiPC
1+ τi
+∑
j
ωji pjyj.
Denote the vector of sales by s and household expenditure share on good i net of taxes by
β∗i = βi/(1+ τi). Then
s′ = (β∗)′ΨPC.
Letting labor be the numeraire, labor demand is then given by
l = s′α = (β∗)′ΨαPC = (β∗)′α˜PC.
Substitute this into the labor supply equation to get equilibrium labor
lθ = (β∗)′α˜.
Differentiate this expression with respect to τi to get
θlθ−1
dl
dτi
= − βi
(1+ τi)2
α˜i.
Rearrange this expression and divide through by the same expression for j to get
dl/dτi
dl/dτj
=
βiα˜i
β jα˜j
(1+ τi)2
(1+ τj)2
.
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Proof of lemma 1.5.3. From the Euler equation, we have that
Pt+1Ct+1 = ρ∗(1+ it)PtCt.
Assume an equilibrium where Ct+1 = C, where C is the long-run efficient steady state value
of consumption. Then the euler equation and the aggregate budget set imply that
1+ it =
Pt+1C/ρ∗
wtlt + rtk− τt .
When the zero-lower bound is not binding, the central bank can ensure full employment and
no inflation by setting the nominal rate equal to 1/ρ∗. However, at the zero lower-bound,
we have
Pt+1C/ρ∗
wtlt + rtk− τt = 1. (A.15)
Rearrange this for labor earnings to get
wtlt =
Pt+1C
ρ∗
− rtk + τt.
Note that
rtk = (1− βα˜)(wtlt + rtk− τt) + (1− δ′α˜)τt.
Rearrange this to get
rtk =
(1− β′α˜)wtlt + (β− δ)′α˜τt
β′α˜
, (A.16)
and substitute it into (A.15) to get
wtlt =
Pt+1C
ρ∗
β′α˜− (β− δ)′α˜τt.
So labor earnings today depend on private nominal consumption tomorrow, and government
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policy today. Note that
Pt+1C =wt+1l + rt+1k− τt+1
=wt+1l +
1− β′α˜
β′α˜
wt+1l +
(β− δt+1)′α˜
β′α˜
τt+1 − τt+1,
=
1
β′α˜
wt+1l −
δ′t+1α˜
β′α˜
τt+1.
Substitute this into the previous expression to get
wtlt =
1
ρ∗
wt+1l − 1
ρ∗
δ′t+1α˜τt+1 − (β− δt)′α˜τt. (A.17)
This gives the aggregate demand curve for labor. 
Proof of Proposition 1.5.4. Since the government cannot commit to future policy τt+1 and δt+1,
we see that the only way the government can boost employment is via (δt − β)′α˜τt.
The household Euler equation at the zero lower bound implies that
Pt+1Ct+1 = ρ∗(1+ it)PtCt = ρ∗PtCt.
The economy is back to its efficient full-employment steady state in period t+ 1. So Ct+1 = C.
Note that as long as current government spending is not so high that it crowds out the
private sector from the labor market, the equilibrium features wt = wt+1. Due to lack of
commitment for fiscal policy, equation (A.16) pins down the rental rate of capital in period
t + 1 in terms of wt:
rt+1k =
1− β′α˜
β′α˜
wtl +
(β− φ)′α˜
β′α˜
τ =
1− β′α˜
β′α˜
wtl +
(β− φ)′α˜
β′α˜
λ
1− λPt+1C.
Therefore, Pt+1 is also pinned down at its long-run steady state value. Since both Ct+1 and
Pt+1 do not respond to the shock, this means that in order for the Euler equation to hold,
either Pt needs to fall or Ct needs to fall.
Since in period t+ 1, the economy returns to full employment, the government’s problem
can be separated in two. In period t + 1, the government spends
pi,t+1gi,t+1 =
λ
1− λφiPt+1Ct+1.
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In period t, however, the government’s problem is different because there is idle labor. The
government’s problem is
max
δ,τt
(1− λ) log
(
PtCt
Pt
)
+ λ∑
i
φi log(git).
The Euler equation pins down PtCt to be PC/ρ∗, where PC is nominal GDP from period
t + 1 onwards. So we can rewrite the government’s problem in period t as
max
δ,τt
−(1− λ) log(Pt) + λ∑
i
φi log(git).
subject to the following constraints
wtlt = β′Ψα
PC
ρ∗
+ δ′Ψατt, (A.18)
rtK = β′Ψη
PC
ρ∗
+ δ′Ψητt, (A.19)
wt−1 ≤ wt, (A.20)
(lt − l)(wt − wt−1) = 0, (A.21)
git =
δiτt
pit
, (A.22)
pit = w
α˜i
t r
η˜i
t consti, (A.23)
Pt =
N
∏
i
(
pit
βi
)βi
, (A.24)
∑
i
δi = 1. (A.25)
The first order condition for δi is given by
λφi
δi
+ µ1α˜kτt + µ2η˜kτt + µ8 = 0,
where µ1 is the lagrange multiplier on the labor market condition, µ2 is the lagrange
multiplier on the capital market condition, and µ8 makes sure that the δi sum to 1. Rearrange
this to get
δi
δj
=
φi
µ2 + (µ1 − µ2)α˜i + µ8
µ2 + (µ1 − µ2)α˜j + µ8
φj
. (A.26)
When the labor market clears, µ1 and µ2 are equal, therefore, the government simply
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equates the marginal returns to various forms of government expenditures. However,
during recession µ2 exceeds µ1, so that expenditures are tilted in favor of sectors with
relatively high network-adjusted labor intensities.
To see this, note that the optimum features wt = wt−1 and lt = l. Substituting these into
labor market clearing (A.18) for t and t− 1 gives
β′α˜PC/ρ∗ + δ′α˜τt = β′α˜PC +
λ
1− λPCφ
′α˜.
Rearrange this to get
δ′α˜ = β′α˜(1− 1/ρ∗)PC + λ
1− λPCφ
′α˜. (A.27)
Substitute this into the first order condition for wt to get
µ1 +
µ3
lt
=
(1− λ)β′Ψα+ λφ′Ψα
wtlt
− µ4 (lt − l)lt ,
=
(1− λ)β′Ψα+ λφ′Ψα
wtlt
,
=
(1− λ)β′Ψα+ λφ′Ψα
β′ΨαPC/ρ∗ + δ′Ψατt
,
=
(1− λ)β′Ψα+ λφ′Ψα
β′ΨαPC + λ1−λPCφ′Ψα
,
=
1− λ
PC
.
Note that the first order condition for τt implies that
µ2τt + (µ1 − µ2)δ′α˜τt = λ.
Substitute (A.27) into this to get
µ2τtδ
′η˜ = λφ′η˜ − (1− λ)β′α˜(1− 1/ρ∗). (A.28)
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Note that the first order equation for rt gives
µ2 =
(1− λ)β′η˜ + λφ′η˜
rtK
,
=
(1− λ)β′η˜ + λφ′η˜
β′η˜PC/ρ∗ + δη˜τt
,
=
(1− λ)ρ∗
PC
+
(1− λ)(ρ∗ − 1)
PC
β′α˜
β′η˜
,
where going from the second to the third line requires substituting in (A.28).
Now note that
µ1 − µ2 = 1− λ
PC
− (1− λ)ρ
∗
PC
− (1− λ)(ρ
∗ − 1)
PC
β′α˜
β′η˜
− µ3
lt
,
= − (1− λ)(ρ
∗ − 1)
PC
− (1− λ)(ρ
∗ − 1)
PC
β′α˜
β′η˜
− µ3
lt
,
< 0,
as required. Note that µ3 ≥ 0 by the KKT conditions.
We now see that the higher the labor-intensity of the household’s consumption, the
larger the required tilting by the government in its stimulus. It is also easy to verify that
if the zero-lower bound does not bind (ρ∗ ≤ 1), then no intervention, and no tilting, is
necessary. Indeed, when the zero-lower bound does not bind, we have that µ1 = µ2. 
Proof of lemma 1.5.5. I analyze the equilibrium where the steady-state equilibrium features
zero inflation, full employment, and no government spending after the first period and
constant government taxes starting in period t + 1. In period t, the intertemporal budget
constraint of the saver and the Euler equation pin down his consumption in period t
ptcst =
pt+1cst+1
ρ(1+ it)
=
(wt+1lt+1 + rt+1Kt+1) (1− χ) + (1− ρ)
[
Dl pt+1pt + Bt(1+ it)− p
g
t gt(1− χ)
]
ρ(1+ it)
.
The budget constraint for the borrower pins down his consumption in period t
ptcbt = (wtlt + rtKt)χ+
Dl
1+ it
pt+1
pt
− Dh pt
pt−1
.
To find the real rate of interest Rt, we solve for the equilibrium interest rate that equates
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supply and demand. This requires that
cst =
wtlt + rtkt
pt
− cbt −
pgt gt
pt
.
Substituting the Euler equation into this and solving for the interest rate gives
1+ Rt =
(wt+1l+rt+1k)(1−χ)
pt+1
+ D
l
pt+1
− p
g
t gt(1−χ)(1−ρ)
pt+1
ρ
(
(wt lt+rtk)(1−χ)
pt +
Dh
pt
)
− p
g
t gt
pt
.
The natural rate of interest, on the other hand, is given by
1+ Rnt =
(wt+1l+rt+1k)(1−χ)
pt+1
+ D
l
pt+1
− p
g
t gt(1−χ)(1−ρ)
pt+1
ρ
(
(wt l+rtk)(1−χ)
pt +
Dh
pt
)
− p
g
t gt
pt
.
The no-arbitrage condition between nominal government bonds and household debt implies
the Fisher equation
1+ Rt = (1+ it)
pt
pt+1
.
If Rnt > 0, then the central bank can maintain full employment with zero inflation, and
government spending is unambiguously bad since it wastes resources that would otherwise
be going to the households. We can see that whether or not the zero lower bound binds
depends on the inflation rate, the amount of government spending, and the size of the
deleveraging shock. When the central bank is able to set it = Rnt , we have full employment
as in figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Zero-lower bound is not binding and aggregate demand is downward sloping
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However, when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds, then the Fisher
equation implies that
(1+ Rt)
pt+1
pt
= 1.
Substituting the expression we have for Rt and solving for wtlt we get
wtlt =
1
ρ
(
wt+1l + rt+1k
)
+
Dl − ρDh
ρ(1− χ) +
1− (1− ρ)(1− χ)
ρ(1− χ) p
g
t gt − rtk.
Now substitute
rtk =
(1− β′α˜)
β′α˜
wtlt +
β′α˜− δ′α˜
β′α˜
pgt gt (A.29)
into this expression and solve for wtlt to get
wtlt =
1
ρ
β′α˜
(
wt+1l + rt+1k
)
+ β′α˜
Dl − ρDh
ρ(1− χ) +
(
β′α˜
[
1− (1− ρ)(1− χ)
ρ(1− χ) − 1
]
+ δ′α˜
)
pgt gt.
(A.30)

Proof of proposition 1.5.6. Societal welfare is given by real GDP net of government expendi-
tures. That is,
wtlt + rtk− pgt gt
pt
=
1
ρ
(
wt+1l + rt+1k
)
+ D
l−ρDh
ρ(1−χ) +
[
1−(1−ρ)(1−χ)
ρ(1−χ) − 1
]
pgt gt
c1wt
(
1−β′ α˜
β′ α˜
lt
k
+ β
′ α˜−δ′ α˜
β′ α˜
pgt gt
kwt
)1−β′ α˜ , (A.31)
where the numerator comes from combining (A.29) with (1.10) and c1 is a constant. The
denominator comes from combining (A.29) with the household’s price index
pt ∝∏
(
wα˜it r
1−α˜i
t
)βi
.
Equation (A.31) gives real GDP in period t net of government consumption, so it warrants
close inspection. The term [
1− (1− ρ)(1− χ)
ρ(1− χ) − 1
]
> 0
in the numerator is the government multiplier on nominal private GDP. This term does
not depend on the composition of government spending since income from either factor
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is distributed between the two households uniformly. The denominator, which gives the
price level, does however the depend on the composition of spending, since government
purchases of capital-intensive goods directly crowds out the household.
The numerator of (A.31) does not depend on the composition of spending, so we can
focus on minimizing the denominator. Note that wt is fixed as long as the zero lower bound
is binding, so we can substitute lt using (1.10) into the denominator of (A.31) and treat wt as
a constant, to get
1
pt
∝
[
1− β′α˜
β′α˜
(
c2
wtk
+ δ′α˜
pgt gt
wtk
)
+ pgt gt −
δ′α˜
β′α˜
pgt gt
kwt
]β′ α˜−1
=
(
c3 − β′α˜δ′α˜pgt gt
)β′ α˜−1
,
where c3 and c2 are constants not affected by p
g
t gt or δ. This is maximized when the inner
term is minimized because the exponent is less than one. The inner term is minimized when
δ′α˜ is maximized, as required. 
A.2 Appendix II: World Trade
In this section, I augment the model in section 1.3 with trade in goods and services but
immobile labor and capital. Assume capital is inelastically supplied at quantity K. The
household chooses
max
∞
∑
t=0
ρt
(
log(Ct)− l
θ
t
θ
)
,
where
Ct =
N
∏
i=1
cβiit ,
where
cit =
(
chit
)κi (
c fit
)1−κi
,
subject to budget constraint
∑
(
phitc
h
it + p
f
itc
f
it
)
+ qtBt = wtlt + rtK + Bt−1 +Πt − τt,
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where Bt is a nominal bond (in zero net supply), Πt is firm profits, τt is lump sum taxes, rt
is the rental rate of capital, and chit is quantity of domestically produced good i and c
f
it is
quantity of foreign produced good i consumed. Suppose that there is a physical limit to the
number of hours that can be worked
lt ≤ l.
A.2.1 Firms’ problem
Firms rent capital and labor on spot markets from the household, and reoptimize every
period. Therefore, their problems are static, so I suppress time-subscripts. Since, in a
competitive equilibrium with constant returns to scale, firm size is indeterminate, I simply
state the problem of the representative firm in industry i:
max
yhi ,li ,xij
phi y
h
i −∑
j
pjxhij −∑
j
p fj x
f
ij − wli − rki
subject to the production function
yhi = l
αi
i k
ηi
i ∏ x
(1−αi−ηi)ωij
ij ,
with
xij =
(
xhij
)κij (
x fij
)1−κij
,
where superscript h denotes domestic and f foreign use of input j by firm i. The network
structure of the economy is captured by the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production
function.
A.2.2 Government behavior
Let government run balanced budgets every period
∑ pigi = τ. (A.32)
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Also, define the fraction of government expenditures on industry i to be
δi =
phi gi
∑i phi gi
.
To keep the notation simple, the government is assumed to only make domestic purchases.
A.2.3 The Rest of the World
The rest of the world’s behavior is treated as being exogenous. The world simply spends its
earnings from trading with home on buying goods and services from home, so that
∑
i
phiteit =∑
j
(
∑
i
p fjtx
f
jt + p
f
jtc
f
jt
)
,
where eit is exports of good i to foreign.
A.2.4 Market Clearing
The market for good or service i clears so that
phiteit + p
h
itc
h
it + p
h
itgit +∑
j
phitx
h
jit = p
h
ity
h
it.
The variable dit is foreign demand for good i in domestic currency. The expenditures of
foreigners on each good and service is treated as being exogenous. This would follow from
a Cobb-Douglas utility function for the rest of the world.
A.2.5 Equilibrium
I will focus on the steady state of this model, and will therefore suppress time-subscripts.
Definition A.2.1. The steady-state competitive equilibrium of this economy is a collection
of prices {phi }Ni=1, wage w, quantities {xij, xhij, x fij, ci, chi , c fi }ij, and labor supply l and labor
demands {li}i such that for a given δ and τ,
(i) Each firm maximizes its profits given prices,
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(ii) the representative household chooses consumption basket {ci} and labor supply l
every period to maximizes utility,
(iii) the government runs a balanced budget,
(iv) and markets for each good, labor, and capital clear.
Definition A.2.2. The employment multiplier of government spending in industry i is
defined as dl/dGi, where l is equilibrium employment and Gi is government expenditures
in industry i.
Since I am focusing on perturbations to the steady state of this model, the changes in
government policy are permanent changes to the steady state of the model. This implies
that government spending has very strong crowding-out effects.
Definition A.2.3. The relative employment multiplier of government spending in industry i
is defined as dl/dδi, where l is equilibrium employment and δi is the share of government
expenditures in industry i, holding fixed the total size of the governments’ budget.
The presence of trade with the rest of the world means that we must adjust the influence
matrix for trade. To that end, let
Ψ∗ ≡ (I − diag(1− α− η)(κ ·Ω))−1,
represent the influence matrix with trade and ψ∗ij represent the jth element of the ith row of
this matrix. Similarly, let
β∗i ≡ βiκi,
for each i and β∗ denote the column vector β∗i .
Proposition A.2.1. The relative government multiplier for shares of expenditure satisfy
dl/dδi
dl/dδk
=
e′iΨ
∗α− δ′Ψ∗α
e′kΨ∗α− δ′Ψ∗α
. (A.33)
Furthermore, labor’s share of income is equal to
wl
GDP
=
(PCβ∗ + τδ+ E)′Ψ∗α
GDP
,
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where E is the vector of expenditures on foreign exports.
The proof for this proposition is very similar to that of proposition 1.3.3 and 1.5.1.
Proof. Let si denote sales of domestic industry i and note that
l =∑
i
li =
s′α
w
.
Market clearing implies that
phi y
h
i = p
h
i ci + p
h
i gi + p
h
i ei +∑
j
phj y
h
j (1− αj − ηj)κjiωji.
Rearrange this to get
s′ = (PCβ∗ + τδ+ E)′Ψ∗.
Equating Labor supply and labor demand gives
l =
(
(PCβ∗ + τδ+ E)′Ψ∗α
) 1
θ
(
1
PC
) 1
θ
.
Take derivatives, rearrange, and use lemma 1.3.2 to get the desired result. 
A.3 Appendix III: Non-unit Elasticity of Substitution
A.3.1 Response to Demand Shocks
Recent work by Atalay (2013) suggests that at business cycle frequencies, the elasticity of
substitution may be significantly less than one. In this section, I sketch how the optimal
policy results can be generalized to cases with non-unitary elasticities.
Suppose that household utility is given by
max
ci
(
N
∑
i=1
β
1
ε
i c
ε−1
ε
i
) ε
ε−1
,
where ε is the elasticity of substitution, βi is the share parameter for good i. The household
faces the same budget set as before
∑ pici = wl + rk− τ.
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The government runs a balanced budget
N
∑
i
pigi = τ.
Government purchases are given by
gi =
(
pi
PG
)−ε
δiG, (A.34)
where
G =
(
∑
i
δ
1
ε
i g
ε−1
ε
i
) ε
ε−1
, (A.35)
and
PG =
(
N
∑
i
δi p1−εi
) 1
1−ε
. (A.36)
The instrument of government policy are the share parameters δi. Observe that as ε→ 1 we
recover the Cobb-Douglas production function as before.
The representative firm in each industry is competitive. It chooses inputs and prices to
maximize profits:
max
pi ,li ,ki ,xij
piyi −∑
j
pjxij − wli − rki
using the production technology
yi ≤
(
α
1
ε
i l
ε−1
ε
i + η
1
ε
i k
ε−1
ε +
N
∑
i
ω
1
ε
ij x
ε−1
ε
ij
) ε
ε−1
.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition A.3.1. In the presence of downward sticky wages, when the labor market fails to clear,
we have
dl/dδi
dl/dδi
=
α˜i − δ′α˜
α˜j − δ′α˜ ,
This proposition shows that the qualitative logic of the previous results carry-over
without change to the case with non-unitary elasticities. Of course, quantitatively, the share
parameters Ω and α no longer correspond to expenditure shares. For simplicity, I have
assumed that the household’s elasticity of substitution across goods is the same as the
firms’ elasticity of substitution across inputs. This assumption can be relaxed without losing
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analytical tractability.
Proof. Note that the price vector P raised element-wise by 1− ε satisfies
P1−ε = Ψ(αw1−ε + ηr1−ε).
Let si = pεi yi. Then
s′ = (Pεc Cβ+ PεGGδ)
′Ψ.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the wage is stuck at w = 1 and that the labor market
is not clearing. Then, labor is determined by demand, so we have
l = s′α.
Therefore,
dl
dδi
=
(
β
dPεc C
dδi
+ δ
dPεGG
dδi
+ eiPεGG
)′
Ψα. (A.37)
Note that
Pεc C =
l + rK− τ
P1−εc
,
=
dl/dδi + drK/dδi
P1−εc
+ (ε− 1)PcCPεc
(
β′Ψηdr1−ε/dδi
)
,
where the last line uses the fact that
P1−εc = βΨ(α+ ηr1−ε).
Market clearing for capital implies that
rK = (1− s′α)r1−ε.
Therefore,
r1−ε =
(
1− s′α
K
) 1−ε
ε
.
So,
dr1−ε
dδi
=
(
ε− 1
ε
)(
s′η
K
) 1−ε
ε −1 ds′α
dδi
1
K
.
174
Furthermore,
drK
dδi
=
dr1−ε
dδi
− r1−εds
′α
dδi
.
Combine these two equations with (A.37) to get[(
1− β′α˜Pε−1c (1− r1−ε)
)
− β′α˜Pε−1c
(
1+ (ε− 1)P2c (1− s′α)
) ε− 1
ε
(
s′η
K
) 1−ε
ε −1 1
K
]
ds′α
dδi
= α˜iPεGG + δ
′α˜
dPεGG
dδi
,
= α˜iPεGG + δ
′α˜
dτ/P1−εG
dδi
,
= α˜iPεGG + δ
′α˜
PεGG
Pε−1G
[
α˜i + η˜ir1−ε + δ′η˜
dr1−ε
dδi
]
.
Rearrange this to get
Θ
ds′α
dδi
= α˜i − δα˜
P1−εG
(
α˜i + η˜ir1−ε
)
,
where Θ does not depend on δi. Recall that ds′α/dδi = dl/dδi. Divide the derivative of
labor with respect to δi by the derivative with respect to δj to get
dl/dδi
dl/dδj
=
α˜i − δα˜P1−εG
(
α˜i + η˜ir1−ε
)
α˜j − δα˜P1−εG
(
α˜j + η˜jr1−ε
) ,
=
α˜i − δα˜P1−εG
(
α˜i + η˜ir1−ε
)
α˜j − δα˜P1−εG
(
α˜j + η˜jr1−ε
) ,
=
α˜i − δα˜/P
1−ε
G r
1−ε
1−δα˜/P1−εG (1−r1−ε)
α˜j − δα˜/P
1−ε
G r
1−ε
1−δα˜/P1−εG (1−r1−ε)
, (A.38)
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Note that
δα˜/P1−εG r
1−ε
1− δα˜/P1−εG (1− r1−ε)
=
δ′α˜r1−ε
Pε−1G − δ′α˜(1− r1−ε)
,
=
δ′α˜r1−ε
δ′(α˜+ η˜r1−ε)− δ′α˜(1− r1−ε) ,
=
δ′α˜r1−ε
r1−ε
,
= δ′α˜.
Substitute this fact into expression (A.38) to get the desired result.

A.3.2 Labor Share of Income with CES
The results of section 1.4 take advantage of the Cobb-Douglas form of the production
functions, but they can be viewed in a more general reduced-form manner. Whatever the
underlying production functions of the different industries, we can define Ω, α, η, and β
to be the observed expenditure shares. Market clearing will then imply that equation (1.3)
must hold. Which in turn allows us to carry out the decomposition in (1.5). Therefore,
since these depend only on accounting identities, the resulting calculations still tell us
how changing expenditure shares are changing labor’s share of income regardless of the
underlying production functions. Of course, without a structural model, it is impossible to
know the causes of these changes.
On the structural front, the benchmark model can be extended to allow for non-unit
symmetric elasticity of substitution. Let the composite consumption of household be given
by
C =
(
∑
k
β
1
εh
k c
εh−1
εh
k
) εh
εh−1
.
Note that as εh → 1, we recover the utility function of the benchmark model. Let the
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production function of the representative firm in industry i be given by
yi ≤
(
α
1
ε
i l
ε−1
ε
i + η
1
ε
i k
ε−1
ε +
N
∑
i
ω
1
ε
ij x
ε−1
ε
ij
) ε
ε−1
.
Once again, note that letting ε → 1 recovers the production functions of the benchmark
model.
Now, labor’s share of private GDP can be written as
wl
GDP
=
(
β ◦ Pε−εh)′ α˜w1−εPεh−1c , (A.39)
where P is a column vector of the price of each good, w is the nominal wage, and Pc is the
price level of aggregate consumption. The network-adjusted labor intensities are still defined
as α˜ = (I − Ωˆ)−1α, but now these numbers pertain to the share parameters rather than
the observed expenditure shares. Equation (A.39) allows us to carry out a decomposition
similar to (1.5), although now we need both price and quantity data to identify the relevant
parameters. A further restriction of εh = ε gives us the even simpler expression
wl
GDP
= β′α˜
(
w
Pc
)1−ε
.
Note that these equations will hold as long as consumption and production have the CES
form, and do not depend on assumptions about other aspects of the model like labor supply,
intertemporal decision-making, and capital accumulation.
A.4 Appendix IV: Profits
In this section, I show that firm profits, rather than inelastically supplied capital, can play
the role of a non-labor sink and break the irrelevance result in section 1.2. A tractable way
of showing this is to use Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition.
Let the representative household maximize
max
cit,lt,Bt
∞
∑
t=0
ρt
(
log(Ct)− l
θ
t
θ
)
,
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where
Ct =
N
∏
i=1
c
βi
∑j βj
it ,
subject to budget constraint
∑(1+ τit)pitcit + qtBt = wtlt + Bt−1 +Πt − τt,
where pit is the price of good i in period t, Bt is a nominal bond (in zero net supply), Πt is
firm profits, τt is lump sum taxes in period t. Note that we no longer have capital income.
The government runs balanced budgets every period
∑ pigi = τ +∑
i
τit pitcit, (A.40)
and the fraction of government expenditures on industry i is
δi
∑j δj
=
pigi
∑i pigi
.
Without loss of generality, suppose that there is a unit mass of firms in each industry.
Assume that these firms are monopolistically competitive so that they make positive profits
in equilibrium, and the elasticity of substitution across firms producing different varieties in
industry i is given by ε i > 1. The representative firm in industry i maximizes profits
max
yi ,li ,xij
piyi −∑
j
pjxij − wli
subject to the production function
yi = (li)αi∏ x(1−αi)ωijij ,
where ωij is the intensity with which the representative firm in industry i uses inputs
from industry j. Assume that ∑j ωij = 1 for all i to maintain constant returns to scale. In
equilibrium, firm i sets its price equal to
pi =
ε i
ε i − 1λi,
where λi is its marginal cost. Let µi denote the reciprocal of the markup of industry i.
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Cost minimization by the firm implies that
wli = αiλiyi = αiµi piyi,
and
pjxij = ωijλiyi = ωijµi piyi.
Denote the sales of industry i by si. Then market clearing for industry i’s goods implies
s′ = H + G + s′µdiag(1− α)Ω = β′(H + G) + s′µΩˆ,
where µ is a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is µi. This implies that
s′ = (H + G)′(I − µΩˆ)−1α.
Market clearing for labor implies that
wl = s′α = (H + G)′(I − µΩˆ)−1α.
The network-adjusted labor intensities are now given by
α˜ = (I − µΩˆ)−1α.
Labor supply is the same as before
l =
(
wl
PC
) 1
θ
.
Combining these two equations we get that equilibrium employment must equal
l =
(
(H + G)′α˜P
) 1
θ .
It is easy to verify that this model behaves in the same way as the benchmark model in
section 1.3.
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A.5 Appendix V: Sticky Prices
In this section, I sketch how the basic intuition of the case with sticky wages can be extended
to sticky prices, as long as labor (and not capital) is the factor that falls during the recession.
Let household utility be given by
∑
t
ρt
[
(1− λ) log(ct)− l
θ
t
θ
+ λ log(Gt)
]
, λ ∈ (0, 1)
where
ct =∑
k
(ct,k)
βk ,
is private consumption, and
Gt =∏
i
gφiit .
is government consumption services. We maintain the assumption that ∑k βk = 1. House-
hold’s budget is
∑
k
pt,kct,k + Bt = (wtlt + rtKt) + (1+ it−1)Bt−1 +Πt − τt,
where pt,k is the price of good k in time t. Nominal government bonds are Bt and Πt is firm
profits in period t. The nominal net interest rate on debt is it. The household receives labor
income wtlt and capital income rtKt. Households are endowed with an exogenous amount
of capital, and both the wage and the rental rate of capital are flexible. Finally, savers face
lump sum taxes τt.
Suppose that each industry consists of a fraction ξ of firms who set their prices ever
period and 1− ξ whose prices are pre-determined. The production function of firms in
industry i are given by
yit = (lit)αi k
ηi
it ∏ x
(1−αi−ηi)ωij
ijt .
I assume that demand for goods from industry i are a CES bundle of goods from the firms
with pre-determined prices and firms with flexible prices.
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A.5.1 Discount Factor Shock
Suppose that there is an unexpected discount factor shock so that for the next period, ρ∗ > 1.
I analyze the government’s fiscal policy without commitment when interest rates are at the
zero lower bound.
Proposition A.5.1. The relative employment multiplier of government spending satisfies
dl/dδi
dl/dδi
=
α˜i − δ′α˜
α˜j − δ′α˜ . (A.41)
Proof. As before, the Euler equation pins down current household expenditures to be
PtCt =
PC
ρ∗
.
Labor supply then implies that
lθ−1t =
wtρ∗
PC
.
Furthermore, combining labor supply and labor demand implies that the equilibrium wage
is given by
wt =
((
β′
PC
ρ∗
+ δ′τ
)
α˜
) θ−1
θ
(PC)θ .
Define government expenditure shares on industry i to be
δi
∑k δk
,
where we assume that ∑k δk = 1. Now Implicitly differentiate equilibrium employment with
respect to δi evaluated at ∑k δk = 1 to get
(θ − 1)PC
ρ∗
lθ−2
dl
dδi
=
θ − 1
θ
(wtlt)−
1
θ
(
PC
)θ
τ(α˜i − δ′α˜).
Divide this expression through by its counterpart for δj to get the desired result. 
Proposition A.5.1 shows that the government multipliers behave much in the same way
with sticky prices and elastic labor supply as with sticky wages and inelastic labor supply.
Welfare analysis in this context is considerably less clean however, since unlike the case
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with downward sticky wages, in this case, the efficient level of employment depends on the
marginal utility of consumption, so there is no “employment-targeting”.
Proposition A.5.2. The optimal share of expenditures by the government in industry i relative to
industry j satisfies
δi
δj
=
φi
φj
const− α˜j
const− α˜i , (A.42)
where const > 1 . So the government tilts spending according to network-adjusted labor intensities.
Proof. As before, the Euler equation pins down current household expenditures to be
PtCt =
PC
ρ∗
.
Therefore current consumption is
Ct =
PC
ρ∗
1
Pt
.
Using the above expression for household consumption, the government’s optimization
problem in period t can be written as
max
1
ε− 1∑i
(βi + 1) log(ξp∗it + (1− ξ)pit) + λ∑
i
φ log(δi) + λ log(τt)− l
θ
t
θ
,
subject to
p∗it = ciw
α˜i
t r
η˜i
t , for each i
lθ−1t = ρ
∗ wt
PC
,
wt =
((
β′
PC
ρ∗
+ δ′τ
)
α˜
) θ−1
θ
(PC)θ ,
rt = β′η˜ + δ′η˜
τ
k
,
1 =∑
i
δi.
The first order conditions for this can be written as
δj
δi
=
φj
φi
const− α˜i
const− α˜j ,
182
where
const = − µ4τt/k + µ5
µ3
θ−1
θ (wl)
−1/θ − µ4τt/k
,
where µk is the lagrange multiplier corresponding to the kth constraint. The term µ4τt/k
captures the scarcity of capital, while the term µ3 θ−1θ (wl)
−1/θ captures the scarcity of labor.

A.6 Appendix VI: Tables and Graphs
Table A.1: Cumulative changes to each component of labor share from 1996-2009. Rows represent the different
countries in the sample. Columns 1-4 show the fraction of change in the labor share for low-skilled labor
attributable to each component. The fifth column gives the change in the labor share for low-skilled labor.
The columns 6-9 show the fraction of change in the labor share for medium-skilled labor attributable to each
component. The tenth column gives the change in the labor share for medium-skilled labor. Columns 11-14
show the fraction of change in the labor share for high-skilled labor attributable to each component. The final
column gives the change in the labor share for high-skilled labor.
cons supply labor lowskill total change lowskill cons supply labor medskill total change medskill cons supply labor highskill total change highskill
AUS 0.142 0.128 -0.014 0.745 -0.055 4.232 1.019 0.524 -4.774 -0.002 0.074 0.046 -0.043 0.924 0.036
AUT 0.100 -0.038 0.207 0.731 -0.038 0.235 -0.226 0.734 0.257 -0.050 -0.056 0.248 -0.234 1.042 0.039
BEL 0.040 -0.024 0.107 0.877 -0.078 0.109 0.072 -0.296 1.115 0.033 0.208 0.106 -0.036 0.721 0.043
BGR 0.339 0.145 0.054 0.462 -0.069 0.201 0.383 -0.210 0.625 0.020 0.213 0.294 -0.124 0.618 0.031
BRA 0.030 -0.039 0.032 0.977 -0.052 -0.079 0.056 0.105 0.918 0.019 -0.069 -0.044 -0.033 1.146 0.029
CAN 0.013 -0.022 0.091 0.918 -0.011 -0.126 -0.647 0.786 0.987 -0.028 0.068 0.186 -0.192 0.938 0.040
CZE 0.423 0.566 -2.379 2.391 -0.003 -0.405 -0.200 1.949 -0.343 0.047 -0.058 0.107 0.542 0.409 0.056
DEU 0.116 0.132 0.243 0.509 -0.016 0.138 0.102 0.319 0.440 -0.066 -0.111 0.098 -0.225 1.239 0.030
DNK -0.425 0.098 0.366 0.960 0.013 0.248 -0.065 -0.150 0.967 -0.055 0.105 0.184 0.023 0.688 0.058
ESP 0.025 -0.012 0.172 0.815 -0.113 0.097 0.037 -0.584 1.449 0.024 0.223 0.228 -0.860 1.409 0.040
EST -0.567 -0.001 0.756 0.812 0.009 -1.033 0.013 1.481 0.540 0.017 0.453 0.564 0.770 -0.787 0.020
FIN 0.054 -0.100 0.146 0.900 -0.060 -0.914 2.916 -3.186 2.184 0.004 0.060 0.278 -0.199 0.860 0.052
FRA 0.007 0.023 0.080 0.890 -0.060 2.209 0.886 5.022 -7.118 -0.001 -0.060 0.131 0.012 0.916 0.048
GBR 0.047 0.021 -0.086 1.018 -0.069 -0.704 -0.352 1.707 0.349 0.007 0.099 0.100 0.029 0.771 0.088
GRC 0.322 0.512 -0.860 1.026 -0.059 -0.146 -0.242 0.661 0.728 0.052 0.229 -0.080 0.501 0.351 0.066
HUN 0.228 0.188 0.083 0.500 -0.036 0.326 0.272 0.144 0.258 -0.079 -0.346 -0.086 0.210 1.223 0.031
IND 0.264 0.199 0.181 0.355 -0.074 0.086 0.345 0.264 0.305 -0.026 0.400 -0.104 -0.523 1.228 0.028
IRL 0.228 0.163 -0.111 0.720 -0.079 0.446 0.372 -0.129 0.310 -0.040 0.162 -0.103 0.033 0.908 0.076
ITA 0.086 -0.013 0.070 0.857 -0.114 -0.096 0.201 -0.184 1.079 0.059 0.099 0.192 -0.093 0.802 0.042
JPN 0.122 0.033 0.062 0.784 -0.044 0.331 -0.020 0.508 0.181 -0.045 -0.117 0.173 -0.375 1.319 0.032
KOR 0.146 -0.080 0.159 0.776 -0.075 0.218 -0.127 0.566 0.343 -0.087 -0.210 0.482 -2.882 3.609 0.024
LTU 2.320 2.251 -3.948 0.376 -0.003 -5.861 -5.846 14.188 -1.480 0.004 0.138 0.003 0.726 0.134 0.054
MEX -0.009 0.106 0.166 0.737 -0.028 0.197 -0.131 -0.641 1.575 0.023 -0.492 0.100 0.319 1.073 -0.014
NLD 0.175 -0.011 0.063 0.772 -0.040 0.047 -0.082 0.212 0.823 -0.039 0.132 0.058 -0.066 0.877 0.072
POL 0.273 0.290 0.250 0.187 -0.123 0.224 0.257 0.422 0.097 -0.330 -0.258 -0.113 -1.358 2.730 0.020
PRT 0.521 0.105 -0.600 0.974 -0.045 0.159 0.133 0.003 0.706 0.026 0.261 0.094 0.057 0.588 0.045
ROU 2.388 1.658 -3.950 0.904 -0.039 0.096 -0.179 0.272 0.811 0.020 0.307 0.025 0.134 0.534 0.035
RUS 0.107 -0.008 0.147 0.754 -0.014 -0.099 -1.336 2.057 0.379 -0.018 0.261 0.417 -0.031 0.352 0.049
SVK 0.106 0.199 -0.074 0.769 -0.010 1.317 1.905 -2.862 0.640 -0.011 -0.052 -0.019 0.424 0.646 0.023
SVN 0.272 0.171 0.218 0.339 -0.052 0.196 0.134 0.347 0.323 -0.072 0.099 0.016 0.054 0.832 0.049
SWE 0.028 0.061 0.094 0.816 -0.050 -0.013 0.141 0.498 0.374 -0.035 -0.035 0.041 -0.175 1.168 0.046
TUR 0.939 -0.851 -0.337 1.249 -0.033 0.101 0.497 -0.174 0.577 0.026 0.467 0.244 -0.304 0.593 0.043
TWN 0.165 0.043 0.235 0.557 -0.098 0.355 -0.108 0.717 0.036 -0.028 -0.175 0.141 -0.532 1.567 0.036
USA 0.175 0.159 -0.055 0.721 -0.013 0.137 0.221 0.001 0.641 -0.055 0.156 0.009 -0.042 0.878 0.051
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Figure A.2: Evolution of the labor share over time for the US using the WIOD.
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Change in Manufacturing value−added labor share
 
 
Composition of value−added
value−added labor share
Figure A.3: Evolution of labor use by the manufacturing industries of the US using the WIOD data from 1995-2009.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 2
B.1 Appendix I: Proofs
Lemma B.1.1. Demand for firm i in industry k’s output is
y(k, i) = c(k, i) +∑
l
∫ Ml
x(l, j, k, i)dj,
= βk
(
p(k, i)
pk
)−εk ( pk
pc
)−σ
C +∑
l
Mlωlk
(
p(k, i)
pk
)−εk ( pk
λl
)−σ
y(l, j).
Proof. Cost minimization by each firm implies firm j in industry l’s demand for inputs from
firm i in industry k is given by
x(l, j, k, i) = ωlk
(
p(k, i)
pk
)−εk ( pk
λl
)−σ
y(l, j),
where λl is the marginal cost of firms in industry l,
λk =
(
αkzσ−1k w
1−σ +∑
l
ωkl p1−σl
) 1
1−σ
,
and pk is the price index for industry k
pk =
(∫ Mk
p(k, i)1−εk di
) 1
1−εk
.
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Household demand for goods from firm i in industry k are
c(k, i) = βk
(
p(k, i)
pk
)−εk ( pk
Pc
)−σ
C,
where Pc is the consumer price index
Pc =
(
∑
k
βk p1−σk
) 1
1−σ
.
Adding the household and firm’s demands together gives the result. 
Proof of lemma 2.3.1. By lemma B.1.1
y(k, i) = βk p(k, i)εk p
εk−σ
k p
σ
c C +∑
l
Ml p(k, i)εk p
εk−σ
k λ
σ
l ωlky(l, j).
Substitute pk = M
1
1−εk
k p(k, i) to get
M
εk
εk−1 pσk y(k, i) = βk p
σ
c C +∑
l
Mlλσl ωlky(l, j).
Observe that
yk =
(∫ Mk
y(k, i)
εk−1
εk di
) εk
εk−1
= M
εk
εk−1
k y(k, i).
Substitute this into the previous equation to get
pσk yk = βkP
σ
c C +∑ωlk M
σ−1
εl−1
l
(
ε l
ε l − 1
)−σ
pσl yl .
Define M˜ to be the diagonal matrix whose kth diagonal element is M
1
εk−1
k , and µ to be
the diagonal matrix whose kth element is industry k’s markup εk/(εk − 1). Now denote
sk = pσk yk. This means that we can write
s′ = β′Pσc C + s′M˜σ−1µ−σΩ.
Rewrite this to get
s′ = β′(I − M˜σ−1µ−σΩ)−1Pσc C
= β˜′Pσc C.
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Proof of lemma 2.3.2. Since all firms have constant returns to scale on the margin, firm i’s
problem in industry k, conditional on entry, can be written as
max p(k, i)y(k, i)− λky(k, i),
where, by lemma B.1.1,
y(k, i) = constk p(k, i)−εk ,
because the firm does not internalize its effects on the aggregate price indices. This
optimization problem gives
p(k, i) =
εk
εk − 1λk.
So, as in standard monopolistic competition models, markups are constant.
Note that
pk =
(
εk
εk − 1
)
M
1
1−εk
k λk.
Substituting this into the definition of λk we get
(
εk − 1
εk
)
M
1
εk−1
k pk =
(
αkw1−σ +∑
l
ωkl p1−σl
) 1
1−σ
.
A column vector an exponent denotes element-wise exponentiation. Then if we let P be the
vector of p1−σk and α the vector of αk, then this system of equations can be written as
µσ−1M˜1−σP = αw1−σ +ΩP.
We can rearrange this to get
P = µ1−σM˜σ−1αw1−σ + µ1−σM˜σ−1ΩP.
Rearrange this to get
P = (I − µ1−σM˜σ−1Ω)−1µ1−σM˜σ−1αw1−σ = α˜w1−σ.
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This implies that for each industry k (
pk
wk
)1−σ
= α˜k.

Proof of theorem 2.3.3. Note that the profits of firm i in industry k are
pi(k, i) = p(k, i)y(k, i)− λky(k, i)− w fk.
This is equivalent to
pi(k, i) = p(k, i)y(k, i)− εk − 1
εk
p(k, i)y(k, i)− w fk,
=
1
εk
p(k, i)y(k, i)− w fk.
Since all active firms in industry k are identical this is
pi(k, i) =
1
εk Mk
pkyk − w fk.
By lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2,
pkyk = pσk yk p
1−σ = β˜kα˜kPσc Cw1−σ,
and so
pi(k, i) =
1
εk Mk
β˜kα˜kPσc Cw
1−σ − w fk.

Proof of proposition 2.4.1. Note that real GDP can be written as
C =
PcC
Pc
=
wl + pi
Pc
,
where pi is total profits. By free entry, profits are zero in equilibrium. Normalize w = 1.
Then
log(C) = − log(Pc).
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The marginal costs of firms in industry k are given by
λk =
( zk
w
)−αk
∏
l
pωkll .
Since industries are perfectly competitive, firms set prices equal to their marginal costs. Let
P denote the vector of industry prices. Then, in equilibrium,
log(P) = (I −Ω)−1 (α ◦ (log(w)− log(z))) .
Therefore,
log(C) = − log(Pc),
= −β′ log(P),
= −β′(I −Ω)−1 (−α ◦ log(z)) ,
= β˜′α ◦ log(z).
Note that β˜ is sales as a share of GDP, and β˜kαk is therefore industry k’s wage bill as a share
of GDP. 
Proof of proposition 2.4.3. Note that industry k’s sales are given by
pkyk = pσk yk p
1−σ = β˜kα˜kPσc Cw1−σ.
Observe that in equilibrium with no shocks,
α˜ = (I −Ω)−1α = 1.
Therefore,
pkyk = β˜kPσc Cw
1−σ.
So an industry’s shares of sales relative to other industries is determined solely by β˜k. 
Proof of theorem 2.4.5. Real consumption is given by
wl + pi
Pc
=
1
Pc
.
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We have shown that
Pc =
(
β′(I −Ω)−1α
) 1
1−σ
.
Let β˜′ = β′(I −Ω)−1 to get the desired result. 
Proof of proposition 2.4.7. The sales of industry j are given by
β˜ je′jΨ
(
α ◦ zσ−1
)
Pσc C.
Therefore
d log(salesj)
dzσ−1i
=
1
β˜ j
dβ˜ j
dzσ−1i
+
1
α˜j
de′jΨ
(
α ◦ zσ−1)
dzσ−1i
+
1
Pσc C
dPσc C
dzσ−1i
,
= 0+
1
α˜j
de′jΨ
(
α ◦ zσ−1)
dzσ−1i
+
1
Pσc C
dPσc C
dzσ−1i
.
Note that
dΨ
(
α ◦ zσ−1)
dzσ−1i
∣∣∣∣∣
z=1
= Ψ
d
(
α ◦ zσ−1)
dzσ−1i
∣∣∣∣∣
z=1
= Ψαiei.
Substitute this in to get
d log(salesj)
dzσ−1i
= e′jΨαiei +
1
Pσc C
dPσc C
dzσ−1i
,
where we use the fact that α˜ = 1. This means that
d log(salesi)
dzσ−1i
− d log(salesj)
dzσ−1i
= αi
(
e′iΨei − e′jΨei
)
,
as required. Lemma 2.4.6 then implies that this is always greater than zero. 
Proof of proposition 2.4.8. By theorem 2.3.3,
∑
k
pik =
β˜′
ε
α˜PcC− 1′M f ,
where division by ε is elementwise. Observe that
PcC = (1+∑
k
pik).
190
Therefore,
∑
k
pik =
(
β˜′
ε
α˜− 1′M f
)
1
1− β˜′ε α˜
.
Therefore, nominal GDP
PcC = 1+
(
β˜′
ε
α˜− 1′M f
)
1
1− β˜′ε α˜
,
does not respond to shocks. Therefore, real GDP is given by
log(C) = const− log(Pc).
Since
log(Pc) = −β′(I −Ω)−1 (α ◦ log(z)) + const,
we can write
log(C) = const+ β′(I −Ω)−1 (α ◦ log(z)) .

Proof of proposition 2.4.9.
∑
k
pik =
β˜′
ε
α˜Pσc C− 1′M f ,
where division by ε is elementwise. Observe that
Pσc C = PcCP
σ−1 =
(1+∑k pik)
β′α˜
.
Combine these two expressions to get the desired result. 
Proof of proposition 2.4.10. Using the same argument as in the proof of proposition 2.4.7, we
can show that Substitute this in to get
d log(salesj)
dzσ−1i
=
1
α˜j
e′jΨαiei +
1
Pσc C
dPσc C
dzσ−1i
,
This means that
d log(salesi)
dzσ−1i
− d log(salesj)
dzσ−1i
= αi
(
e′iΨei
α˜j
−
e′jΨei
α˜j
)
,
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as required. Lemma 2.4.6 then implies that this is always greater than zero. 
Proof of proposition 2.5.1. Note that real GDP can be written as
C =
PcC
Pc
=
wl + pi
Pc
,
where pi is total profits. By free entry, profits are zero in equilibrium. Normalize w = 1.
Then
log(C) = − log(Pc).
The marginal costs of firms in industry k are given by
λk =
(αkzk
w
)−αk
∏
l
(
ωkl
pl
)−ωkl
,
substitute
λk = M
1
εk−1
k
εk − 1
εk
pk,
and let P denote the vector of industry prices. Then, in equilibrium,
log(P) = (I −Ω)−1 (−α ◦ log(z) + log(µ1)− log(M˜1)) .
Free entry implies that
M˜k =
(
β˜kPcC
fkεk
) 1
εk−1
.
Substituting this in to M˜ and combining with the fact that
log(Pc) = β′ log(P),
gives
log(C) = − log(Pc) = β˜′α ◦ log(z)−∑
k
1
εk − 1 β˜k log( fk) + const,
where
const = β˜′
(
log(µ1) +
1
ε− 1 ◦ log(β˜)− log(ε)
)
.
In the above expression 1/(ε− 1) is the vector of 1/(εk− 1). By lemma 2.3.1, β˜ is proportional
to the sales vector and nominal GDP is always equal to 1, we have the desired result. 
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Proof of lemma 2.5.2. Recall that
β˜′ = β′(I − M˜σ−1µ−σΩ)−1.
So
dβ˜′
d log(Mi)
= Mi
dβ˜′
dMi
,
= −Miβ′Ψs d(I − M˜
σ−1µ−σΩ)
dMi
Ψs,
= Miβ′Ψs
dM˜σ−1
dMi
µ−σΩΨs,
= Miβ′Ψs
dM˜σ−1
dMi
M˜σ−1M˜1−σµ−σΩΨs,
= Miβ′Ψs
dM˜σ−1
dMi
M˜σ−1(Ψs − I),
The kth element of this vector is
dβ˜k
d log(Mi)
=
σ− 1
ε i − 1 β˜i(Ψs − I)ek.
Putting this all into a matrix gives
dβ˜′
d log(M)
= diag(β˜)diag
(
σ− 1
ε− 1
)
(Ψs − I).

Proof of lemma 2.5.3. Recall that
α˜ = (I − M˜σ−1µ1−σΩ)−1M˜σ−1µ1−σα.
To simplify the notation, for this proof, let
B = (I − M˜σ−1µ1−σΩ)−1.
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So
1
Mi
dα˜
d log(Mi)
=
dα˜
dMi
,
= B
dM˜σ−1
dMi
µ1−σα+ B
d(M˜σ−1)
dMi
(
M˜σ−1
)−1
(M˜σ−1)µ1−σΩB(M˜σ−1)µ1−σα,
= B
dM˜σ−1
dMi
µ1−σα+ B
d(M˜σ−1)
dMi
(
M˜σ−1
)−1
(B− I)(M˜σ−1)µ1−σα,
= B
d(M˜σ−1)
dMi
(
M˜σ−1
)−1
B(M˜σ−1)µ1−σα,
= B
d(M˜σ−1)
dMi
(
M˜σ−1
)−1
α˜,
= Ψd
(
M˜
)1−σ
µσ−1
d(M˜σ−1)
dMi
(
M˜σ−1
)−1
α˜,
The kth element of this vector is
dα˜k
d log(Mi)
=
(
σ− 1
ε i − 1
)(
ε i
ε i − 1
)σ−1
e′kΨdeiα˜i
1
Mσi
.
Putting this all into a matrix gives
dα˜
dM
= Ψddiag(α˜)µσ−1diag(M)1−σdiag
(
σ− 1
ε− 1
)
.

Proof of proposition 2.5.4. Note that
Mi =
β˜iα˜i
ε i fi
Pσc C.
Therefore,
d log(M)
dαi
= M1
dPσc C/dαi
Pσc C
+Mdiag(β˜)−1
dβ˜
dM
dM
dαi
+Mdiag(α˜)−1
dα˜
dM
dM
dαi
+Mdiag(α˜)−1Ψdei.
Rewrite this as
d log(M)
dαi
= M1
dPσc C/dαi
Pσc C
+ M
(
diag(β˜)−1Ψ1 + diag(α˜)−1Ψ2
) dM
dαi
+ Mdiag(α˜)−1Ψdei.
Rearrange this to get the desired result. 
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Proof of proposition 2.5.6. Note that
C =
PcC
Pc
=
1+∑k pik
Pc
=
(
1
β′Ψd(α ◦ zσ−1)
) 1
1−σ
.
Therefore,
d log(C)
dzi
=
1
σ− 1
d
(
log
(
β′Ψd(α ◦ zσ−1)
))
dzi
,
=
1
σ− 1
1
β′α˜
β′
∂α˜
∂M
∂M
∂zi
+ β′Ψd
d(α ◦ zσ−1)
dzi
,
by lemma 2.5.3 and proposition 2.5.4,
=
1
σ− 1
1
β′α˜
β′Ψ2MM−1(I −Λ)−1
(
1
dPσc C/dzi
Pσc C
+ diag(α˜)−1Ψdei
)
+
1
β′α˜
β′Ψdeiαizσ−2i .
Note that
dPσc C/dzi
Pσc C
=
d log(Pσc C)
dzi
= −(σ− 1)d log(C)
dzi
.
Substituting this into the previous expression and rearranging gives(
1+
β′Ψ2(I −Λ)−11
β′α˜
)
d log(C)
dzi
=
1
β′α˜
(
β′Ψ2(I −Λ)−1
(
diag(α˜)−1 + I
)
Ψdei
)
αizσ−2i .
Rearranging this gives the desired result.

Proof of proposition 2.5.7. Let s be the sales of the representative firm in each industry. Then
d log(s)
dα
=
d
dα
(
log(β˜) + log(α˜)− log(M))+ d
dα
log(Pσc C).
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By the chain rule,
d log(s)
dα
=
(
diag(β˜)−1
dβ˜
dM
+ diag(α˜)−1
dα˜
dM
− diag(M)−1
)
dM
dα
+ diag(α˜)−1Ψdek +
d
dα
log(Pσc C),
=
(
diag(β˜)−1Ψ′1diag(M)
−1 + diag(α˜)−1Ψ2diag(M)−1 − diag(M)−1
) dM
dα
+ diag(α˜)−1Ψdek +
d
dα
log(Pσc C),
=
(
diag(β˜)−1Ψ′1 + diag(α˜)
−1Ψ2 − I
)
diag(M)−1
dM
dα
+ diag(α˜)−1Ψdek +
d
dα
log(Pσc C),
=
[(
diag(β˜)−1Ψ′1 + diag(α˜)
−1Ψ2 − I
)
diag(M)−1diag(M)
(
I − diag(β˜)−1Ψ′1
−diag(α˜)−1Ψ2
)−1
+ I
]
diag(α˜)−1Ψdek +
d
dα
log(Pσc C),
= 0,
where the second to last line uses proposition 2.5.4. 
Proof of proposition 2.5.8. Let s be the sales of the industries. Then
d log(s)
dα
=
d
dα
(
log(β˜) + log(α˜) + log(Pσc C)
)
.
By the chain rule,
d log(s)
dα
=
(
diag(β˜)−1
dβ˜
dM
+ diag(α˜)−1
dα˜
dM
)
dM
dα
+ diag(α˜)−1Ψdek +
d
dα
log(Pσc C),
=
(
diag(β˜)−1Ψ′1diag(M)
−1 + diag(α˜)−1Ψ2diag(M)−1
) dM
dα
+ diag(α˜)−1Ψdek +
d
dα
log(Pσc C),
=
[
Λdiag(M)−1diag(M)(I −Λ)−1 + I
] [
diag(α˜)−1Ψdek +
d
dα
log(Pσc C)
]
,
= (I −Λ)−1
[
diag(α˜)−1Ψdek +
d
dα
log(Pσc C)
]
,
which gives the desired result. Note that the second to last line of the derivation uses
proposition 2.5.4, and the last line uses the fact that
Λ(I −Λ)−1 + I = (I −Λ)−1.

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Proof of lemma 2.6.1. Element (u, v) of both Ψd and Ψs are a weighted sum of the number of
directed walks from u to v. If u and v are not connected, then this is always equal to zero.
Similarly, element (v, u) of both Ψs and Ψd must also be equal to zero.
Element (u, k) of both Ψd and Ψs are weighted sums of the number of directed walks
from u to k. If u is not connected to v, then no walk from u to k goes through v, therefore
the (u, k)th element of Ψd and Ψs do not depend on v. A similar argument implies that the
(k, u)th element of Ψs and Ψd also do not depend on u.
Since β˜u and α˜u are linear combinations of the uth column and row of Ψ1 and Ψ2, and
since the (u, v) and (v, u)th elements of Ψd and Ψs are equal to zero, and the (k, u) and
(u, k)th elements of Ψs and Ψd do not depend on v, then β˜u and α˜u also do not depend on
v. 
Proof of theorem 2.6.2. Consider a firm i ∈ B. Suppose that the failure of v results in an
equilibrium where firms in the set C fail. If i is not connected to any firms in C, then by
lemma 2.6.1, α˜i and β˜i are the same regardless of whether or not v is rescued. Since the
profits of firm i can be expressed as
pii = const Pεc C
(
α˜i × β˜i
)
,
if firm i prefers for v to be rescued, it must be that the exit of v causes Pεc C to fall. Note that
exits can only cause Pεc to increase, so if Pεc C falls, it must be that C has fallen. Since C is the
utility of the household, it follows that rescuing v must be Pareto-efficient.
Now suppose that two firms i and j in B disagree. In particular, i does not want v
rescued but j does. Then it must be the case that Pεc C is not falling, but either of α˜j or β˜ j has
fallen – this will occur if and only if some firm in C is connected to firm j. 
Proof of proposition 2.5.11. By theorem 2.3.3, the profits of industry i are
pii =
βiαi
fiε i
Pσc C,
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when Ω = 0. Therefore
dpii
dMj
=
βiα˜i
fiε i
dPσc C
dMj
.
We can write
Pσc C =
1−M′ f
β′α˜− diag(ε)−1β′α˜ .
Hence,
dPσc C
dMj
=
− f j
β′α˜− diag(ε)−1β′α˜ −
1−M′ f
β′α˜− diag(ε)−1β′α˜ βi(1− 1/ε i)
σ− 1
ε i − 1 M
σ−εi
εi−1
i µ
σ−1
i αi.
Since σ > 1, both of these terms are negative and industries can only be enemies. 
Proof of proposition 2.5.13. Let pi(M) be the vector industrial profits with mass of entrants
M. Note that an equilibrium of the continuous limit corresponds to M(0) such that
pi(M(0)) = 0. Let M(∆) correspond to the equilibrium mass of entrants for some ∆  0.
Then pi(M(∆)) ≥ 0. By the mean-value inequality
‖pi(M(∆))‖ = ‖pi(M(∆))− pi(M(0))‖ ≤ ‖Dpi(M∗)‖‖M(∆)−M(0)‖,
where M∗ is in the convex hull of M(0) and M(∆). Rearrange this expression to get the
desired result. 
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